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ABSTRACT  
 
John L. Lovett Jr.: Individual Members of Congress and Policy Change: The Use of Issue 
Salience as Subsidy. 
(Under the direction of Frank R. Baumgartner) 
 
 How do individual members of Congress change public policy?  While some members use 
the standard practice of climbing to the top of a committee to change policy, this avenue can only be 
used by a select number of members on any given policy.  Yet, members of Congress outside of the 
normal committee control system have in the past shift public policy by taking power away from 
committee leaders.  How has this happened?  I argue that members of Congress use changes in issue 
salience as a subsidy, a cheap form of information that helps members make policy decisions.  
Members use increased salience on an issue area to engage in that issue in media, pushing policy 
leaders who would normally avoid media involvement on owned issues.  Using an original dataset of 
articles in The Washington Post on 10 issues between the years 1977 and 2012, I explore the question 
of member engagement and issue salience.  I find that when average salience is generally low, 
members of Congress use increases in issue salience to push for policy change, and that these 
increases can lead to shifts in public policy.  At a high average level of salience, members must 
instead bring the media to them by cultivating interest, as all members already have a sense of the 
importance of the issue.  The work here further explores the larger question of how individual 
members of Congress change public policy and also highlights the back and forth relationship 
between the Congress and the political media.  
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Chapter 1: A Theory of Issue Salience as Member Subsidy 
Introduction  
How does an individual member of Congress change public policy, and when do they try 
to change policy?  We know that some members succeed through being what multiple scholars 
have called “work horses” (Cook 1986; Ornstein 1983; Ranney 1979), working tirelessly through 
the system, climbing up until finally holding the committee chair or subcommittee chair position 
that will allow a member to begin working on reshaping public policy on their issue of choice.   
While a path for some, committee control is only open to a select few individuals.  While some 
members may eventually expect to obtain a leadership post, members will have preferences in 
other issue areas that cannot be realized from their leadership positions.  Even when a member 
succeeds at getting their desired chair, policy change is still not a certainty, as party leaders, 
other committee chairs, and other members of Congress may intrude on their turf in the name of 
wanting to protect the status quo policy or reshape policy in a direction contrary to the chair’s 
desire.  In general, the work horse path is a long, hard slog toward probable, but not guaranteed, 
results.  
At the same time, members of Congress do succeed at changing public policy from 
outside of the committee system.  In 1982, a coalition of lawmakers led by Congressman Edward 
Markey of Massachusetts used legislation to attempt to enact a nuclear freeze, a measure that 
would call for the United States to negotiate a freeze on the production of nuclear weapons with 
the Soviet Union.  Markey and his coalition had no policy leadership credentials on the question 
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of nuclear weapons, yet their bill eventually passed the House and negotiations for a nuclear 
freeze would eventually be built into United States/Soviet relations.  Members of Congress can 
influence issues that they may not necessarily control.  The question I ask then is: when do we 
see members act, and under what conditions do members without policy control actually change 
public policy?     
Keeping all of these issues in mind, to understand when individual members of Congress 
change public policy we need to understand how members of Congress use attention to issues.  I 
argue that members of Congress use changes in salience on specific issues as a subsidy (Hall and 
Deardorff 2006), acting on increases in media interest in an issue in order to maximize the 
possibility of policy change.  The effect of salience varies by the average coverage an issue 
receives: when salience increases on issues with normally lower average salience (an article a 
day or less), members of Congress will react to the increase by engaging in the issue.  When 
salience is on average high (on average more than an article a day), members will instead have to 
carve out their own niche in salience in order to cut through the large amount of coverage 
already present on an issue.  Regardless of the level of salience, the final goal of members is to 
change public policy by weakening the power of policy leaders.  Policy leaders (those members 
of Congress who hold formal control over an issue area) find their control of policy weakened 
when more members of Congress are involved, giving non-leaders an opportunity to potentially 
change public policy or block leaders from making major shifts in public policy, depending on 
the desire of non-leader members.    
My goals in this dissertation are threefold: first, to explore the role issue salience plays in 
the considerations of members of Congress in terms of issue engagement, second expand upon 
our understanding of the relationship between members of Congress and the political media, and 
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third to show how the relationship between members of Congress and the media contributes to 
the changing of American public policy.  Each of my goals relate to the larger question of how 
members of Congress use the media in attempting to change public policy.  The relationship 
between the two groups will guide much of the rest of this work, as members of Congress use 
changes in media to maximize engagement. 
In the rest of this chapter, I outline my theory of the use of issue salience as a subsidy, 
looking at how increases in salience lead to more member involvement in an issue and the 
potential creation of public policy. I start by exploring what we already know about members of 
Congress and their use of subsidies, offering a series of assumptions I make on how members of 
Congress do their job and their relationship with the political media.  After this, I outline my 
larger theory of subsidies, differentiating my theory from Hall and Deardorff (2006), as political 
lobbying and issue salience are based on different constructions that will differentiate how the 
two will work on members of Congress.  I then offer a series of expectations based on the 
previous discussion, focusing both on the role of non-leader and policy leader members of 
Congress and their potential for policy change.  I end the chapter by outlining the rest of the 
dissertation, giving focus to each of my subsequent chapters.  
Background on the Relationship between Members and Salience 
In order to understand how changes in issue salience can have an effect on member 
engagement, it is important to understand the various goals members of Congress have and how 
those may relate to their duties in regards to public policy.  In addition, it is important to 
understand the media’s role in this process, as they are the group central to creating the issue 
salience that drives its use as a subsidy.   
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Members of Congress and Issue Involvement 
First, we should understand what motivates Congressional behavior in general.  The 
classic assumption about members of Congress is that they are primarily geared toward re-
election (Mayhew 1974), and that their actions should guide them toward policies and plans that 
will ensure re-election. That said, there are other motivations for members as well, including the 
desire to create “good public policy” (Burgin 1991, 1995; Fenno 1978; Hall 1996), the desire for 
power within Congress or outside of the body through attaining a more powerful political office 
(Hibbing 1989; Fenno 1978; Rohde 1979; Schlesinger 1966), and potential district concerns 
(Arnold 1990; Browne and Paik 1997; Hall 1996; Harward and Moffett 2010). 
The varying motivations that guide members of Congress also guide their involvement in 
issue areas. For those interested in creating good policy or district-related issues, engagement 
into an issue area is paramount to success, since members must be involved in order to ensure 
that their preferred outcome on policy is either achieved or protected. For those interested in 
upward mobility or re-election, policy is less about winning on the issue and more about 
exposure. By engaging in an issue, an ambitious member can market both the issue and 
themselves, with a particular eye toward moving up politically.   
While issue involvement may be based on these goals, this is not to say that members are 
strictly motivated by one goal or another.  In fact, the goals of good public policy and political 
ambition are not mutually exclusive.  Members of Congress may be guided by both the desire to 
create good public policy and the desire to reach higher political office, and see a specific issue 
area as a way to reach a member’s personal goals.  In addition, the motivation of members will 
vary from issue to issue: an individual member will likely choose involvement in one issue over 
another for a variety of reasons, from the lack of space on their own personal agenda to district 
concerns. Furthermore, good public policy involvement can also be good for an ambitious 
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politician, as issue involvement is part of the legislative activity members focus on when 
considering upward movement in Congress (Herrick 2001; Herrick and Moore 1993; Herrick, 
Moore, and Hibbing 1994; Victor 2011).  
We know then that members of Congress want to become involved in issues based on 
their goals, but what might motivate members to become involved?  Issue salience provides an 
answer, cueing members of Congress to the importance of a single issue and motivating 
members to become involved in a highly salient issue. 
Issue Salience 
What role does salience play in the promotion and discussion of issues? We know that 
there is limited space within both the media and political agendas. As Jones and Baumgartner 
(2005) point out, information is processed disproportionately, as there is simply not enough room 
on the agenda to deal with every issue at the same time.  In addition, the media agenda tends to 
move in more fitful bursts because of the lack of agenda space (Boydstun 2013). These attention-
based conditions then lead to variance of attention to specific issues at different times. Therefore, 
any issue could become highly salient, given the right time and circumstances.  
Why does salience matter? Increases in issue attention mean that more people know 
about the issue, in turn making the general public more informed on that specific issue. Page and 
Shapiro (1992, 11) argue that familiarity with issue information increases when that issue 
receives more coverage. Further, issues that receive more coverage in the national media (and in 
particular national TV news) are considered more salient to the public, while those that receive 
little coverage are in general ignored by the public (Iyengar and Kinder 1987).   From a public 
perspective, individuals are more likely to use political information when thinking about highly 
salient issues versus party cues (Ciuk and Yost 2016). Highly salient issues also have an effect 
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on the evaluation of presidents (Edwards, Mitchell, and Welch 1995) and media coverage of 
issues can affect the evaluation of policymakers in general (Iyengar 1991). Salience also affects 
the responsiveness of committee members to their non-committee brethren when it comes to 
issues (Fenno 1966; Maltzman 1995). In addition, salience, when interacted with the complexity 
of an issue, can determine whether politicians get involved in policy (Eshbaugh-Soha 2006; 
Gormley 1986).  It is apparent then that salience has many different effects on the political 
process.  
Salience can also alert individuals to an issue area they may have otherwise ignored. 
Central to this conception is E. E. Schattschneider’s (1975) conflict expansion theory. 
Schattschneider conceives of conflict expansion theory in terms of a fight: there are two sides, 
and one side is at an advantage.  The side that does not have an advantage will under normal 
circumstances be the losing side.  In order to increase their odds of victory, losers must find a 
way to take the advantage from winners.  Therefore, losers expand the conflict out to new people 
in an attempt to find people who may be sympathetic to their position, and who can then help 
them take away the advantage winners normally have in the conflict. 
We can apply conflict expansion to issue salience. Increases in story coverage mean that 
more individuals know about the issue in general. As a result, interested parties will know the 
stakes and the players, and having that information can help their side gain an advantage. This 
may mean that the currently winning side still wins, but it does give hope to the losers that there 
is a chance to usurp the winners through the recruitment of newly interested individuals.  Losers 
then have incentive to expand conflict, in an attempt to defeat winners.  Winners, on the other 
hand, should work to avoid expanding the conflict, as their power rests on a minimal number of 
people being involved.   
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While members who want to change the system should desire to increase salience, 
members of the policy leadership, as the current status quo on a subject, should attempt to 
minimize salience as much as possible.  Glazier and Boydstun (2013) find that as large-scale 
events (such as the Iraq War) persist over time, leadership framing on an issue begins to give 
way to other frames, decreasing leadership message control.  It is due to the loss of message 
control that salience is generally a negative proposition for leaders.  While the potential for what 
Baumgartner and Jones call “waves of enthusiasm” (2009, 84) (wherein the desire to create new 
systems drives increased attention), the potential for “waves of criticism,” and their destructive 
nature, will make leaders generally reticent about seeking media attention.  Therefore, 
challengers find increased salience of an issue helpful to their goals.  Salience increases on an 
issue, which in turn brings more political elites into a discussion.  The presence of more elites 
decreases the leadership message control.  Therefore, challengers should seek to find or create an 
increase in issue salience in an attempt to lessen the control policy leaders have over issues.  
Member Involvement in Issues and Cost of Engagement 
Issue salience can help us understand general involvement, however we know that all 
members of Congress are not involved in all issues at the same time.  So when do members of 
Congress actually become involved in a given issue?  From a general standpoint, we know that 
individual members of Congress become involved in issues when their individual interest in that 
issue is high and when the costs to get in are low (Hall 1996; Wawro 2000).  We know that 
members of Congress have limited resources to work with both formally between the 
combinations of the work they and their staffs can do (Salisbury and Shepsle 1981) and the 
limitations of the size of an individual policy agenda space (Jones and Baumgartner 2005).  
While members of Congress want to generally be involved in as many issues as possible, both 
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formal and informal constraints should cause members to focus on those areas with the lowest 
personal costs.  
The cost of involvement varies from both issue to issue and member to member. In 
general, many of these can be offset through the use of what Richard Hall and Alan Deardorff 
(2006) call legislative subsidies.  The legislative subsidy, according to Hall and Deardorff, is a 
“matching grant of costly policy information, political intelligence, and labor to the enterprises 
of strategically selected legislators” (69).  The subsidy is not meant to change minds, but rather 
help supplement the work already being done on issues by members of Congress by decreasing 
the costs of engagement.  Therefore, lobbying is directed primarily at those individuals who are 
most likely to support the issue position the interest group holds. By doing this, members are 
alerted to issues, and in turn, lead supportive members of Congress to lobby their peers and work 
toward the goals of the interest group.   
The Media versus Political Elites 
While we understand the roles the individual political actors play in issue policy, we also 
need to understand the role played by the group actually writing the stories that move members 
into the limelight.  The media in general, and the political media in particular, are guided by what 
James Hamilton (2004) refers to as the profit motive. Simply put, journalists’ stories are an 
economic good, and the goal is to maximize the use by the general public of that economic good. 
Hamilton shows that coverage of issues and events can be directed at specific groups in an 
attempt to get occasional consumers of the product to consume the product more (2004, 91-102).  
As a result, the media is attempting to increase its base, and will use coverage to do so.  
Relatedly, there is the question of who actually gets “in” when it comes to coverage from 
newspapers and media.  The answer here is multifaceted.  Most studies have shown a 
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relationship between leadership and media engagement in the United States (Arnold 2004, Cook 
1986, Kuklinski and Sigelman 1992, Schaffner and Sellers 2003, Sellers and Schaffner 2007, 
Squire 1988, Waismel-Manor and Tsfati 2011). Other studies have shown effects when members 
of Congress attempt to engage in what Vos (2014) calls “media work”, activities designed to 
attract journalists (Fogarty 2012). However, the effects of other variables beyond leadership and 
“media work” are more muddled.  Conducting a literature review of the state of member 
engagement in media, Vos (2014) finds general support in the literature for the leadership-based 
hypothesis and general support for the “media work” hypothesis, but varied support in other 
areas, such as gender, seniority, and party.  Therefore, we can assume that members of Congress 
could take one of two pathways to get themselves into media:  either climb the leadership ladder 
and reach the top, or do things that will lead the media to notice their activity.   
To become involved in issue areas in the media, members must have some relationship 
with the journalists who construct the stories in media.  While some view the news media as a 
distinctive institution with general independence from the pressures of political actors (Sparrow 
1999), others view Congress’ relationship with journalists more as a relationship between two 
groups seeking goods. Politicians seek publicity and journalists seek stories (Cook 1989; 2006), 
with politicians becoming, in the words of Timothy Cook, “coauthors of the news” (Cook 2006, 
162). Cook in particular connects the concepts of newsmaking and policy making, using the 
example of Senate press conferences and endorsements as not only newsmaking endeavors, but 
also cueing endeavors to construct policy (Cook 2006, see also Cook 1989). Further, others have 
found a relationship between journalists and House press secretaries, one that shapes the 
portrayal of members of Congress within the media (Gershon 2012).  
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 If members of Congress can be co-authors of the news, then members have the potential 
to influence not only the discussion of policy in the media, but when that policy discussion 
occurs.  Members interested in creating issue salience should be regularly involved in an issue, in 
an attempt to increase discussion of that issue.  For members interested in a more powerful 
office, engagement would be timed with the appearance of the issue in question at the front of 
the political agenda.  Recalling the earlier discussion of salience, leadership then will wait to 
become significantly involved until after an issue has achieved increased salience as leadership 
does not want to draw attention to an issue unless leadership engagement is required to keep 
control of the issue’s discussion in the media.  
Constructing a Theory of Issue Salience as Subsidy 
Keeping previous work in mind, I will now walk through my adaption of Hall and 
Deardorff’s subsidy theory, applying it to issue salience.  To do this, I offer a series of 
assumptions about how members of Congress act and their relationship with the political media.   
First, I assume that members of Congress are goal-seeking.  Simply, members of 
Congress want to get something out of their service in the United States Congress.  What this 
may be is varied from more immediate goals such as re-election and best serving their districts to 
broader goals such as the enactment of “good public policy” or the seeking of more power either 
within or outside of the body of Congress they serve in.  These goals themselves are not mutually 
exclusive, as members of Congress may seek policy change not only because they see the policy 
change as good, however they may be using that policy change as a way to promote themselves 
in anticipation of running for higher office.  In general, members of Congress are focused on 
goals that they look to achieve through their work in their elected position.  
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Second, I assume that the goals of members of Congress vary from member to 
member.  Following Schlesinger’s (1966) discussion of the types of ambition, different 
members of Congress want different things out of their work in Congress:  some members want 
to serve their districts and retire, others seek to move up and become committee chairs or reach a 
higher political office, and others want to change public policy.  Each member of Congress will 
have a different set of goals that will guide how they become involved in issues: some members 
may stick to specific issues while others will focus on a litany of issues, engaging to help their 
own personal political aims.  
The third assumption I make is that the goals of members of Congress also vary from 
issue to issue.  A member of Congress simply does not have the capacity to focus on all issues at 
any one time.  Therefore, members need to pick and choose what issues receive the most focus.  
A member of Congress from Kansas who wants to focus on district issues will devote significant 
amounts of time to agricultural issues, while a member in New York City in the same situation 
will focus on financial issues.  It is due to this that members of Congress then will not engage in 
all issues equally, and will need to be strategic about the types of issues they do and do not 
engage. 
Fourth, I assume that member behavior will vary depending on their status on a 
specific issue area.  In particular, members of Congress who are already policy leaders on an 
issue do not need to further promote discussion of an issue area.  A Banking Committee chair 
does not need to engage on banking issues because they already have formal power over the 
committee in question.  Their needs and desires can be achieved through the inner workings of 
the congressional committee, making the need for engagement moot.  Members who do not have 
12 
 
policy control on the other hand will be more likely to engage, in order to move policy closer to 
their desired policy on a specific issue.   
Finally, I assume that members of Congress have at least some control over the 
coverage that they receive related to issues.  When I refer here to coverage, it is coverage 
related to engagement in specific issue areas.  Following Cook’s (2006) discussion of members 
of Congress as “co-authors of the news,” I assume that members of Congress have the capacity 
to engage in a specific issue when it fits both their needs and the needs of the media itself.  
Members of Congress can either control their own coverage by becoming the media, whether 
through commentaries or opinion pieces to newspapers, but also through their decision to 
comment on issues, introduce legislation related to specific issues, and through contacts with 
reporters.  While members of Congress do not have total control over coverage, members do 
have the ability to decide whether or not to become involved in an issue in media.   
Based on these assumptions, I will now construct the concept of issue salience as a 
subsidy that members of Congress use to determine when to engage in a specific issue area.  It is 
important in particular to establish how the subsidy of issue salience differs from that of the 
subsidy of lobbying as outlined by Hall and Deardorff (2006), as the differences between the two 
will lead to different behavior from members of Congress.  
Issue Salience as a Subsidy 
As we know based on Hall and Deardorff’s work, a subsidy is “matching grant of costly 
policy information, political intelligence, and labor to the enterprises of strategically selected 
legislators” (69), and is something that is used by members of Congress not to change their mind, 
but rather to supplement the member’s ability to work on a specific issue area.  Immediately, we 
can see that there are two main differences between issue salience and lobbying when thinking in 
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terms of a subsidy.  The first of these is that issue salience (and changes to issue salience) do not 
change the amount of labor a member of Congress devotes to a specific issue area.  Second, 
unlike lobbying, every member of Congress has similar access to issue attention.  We can 
assume that members of Congress and their staffs are monitoring media regularly, seeing what 
issues are receiving more coverage than other issues.  
 As a result, the subsidy of issue salience has three factors that make it different than the 
subsidy of lobbying.  First, all members of Congress should have equal access to the subsidy, in 
that every member of Congress has equal access to media coverage of an issue.  Therefore, 
unlike Hall and Deardorff’s subsidy, we should expect that all members of Congress could use 
the subsidy to their advantage.   Next, the subsidy only comes with new political information.  
Unlike Hall and Deardorff’s lobbying subsidy, there are no extra bodies added to the equation as 
there are with lobbyist work. Journalists, unlike lobbyists, profit on the dissemination of their 
trade, not the successful use of their trade in Congress. Therefore, the journalistic role here is one 
of an information provider rather than manpower provider, with the information being the 
change in issue salience.  Finally, salience, unlike lobbying, does not necessarily come with a 
specific viewpoint.  It is up to the member of Congress to implant their viewpoint upon the issue 
once they know it is important.    
What type of political information and intelligence are we working with when we discuss 
issue salience as a subsidy?  In addition to discussion of the problem at hand, the changes in 
issue coverage shed light on the importance of the issue to the general public.  Simply, members 
of Congress see that increased coverage on an issue from the media means that an issue is 
important to the political media, and more importantly, the public at large.  By drawing attention 
to specific problems and issues, the media sheds light on specific events and processes that a 
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member of Congress can offer a political solution to, depending on their own personal goals and 
issue goals.  Members of Congress then can offer those solutions, promoting both their policy 
and themselves to the larger media.  Knowing that the media is acting on an issue, members now 
know that this is the perfect time to join in with their political solution.  Therefore, the 
information in play is the increase in salience.  When attention to an issue increases in the public, 
members of Congress see this increase and act, engaging in the issue in an attempt to be the 
policy winner.   
The use of the issue salience subsidy will differ depending on the amount of salience 
already present in an issue area.  As the effect of the issue salience subsidy is based on the 
increase of salience in an issue area, the power of an increase will change depending on the 
average level of salience.  Simply put, an increase from 1 to 10 articles on an issue per month (an 
increase of 900%) is different than an increase of 50 to 60 articles per month (an increase of only 
20%).  An issue with on average high coverage will already have a litany of policy actors 
engaging in the media on the issue on a daily basis.  As a result, an individual member of 
Congress will have a harder time making a name for themselves on that issue versus an issue 
with little coverage, where there are fewer actors involved.  It is because of this that members of 
Congress who wish to change these high average issue areas need to be more strategic, creating 
their own salience and carving out their own niche within the coverage.  Members use the 
subsidy not to react to the news, but to create the news through their policy niche.    
What does this all mean for public policy?  By either acting on the increase in salience 
(as in cases of low average salience) or acting to create one’s own salience (as in the case of 
generally high average salience), the potential increases to either change public policy or prevent 
leaders from creating new public policy.  Extending from Schattschneider’s conflict expansion 
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theory, the increase of salience results in more individuals knowing about a policy issue.  When 
salience is at its constant state, policy leaders control the issue through both formal (committee) 
and informal (deferential) means.  When salience increases, policy solutions outside of the 
leader’s solution are now available for other members of Congress and the general public to 
peruse, giving other solutions potential allies.  As a result, policy leaders may lose control over 
their issue to other members of Congress.  
In Figure 1.1, I contrast the different movements of members of Congress depending on 
the level of issue salience.  I differentiate between issues that on average receive low or middling 
coverage with those that on average receive high amounts of coverage.   
Figure 1.1: Direction of Member Activity and Issue Salience by Level of Average Salience 
 
As we can see from Figure 1.1, the expectations for salience differ depending on levels of 
salience.  On issues with on average low levels of salience, the subsidy acts as a signal, telling 
members of Congress that an issue is important and that they should become involved in the 
issue.  At high average levels of salience, on the other hand, members of Congress need to act in 
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order to increase salience, and will have to carve out a niche that contrasts their own view with 
the view of leadership.  Only then will members have a chance of changing public policy.   
Exploring the Salience Subsidy 
Hypotheses for the Relationship between Salience and Members of Congress 
By using salience as a subsidy, members of Congress are cued to when they should 
engage in discussion.  Simply, if salience increases on an issue, then members are more likely to 
engage in that issue area.  Based on the above discussion, I now move into the expectations that 
will drive the rest of this dissertation, from which I will derive hypotheses in each of three 
empirical chapters.  I will first focus on member activity itself before moving into the questions 
of leadership response and policy change.  
In general, my primary hypothesis guiding the rest of this work is that as the number of 
articles on a subject increases, the number of members of Congress who engage in that 
issue area also increases.  Members of Congress see increases in issue salience, and use that as 
a reason to become involved in an issue area. Increases in issue salience will not move all 
members, but the change of interest will move some members, increasing the number of 
members who engage on a specific subject.  
My second hypothesis derives from the first, looking at the role the level of average 
salience plays in the process from a temporal standpoint.  Primarily, I expect that on issues of 
low average salience, articles will lead members of Congress to become involved, while on 
issues of high average salience, members of Congress will lead to more articles being 
written on a subject.  At low levels, members wait and anticipate changes in issue salience to 
become involved in an issue, acting on the increased salience to attempt to move public policy.  
This period of anticipation is not possible in very high levels of salience due to the ever-presence 
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of the issue in regular discussion.  Instead, members must create the news on the discussion if 
they wish to move policy.   
Moving on to the question of leadership response, my third hypothesis is that as 
members of Congress engage in policy that they do not control, leaders will be more likely 
to engage in the issue in the media, in order to maintain their policy control and the current 
status quo on an issue area.  Leaders will normally avoid media coverage of their issues, hoping 
to maintain control through the committee process. However, if other members of Congress are 
attempting to take control of their turf, then a leader will be more likely to engage to protect their 
piece of the status quo.   
Finally, on the question of policy change, I hypothesize that increases in issue salience 
improve the possibility of non-leader policy change, and decrease the possibility of policy 
leader-backed policy change.  With the presence and engagement of more members of 
Congress, non-leaders have a greater (albeit small) opportunity to push public policy on an issue 
closer to a non-leader’s ideal point.  The possibility of success is rare, but the potential does exist 
to enact significant policy change on an issue.  In addition, leader-backed change is less likely to 
happen during times of higher salience.  There will be times that leaders want to enact policy 
change, through what Frank Baumgartner and Bryan Jones call “waves of enthusiasm” (2009, 
84).  When fewer people know about the policy change, leaders should be able to enact the 
change, even with some opposition.  However, increases in issue salience will bring more people 
into the issue, making it much harder for policy leaders to control and change an issue area.  
An Overview of this Dissertation 
The four expectations outlined above guide the rest of this dissertation, exploring the 
question of how an individual member of Congress can go about changing public policy without 
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going through the normal processes of Congressional policy leadership development.  To test my 
expectations, I employ an originial dataset of article and member of Congress mentions on 10 
issues in The Washington Post, nine issues with generally lower levels of issue salience over a 36 
year period (1977-2012) and 1 issue with very high salience over a 10 year period (1977-1986).  
I use the Post for two reasons: the Post is a newspaper with a national presence and a close 
proximity to members of Congress.  As it is the primary paper of record for the United States 
Congress, it offers members of Congress an opportunity to extend themselves outside of their 
local range into national coverage.  In addition, the paper also has the longest continuous 
coverage in Lexis-Nexis, allowing for a more comprehensive time series for analysis.  
I employ 10 issues in my analysis, drawn from using either one or two subject search 
terms within the Lexis-Nexis subject category database.  The 9 issues used over a 36 year period 
are: agricultural subsidies, climate change/global warming, drug policy, energy policy, gays & 
lesbians, immigration, income assistance/social welfare, NASA/space policy, and nuclear 
weapons.  I use these 9 issues to allow for a wide amount of variation in terms of content area 
and coverage by the Washington Post, as well as coverage both within and outside of the context 
of Congress.  Some of these issues, like immigration and nuclear weapons, receive regular 
coverage in the Washington Post, while others, such as agricultural subsidies, receive far less 
coverage.  The goal is to create an expansive study of the nature of how members of Congress 
engage in issues, and to look at how this engagement relates to issue salience.  
In addition to the 9 issues studied over a 36 year period, I employ a dataset on one issue 
over a shorter time period, looking at taxation from 1977-1986.  Taxation, unlike the other 9 
issues, is an issue that is constantly in the news, with on average nearly 2 articles per day written 
on the subject during the period under study.  Members of Congress are inundated with 
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discussion of taxation, and as a result their behavior on the question of taxation should differ 
from their behavior when looking at issues with less coverage. 
In Chapter 2, I outline the larger research design of the dissertation, discussing the 
temporal questions that come with looking at a relationship between two concepts over time as 
well as an overview of each of the 10 issues that will be explored in the subsequent three 
chapters of the dissertation, both in terms of the collection of data in general as well as the 
potential nuances that exist in each issue area and the policy leadership I identified in each case.   
In Chapter 3, I explore the question of member engagement in issues, looking at the role 
issue salience plays in members engaging issues and how leaders respond to the involvement of 
other members of Congress.  For this chapter, I focus on the 9 issues with 36 years of data, 
exploring at the monthly article level how members of Congress use issue salience to determine 
when to become involved in issue areas, and how leaders respond to the movements made by 
other members of Congress.  I look at the first and third primary hypotheses here, exploring 
periods when changes in issue salience are large relative to general coverage of a specific issue 
area to see whether more members of Congress engage in these issues, and the ramifications that 
come from this engagement for policy leadership.  
In Chapter 4, I explore the question of policy change, focusing on the final hypothesis by 
looking at four potential types of policy change derived from two variables: leadership-induced 
change versus non-leadership induced change during times of either lower or increased salience.  
Here, I use three issues to explore how individuals attempt to change public policy under 
different conditions, focusing on agricultural subsidies (leadership and non-leadership induced 
change during times of lower salience), immigration (leadership-induced change during 
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increased salience), and nuclear weapons policy (non-leadership induced change during 
increased salience).    
In Chapter 5, I explore the question of constant high salience, focusing on the issue of 
taxation. Here, my focus is on the second hypothesis that high average levels of salience will 
lead to member-induced action versus newspaper-induced action on issue areas.  I use a weekly 
level of analysis because of the large amount of data on taxation over the period of 1977-1986.  I 
focus in particular on the period 1977-1981, and the work of Congressman Jack Kemp of New 
York.  Kemp, a Republican in the minority with no tax-writing committee experience, becomes 
one of the central actors behind taxation in the United States Congress, culminating in the 
passage of a version of his tax cut bill, the Economic Recovery Tax Act (ERTA), in 1981.  
Kemp’s story is one combining perseverance with opportunity: Kemp creates his own salience 
on the issue of taxation through constant bill introductions and appeals to Republican Party 
leaders, eventually getting the support of former California governor Ronald Reagan for his tax 
cut.  Kemp’s story signifies the process by which a member can even succeed at policy change 
when issue salience is on average high.   
Finally, in Chapter 6, I explore the ramifications of my work, looking at the question of 
what all of the discussion of media tells us about how members of Congress use salience to their 
advantage.  If we can think of both lobbying and issue salience as subsidies, what other forms of 
outside information could also be helpful to members of Congress? I will recall my three primary 
goals here, looking at my work related to the role of issue salience in member considerations, the 
relationship between members of Congress and the media, and the role these processes play in 
policy change.  
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Chapter 2: Research Design and Case Structure 
Introduction  
In this dissertation, I use a series of original datasets on 9 issues discussed in The 
Washington Post between the years 1977-2012 and a 10th issue between 1977 and 1986, looking 
at both the number of articles written and the number of members of Congress who discuss 
issues in The Washington Post during this period. In this chapter, I outline the research design, 
focusing on the creation of my datasets as well as the process of data creation and general 
testing.  In addition, I walk through the nine series that will be used for testing in Chapters 3 and 
4, looking at the major events under analysis during the period tested and the nature of the data 
for each case (in Chapter 5, I will give similar treatment to my tenth case, taxation).  My goal 
here is to link back theory to data.  In this case, I use media data to look at how members of 
Congress become involved in issue areas over time.  Members see the discussion in media of a 
subject, and then become involved in the issue, in turn weakening the control policy leaders have 
over the process.   
Data Exploration and Creation 
The Washington Post between 1977 and 2012 
My primary data for this dissertation is a series of original datasets on issues written 
about in The Washington Post between the period 1977 and 2012.  I collected both the total 
number of articles and articles that contained members of Congress as identified from a series of 
search term identifiers for members of Congress.  
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I use only The Washington Post because of its proximity to Congress and the equal effect 
publicity will have on members of Congress themselves.  The Washington Post is the primary 
newspaper of the United States capital.  The Washington Post covers the activities of 
Washington, D.C. regularly, including activities in the United States Congress.  As a result, 
members of Congress will receive general coverage here for their activities on bills and 
proposals.  In addition, the wide variation in coverage of local members of Congress among local 
newspapers (see Arnold 2004) makes The Washington Post an ideal stop for members to push 
for issues, as one of the Post’s primary foci is the activities occurring within Washington D.C, 
including Congress.    
In addition, following Cook’s notion of “coauthors of the news” (Cook 2006), every 
member of Congress will want coverage in The Washington Post.  The Washington Post is a 
newspaper read by policymakers and people in the United States Congress.  If a member of 
Congress wants to appeal to other members in the House or Senate, the Post is a good place to do 
this, with the appeal getting from paper to staffers of members who may share interest with the 
appealer.   
In addition, every member will want to compete here.  While other newspapers, such as 
The New York Times, may be larger in terms of circulation, some members will have less need 
for coverage in non-Washington papers.  The ability to appeal to policymakers gives the Post an 
advantage over other papers: while some members may be particularly competing to get in (such 
as members from Virginia and Maryland), all members will likely have some desire for coverage 
from The Washington Post. While some issues may not be fully representative of national 
coverage due to the lack of reporting over the period, other issues with regular amounts of 
coverage, such as immigration and nuclear weapons, are in line with expectations on the level of 
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coverage required by researchers to be considered nationally representative (Atkinson, Lovett, 
and Baumgartner 2014). 
For nine of my ten cases, I use the time period of 1977-2012 in order to maximize the 
amount of data I have available to analyze.  I began my collection period in 1977 due to data 
availability, as the data was collected from Lexis-Nexis Academic, which has data for The 
Washington Post back to January 1, 1977.  The data ends in 2012 as I began data collection in 
2014 and wanted my data to encompass the entirety of sessions of Congress.  The result is that I 
have data from the period between the beginning of the 95th Congress and the end of the 112th 
Congress.  The time period also gives a specific picture of the United States Congress, namely 
one in the aftermath of major institutional changes in the United States Congress resulting from 
both the Subcommittee Bill of Rights and the 1974 Budget and Impoundment Control Act, both 
of which reshuffled the House committee and subcommittee structures.  This era also includes 
time periods of total Democratic control of the executive and legislative branches of government 
(1977-1980, 1993-1994, 2009-2010), total Republican control (2001- May 2002, 2003-2006) and 
divided control between the two parties, resulting in extensive variation in terms of who has 
power within Congress.  
I collected all articles in The Washington Post that reference an issue area, using only 
newspaper articles.  To collect these, I searched Lexis-Nexis using issues and an 85% threshold 
according to Lexis-Nexis’ algorithm-assigned issue structure.  Simply, if an article receives a 
score of 85% or greater on that issue according to Lexis-Nexis, then the article appears in the 
dataset.  In Appendix 1, I include search terms for all ten issue areas for both the large searches 
for all articles and the smaller general searches for articles including members of Congress.  I use 
an 85% threshold in order to maximize article collection while minimizing the inclusion of 
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articles only tangentially related to the issue in question.  In addition the 85% threshold allows 
me to capture articles about multiple subjects that focus only one blurb on the issue.  In general, 
the goal here is to maximize collection coverage of issues while minimizing the presence of 
articles that have nothing to do with the subject.   In addition, after 2003, I used the Newspaper 
only identifier on Lexis-Nexis, as Lexis-Nexis includes internet-only articles, internet versions of 
articles, and blogs in their counts, especially during the period 2011-2012, where the counts 
given by Lexis-Nexis on first search are double the actual newspaper counts because the system 
counts the internet version of an article along with the non-internet version of an article.  
Members of Congress 
I have two main dependent variables in my analysis.  The first is the number of articles 
written on an issue in a given time period, as discussed above.  The second is the number of 
members of Congress who are mentioned in The Washington Post on a specific issue area.  To 
maximize collection of members, I use a second set of search terms that, like the search terms for 
all articles, can be found in Appendix 1.  The second search is simply the first search for all 
articles on a subject combined with a series of identifiers The Washington Post uses for 
Democratic and Republican members of Congress.  I used preliminary searches to determine the 
style used by The Washington Post on member of Congress identification.  From these searches, 
I found that for the most part members of Congress were identified using their names and 
positions along with an abbreviated party and state.  With this in mind, I constructed my 
identifiers.  These identifiers include searching for versions of the words Congressman/woman, 
Senator, and Representative, as well as leadership terms such as Chair, Speaker, 
Majority/Minority Leader, and Whip, combined with a party identifier nearby.  My search would 
then find such things as “Congressman Edward Markey (D-MA)” or “Speaker Thomas P. “Tip” 
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O’Neill (D-MA)”.  The goal in this collection was to find as many members of Congress 
involved as possible.  
After running the searches and compiling the data, I (with the help of a research assistant) 
hand-coded every member of Congress involved in an issue area.  I used hand-coding here rather 
than machine coding because my searches were designed to maximize the number of members 
collected, and the searches themselves allowed for more articles to be identified than the number 
of articles including members of Congress.  Those identified included state legislators (especially 
those in Maryland and Virginia) as well as people who may chair some group who happen to 
have a middle initial of D or R.  In addition, some members of Congress also did not get directly 
identified through my coding system, usually because they were either part of a series of 
members being identified, the identifier appeared too far away from the member’s name, or 
potential transcription errors between printing and transferring the printing to Lexis-Nexis.  In 
addition, I learned afterwards that The Washington Post occasionally used the terms Democratic 
and Republican rather than simply always using D and R.  There is then the potential that I 
missed some members of Congress and some articles in the member searches. I assume that the 
misses do not lead to systematic errors because of the randomness of use of the words 
Democratic and Republican by Washington Post writers over time.     
After running the searches, I collected every member of Congress mentioned on an issue 
area in The Washington Post (regardless of whether or not the search was able to directly identify 
them), in order to achieve my primary goal to collect as many members as possible.   While they 
may not be directly identified by my search, these are still members of Congress who are 
involved in the issue.  I identify members of Congress as being involved on an issue if I 
determined that a member was actively involved in the issue.  I define active involvement as 
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being any type of involvement mentioned by The Washington Post about a specific member of 
Congress that is not simply about that member voting on an issue.  These activities include, but 
are not limited to, comments from members, introductions of bills mentioned by the Post, floor 
activity, committee activity outside of voting on an issue, opinion pieces written by members of 
Congress, and discussions of member activity in editorials and commentary pieces.  If a member 
of Congress’ vote is noted and the member offers a reason for that vote to the Post, then that is 
considered active involvement, as the member wishes to go on the record about why they made 
the decision they made.    
I use active involvement rather than all involvement because active involvement assumes 
members seek out publicity when they receive coverage on non-voting matters.  When members 
take on any of the above actions, there is an expectation that members wish these activities to be 
covered by newspapers.  Members engaging in active involvement are doing something that 
most of the rest of Congress is not doing on that issue at a given time.  A vote, on the other hand, 
is an activity being taken on by all 535 members of Congress at any given time.  To borrow from 
work on urban communities, a more passive action, one that is within the minimum of activity on 
an issue area (Lyons and Lowery 1986). The regularity of voting makes it a less direct action for 
media coverage than other potential activities.   
One final note on members is an issue with independent members of Congress.  The 
search terms do not include independents. Independents are significantly harder to search for in 
the Washington Post because the primary term identified with them, Ind., happens to also be 
used as an abbreviation for the state of Indiana.  In addition, there are only 7 independents who 
served in Congress as independents during my time period:  Dean Barkley, Henry F. Byrd Jr., 
Virgil Goode (2001-2002), Jim Jeffords (after May 2001), Joe Lieberman (after 2007), Bernie 
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Sanders, and Bob Smith (2000).   Of these, only Byrd (Finance Subcommittee on Taxation) and 
Jeffords (Senate Environment and Public Works Committee) serve as chairs or ranking members 
on relevant issues in my data while independents (Smith became chair of Environment and 
Public Works after returning to the Republican Party).  To deal with this, I conducted individual 
searches for Byrd and Jeffords in their respective issue areas (taxation and climate change), in 
order to most directly capture issue leadership.   
 The two main variables I focus on are the number of members of Congress mentioned on 
issues and the number of articles on a specific issue. I am working with a variety of different 
issues, each with differences in member involvement, general salience, and coverage over time.  
In the next section, I explore those differences by giving brief treatment to each of the issue 
areas.   
Case Structure 
I will now walk through each of the 9 cases under discussion in Chapters 3 and 4.  The 
first nine issue areas include discussion between the years 1977-2012.  In Chapter 5, I give 
similar treatment to taxation during the period 1977-1986.  I begin by exploring the case 
selection process before getting into the nuances in each case.  I present three particular pieces of 
information: the general trend of coverage over time, the major events encompassed in that 
period, and finally my identification of policy leadership on the issue.  To identify policy 
leadership, I used both CQ Almanac and The Almanac of American Politics to identify relevant 
political committees for each issue, and then used the same two sources to identify policy leaders 
(chairs and ranking members for each Congress, from the 97th Congress (1977-1978) to the 112th 
(2011-2012).  
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Case Selection Process 
I selected cases based on a variety of factors. Importantly, I wanted a range in both the 
number of articles written on a subject as well as the number of members of Congress who were 
regularly involved in the subject.  In addition, I wanted issues that varied in terms of content and 
potential population of members that would qualify as leadership.  There are a few cases where 
overlap exists, including Climate Change and Gas & Oil Policy, which both include the House 
and Senate Energy Committees.  In general, each issue area has different combinations of policy 
leaders based on the committees that deal with the issue in question.    
Agricultural Subsidies 
Agricultural subsidies have existed in the United States budget since the 1933 
Agricultural Adjustment Act, which gave farmers money to not grow on certain lands..  Since 
then, the subsidy program has expanded into supplementing farmer incomes in a variety of 
agricultural goods, from wheat and corn to mohair and peanuts.  Agricultural subsidies 
themselves are not highly talked about in American politics.  In Figure 2.1, I present a yearly 
graph for the number of articles written on agricultural subsidies in The Washington Post.  In my 
search, I use the search term “agricultural subsidies” to find articles and members.  
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Figure 2.1: Articles on Agricultural Subsidies in The Washington Post, 1977-2012 
 
 
As we can see from Figure 2.1, the issue of agricultural subsidies is not highly salient at 
any point in the period 1977-2012.  At its peak, 1985 (during the Farm Aid Movement), there are 
111 articles on the subject, or about 2 a week.  At its lowest points, there may be at most an 
article every 3 months, as seen in 2009, when only 4 articles were written about agricultural 
subsidies.  
For the most part, most of the upward spikes related to subsidies are linked to years when 
the United States Congress passed the Farm Bill, an omnibus piece of legislation around 
agriculture that includes subsidies.  In Chapter 4, I will further explore one of these farm bills, 
the Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1995, and the road members of 
Congress took to pass it.  
For leadership, I identified two full committees and three subcommittees that hold policy 
leadership on agricultural subsidies.  These are the House Agriculture Committee, the Senate 
Agriculture Committee, and the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Agriculture, the Senate 
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Agriculture Subcommittee on Agricultural Production, and the Senate Appropriations 
Subcommittee on Agriculture.  
Climate Change & Global Warming 
Since the passage of the Clean Air Act in 1970, questions of global warming and climate 
change have been a part of American political life.  However, until the late 1980s the issue 
received little coverage in The Washington Post. In Figure 2.2, I present a yearly graph for the 
number of articles written on climate change and global warming in The Washington Post.  I use 
both search terms due to their interchangeability both in use by the general public and by Lexis-
Nexis when identifying articles.   
Figure 2.2: Articles on Climate Change in The Washington Post, 1977-2012 
 
As we can see from Figure 2.2, from about 1977 to 2006, coverage never tops 130 
articles, as the issue was relegated to the sidelines.  After 2007, when the Democrats took control 
of the House, coverage greatly intensified, driven by an increased focus on the climate change 
issue due to changes in the Earth’s temperature and the work of former Vice President Al Gore, 
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whose documentary, An Inconvenient Truth, put direct focus on the issue leading up to the 2008 
election.   
For policy leadership, I use 9 committees and subcommittees that have some jurisdiction 
over environmental issues.  These committees are the House Interior Committee, the House 
Energy Committee, the House Select Committee on Energy Independence and Global Warming 
(2007-2011), the Senate Energy Committee, Senate Environment and Public Works Committee, 
the House Energy Subcommittee on Energy and Environment, the House Government 
Operations Subcommittee on Environment, the Senate Environment Subcommittee on 
Environmental Pollution, and the Senate Environment Subcommittee on Clean Air.  
Drug Policy 
While the war on drugs in the United States began in the 1970s, it would take until the 
mid-1980s to see significant interest in the subject from the media.  In Figure 2.3, I present a 
yearly graph for the number of articles written on drug policy in The Washington Post.  I 
designed the search term for drug policy to include all articles with drug policy subjects, but take 
out articles with only subject terms for prescription drug policy, an issue identifier used for such 
things as Medicare Part D and other regulations related to prescription drugs.   
32 
 
Figure 2.3: Articles on Drug Policy in The Washington Post, 1977-2012 
 
Coverage of drugs peaks in the late 1980s, with 634 articles on drug policy in The 
Washington Post in 1989 (or about 2 articles per day).  The upward movement on drug policy 
begins in 1986, following the cocaine overdose death of University of Maryland basketball 
player and #2 overall NBA draft pick Len Bias.  In the period 1986-1990, there were on average 
349 articles written per year in The Washington Post on drug policy, nearly one article per day.  
This five year period accounts for 42.6% (1,795 of 4,095) of the total coverage of drug policy 
over the 36 years in my study.   
I use 5 committees and subcommittees to track policy leadership.  These are the Senate 
Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, the House Select Committee on 
Narcotics Abuse and Control, the House Government Reform Subcommittee related to Drugs, 
the Senate Labor Subcommittee related to drugs, and the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on 
Drugs and Crime.    
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Gays & Lesbians 
The rights of gay and lesbian Americans changed markedly between 1977 and 2012.  At 
the beginning of the time period, only a few city council members and other legislators were 
openly homosexual, and the issue of homosexuality was not at the forefront of American politics, 
a far cry from the end of the series, when major events reshaped American policy on gays and 
lesbians.  In Figure 2.4, I present a yearly graph for the number of articles written on gays & 
lesbians in The Washington Post between 1977 and 2012.  
 Figure 2.4: Articles on Gays & Lesbians in The Washington Post, 1977-2012 
 
As we can see, the amount of coverage gay & lesbian issues received increased 
throughout the 1980s and 1990s, with coverage of the issue on an upward spike by the end of the 
series.  The coverage of gay and lesbian issues involves a multitude of topics during the period 
1977-2012, starting with the AIDS epidemic of the 1980s and moving into the enactment of 
“Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” following the election of Bill Clinton and passage of the Defense of 
Marriage Act in 1996. In the 2000s, the movement to allow same-sex marriage and the 
movement to end “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” brought added discussion from The Washington Post, 
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culminating in President Obama’s decision to support same-sex marriage just before the 2012 
presidential election.   
As a result of the broadness of this issue, and the number of issue areas that the issue 
reaches into, this is the one issue where I was unable to assign policy leadership.  There are no 
committees or subcommittees designed directly for gay and lesbian issues, and the number of 
issues (from legal issues such as equal rights and marriage to military issues to health issues) 
made assigning a leader problematic.  As a result, rather than try to assign a specific leader, I 
instead leave the gays and lesbians issue out of my leader-based analysis.  
Immigration 
Immigration has long been a central part of American life.  In the period 1977-2012, the 
controversy over illegal immigration intensified, culminating in a combination of legislation and 
protests in 2005-2006.  In Figure 2.5, I present a graph of the yearly number of articles on 
immigration in The Washington Post. 
Figure 2.5: Articles on Immigration in The Washington Post, 1977-2012 
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As we can see from Figure 2.5, immigration received general coverage from The 
Washington Post, though this coverage began to inch up throughout the 1980s and 1990s as 
questions over illegal immigration from Mexico began to overwhelm other parts of the 
discussion.  The trend culminates in 2006-2007, with over 800 articles appearing in the Post on 
immigration each year, nearly 3 a day.  This period marks the end of Republican leadership’s 
attempts to pass immigration legislation in 2006 in the midst of massive protests by Latino 
groups and the beginning of Democratic leadership’s attempt to also pass legislation after taking 
control of Congress in 2007. 
For policy leadership, I identify two full committees and two subcommittees: the House 
and Senate Judiciary Committees, and the House and Senate Judiciary Subcommittees on 
Immigration.  These two committees and two subcommittees are the primary leaders on this 
issue.  As we will see in Chapter 4, these leaders were a major part of immigration policy in the 
1980s, but lost significant power over time.  
Income Assistance & Social Welfare 
Income assistance and social welfare in the United States reached its peak discussion 
apex in 1995 and 1996 when the United States Congress, in the hands of Republicans for the first 
time since 1954, worked toward reshaping the welfare laws of the United States.  In Figure 2.6, I 
present a graph of the yearly number of articles on income assistance and social welfare in The 
Washington Post.  I use two codes due to their interchangeability in Lexis-Nexis issue 
generation.  
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Figure 2.6: Articles on Income Assistance in The Washington Post, 1977-2012 
 
As we can see from Figure 2.6, income assistance and social welfare in general does not 
receive much coverage from The Washington Post.  In most years, the average number of stories 
is about 1 a week.  In 1995 and 1996, during the debates on welfare reform, the article counts 
skyrocketed, as Congress worked to change the Aid to Dependent Families with Children 
(AFDC) plan into the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) plan.  
For policy leadership, I identify two full committees and one subcommittee.  These are 
the House Ways & Means Committee, the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and 
Pensions, and the House Ways & Means Subcommittee on Human Resources.  
NASA & Space Exploration 
The United States last went to the moon in 1975, though the space program has remained 
active and a major part of the United States government.  In Figure 2.7, I present a yearly graph 
of articles on NASA and Space Exploration in The Washington Post.  I use two search terms here 
to find articles related to NASA: space exploration, and space & aeronautics agencies.  I use the 
two terms due to the lack of a specific term for NASA: as a result, these two terms capture the 
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activity of NASA both in terms of general government activity and the mission of the space 
program.   
Figure 2.7: Articles on NASA in The Washington Post, 1977-2012 
 
Figure 2.7 shows two major spikes in attention to NASA, in 1986 and 2003.  These two 
spikes correspond with the two spaceship tragedies in the modern era, the explosion of the 
Challenger spacecraft on liftoff in January 1986 and the disintegration of the Columbia 
spacecraft during reentry in February 2003.  Both events led to months of investigations and 
continued coverage, leading to questions about whether the United States should continue to 
invest in its space program. That being said, in general NASA receives coverage from The 
Washington Post, with at least on average 1-2 articles a week during the years with the lowest 
coverage. 
I rely on two committees and four subcommittees when determining policy leadership on 
NASA.  These are the House and Senate Space, Science, and Technology Committees, the 
specific subcommittees related to space on each Space, Science, and Technology Committee, 
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and the specific subcommittee in the respective Appropriations committees related to space 
exploration and NASA’s budget.  The names of these committees change from time to time 
during the series, so I ensured that I had found the correct subcommittee in each Congress.  
Nuclear Weapons 
The United States had been the first nation to develop a nuclear bomb and remains the 
only nation to ever use an atomic weapon in wartime.  During the period 1977-2012, the United 
States watched as the nature of war changed from a détente with the Soviet Union to a fight 
against global terrorism.  In Figure 2.8, I present yearly data on the number of articles on nuclear 
weapons in The Washington Post.  
Figure 2.8: Articles on Nuclear Weapons in The Washington Post, 1977-2012 
 
As we can see from Figure 2.8, in general coverage of nuclear weapons is always high, 
with at least on average 2-3 articles a week on the subject in The Washington Post during the 
years with the lowest coverage.   The primary peak in coverage occurred in the early 1980s as 
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Congress debated a nuclear freeze motion offered by a bipartisan group of members and Reagan 
considered making changes to the nuclear arsenal.   
I identify four committees and nine subcommittees to for policy leadership on nuclear 
weapons.  These are the House and Senate Armed Services Committees, the House Foreign 
Relations/International Relations Committee, the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, the House 
Armed Services Subcommittee on Nuclear Weapons/Strategic Forces, the House Appropriations 
Subcommittee on Defense, the House Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Terrorism and 
Nonproliferation, the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Nuclear Weapons/Strategic 
Forces, the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Nuclear Stockpiles, the Senate Government 
Operations Subcommittee on Nuclear Weapons, the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on 
Defense, the Senate Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on European Affairs, and the Senate Foreign 
Relations Subcommittee on Strategic and Theater Nuclear Forces  
Oil & Gas Policy 
Oil and gas policy in the United States is an issue that, while still important in American 
life, received particularly high coverage early in my time period, during the gas shortages of the 
1970s.  In Figure 2.9, I present yearly data on the number of articles in The Washington Post on 
oil and gas policy.   
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Figure 2.9: Articles on Oil & Gas Policy in The Washington Post, 1977-2012 
 
In 1979, The Washington Post printed 963 articles on oil & gas policy, as the Carter 
administration and Congress attempted to deal with the oil shortages caused by the OPEC oil 
embargo.  Coverage in the rest of the period never reaches the heights of coverage in 1979, 
though oil and gas policy is on average getting about an article a day from the Post throughout 
the rest of the series.   
For policy leadership, I track four committees and four subcommittees to identify leaders 
on oil & gas policy.  These are the House Interior/Natural Resources Committee, the House 
Commerce and Energy Committee (after creation of the Department of Energy), the House 
Select Committee on Energy, the Senate Energy Committee, the House Government Operations 
Subcommittee on Energy, the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Energy, the House 
Commerce Subcommittee on Energy, and the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Energy. 
The Issues in General 
Each of the nine issues has characteristics that contrast it with the other eight.  Some 
show little movement over time (such as agricultural subsidies), others have generally high 
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coverage (such as NASA and Nuclear Weapons).  Some, such as NASA and drug policy see 
movement due to the appearance of a spike in coverage, while others, such as nuclear weapons, 
do not show large spikes in the way other issues exhibit. The issues are all unique, with their own 
nuances and temporal constructions that lead to massive variation from issue to issue.  In the 
next section, I explore the data analysis, focusing in particular on this temporal aspect through 
my use of time series to test how members of Congress use the media to bring about policy 
change. 
Data Analysis 
I use two forms of analysis in my testing, time series cross-sectional modeling and case 
studies.  I use two methods in order to explore the two primary mechanisms involved in my 
process, first the process of engaging in issue areas through the media and second the process of 
using that engagement to bring about changes in public policy.  Chapter 3 employs the time 
series modeling while Chapter 4 focuses on case studies.  In Chapter 5, I use both strategies to 
explore the large-scale salience case of taxation, focusing both on the role individual members 
play in the process and the role members in general play through the time series modeling.   
Time Series Cross-Sectional Modeling 
I use time series cross-sectional modeling in order to capture both the temporal and issue 
characteristics of my data.  I employ a panel setup to test each of my individual models together 
rather than test each one individually.  I test all together because all of the data comes from the 
same source: The Washington Post, during the same time period: 1977-2012.  Each of the 9 issue 
areas, as noted above, has nuances that need to be controlled for when testing the general effects 
in modeling.  As a result, I use fixed effects regression in all of my models.  
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In Chapter 3, I fit two types of models:  first a cross-lag model (Selig and Little 2012) 
and second a fixed panel logistic regression.  I use the cross-lag model to assess the relationship 
between member engagement and articles, in order to tease out the potential endogenous and 
exogenous relationships between member of Congress engagement with issue areas and the 
number of articles written about a subject. A cross-lag model uses two dependent variables: in 
this case I use the number of articles written on a subject at month t and the number of members 
of Congress engaged in an issue at month t.  Then each dependent variable is regressed using 
independent variables for the previous month (t-1) values of the two dependent variables. For 
example:  
Articlest  = B01 + B1 * Articlest-1 + B2 * Members t-1 + e 
Memberst  = B02 + B3 * Articlest-1 + B4 * Members t-1 + e 
The coefficients B1 and B4 represent the lagged dependent variable for each model, in 
order to see whether previous values of the dependent value predict current values.  The 
coefficients B2 and B3 represent the cross-lags.  Does a variable’s previous value have an effect 
on the dependent variable at the current time?  My focus then is on B2 and B3 in this setup, as 
my question focuses on how members use the media, and how members are cued by the media to 
become interested in an issue area.  Because I work with a month level on the unit of analysis for 
the work in Chapter 3, I only fit the model on the previous month.  In Chapter 5, I employ a 
weekly model using lags for the previous four weeks to see how previous weeks can have an 
effect on the current week.  I do this because I have the data capability and a short enough time 
span that there should be meaningful results in looking at multiple weeks versus multiple 
months.   
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My second type of model is a fixed effects logistic regression with policy leadership 
involvement as the dependent variable. Here, I combine regression results with logistic curves 
and interaction curves to best represent and present the data and improve my general analysis of 
the relationship between policy leadership and involvement in issues from other members of 
Congress.  
Temporal Questions 
In an ideal world, a daily or weekly level of analysis would be most appropriate for my 
analysis here.  My focus is on the connection between members of Congress and articles, and the 
reaction by members of Congress to articles (and vice versa) is a crucial part of the testing 
process.  However, for most of my issues under study the number of articles never reaches more 
than 3-4 articles per week.  For example, in income assistance, with the exception of the period 
1995-1997, the series never reaches above 200 articles, or 4 articles per week.   As a result, 
analyzing at the week level would result in a multitude of zeroes, with those zeroes giving too 
much power to non-zero entries.  Therefore, for the nine issues under study in Chapter 3, I use a 
monthly series.  While the monthly series is more resistant to fluctuations due to the longer time 
period, all nine issues can be analyzed without the constant presence of zeroes.  In Chapter 5, I 
use a weekly analysis because of the large amount of data I have available in taxation, an issue 
consistently discussed by The Washington Post.  
Case Studies 
In Chapters 4 and 5, I employ multiple case studies in an attempt to look at how 
individual members of Congress either change public policy or stop others from changing public 
policy.  I use case studies here because a specific model-based analysis does not lend itself well 
to the public policy change process.  In order to best understand how these issues are changing 
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(or not changing), I need to go down into the weeds of the issues to see how individual members 
either move legislation through Congress or stop others from moving legislation through 
Congress. 
In particular, I explore member engagement in terms of individual members of Congress, 
looking at the major players in the process.  Some of these individuals, such as Richard Lugar 
and James Sensenbrenner, are policy leaders in their respective areas who are attempting to 
change public policy on an issue.  Others, like Edward Markey and Jack Kemp, are attempting to 
reshape public policy.  Each member attempts to change public policy through their actions, and 
depending on the level of issue salience, the members either succeed (whether through moving 
leadership on an issue or seeing their bill become law) or preventing others from succeeding in 
the policy process. 
In general, my focus here is on public policy: namely how does it change and what 
happens when individuals try to change public policy?  By using case studies to explore 
individual change processes, I can see the cogs of the larger engagement analysis at work, 
attempting to move policy through the use of the media as a subsidy.   
Discussion 
The primary purpose of this chapter is to set up the general research design and cases 
under analysis.  A central part of my theory is that members are using salience to their 
advantage.  By using a newspaper that receives equal competition from all members for 
coverage, I can see how members of Congress both view and react to the media to determine 
whether or not to become involved in an issue area from month to month.  In addition, I can then 
use my case studies to explore the individual aspect of the process, in how members of Congress 
translate engagement into attempts at reshaping public policy.  
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Chapter 3: Issue Engagement and Leadership Response 
Introduction 
In the spring of 1982, as the United States and the Soviet Union continued a back-and-
forth game of nuclear brinkmanship, Congress began to consider the possibility that a continually 
increasing nuclear arsenal would not lead to American safety from conflict. Members of 
Congress, led by Republican Senator Mark Hatfield of Oregon and Democratic Senator Edward 
Kennedy of Massachusetts, introduced a bill designed to move the United States and Soviet 
Union toward a bilateral freeze of nuclear weapons production. While Hatfield and Kennedy had 
both spoken against nuclear weapons in the past, neither could be considered the primary policy 
leaders on nuclear weapons. As of 1982, neither Hatfield nor Kennedy had served on the Senate 
Armed Services Committee, the committee that would normally hear matters related to nuclear 
weapons production. In addition, Hatfield and Kennedy were opposing the policy leadership in 
their respective parties; Republican John Warner and Democrat Henry Jackson, acting as the 
chair and the ranking member of the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic and 
Theater Nuclear Forces, immediately came out against the Hatfield-Kennedy proposal. Hatfield 
and Kennedy had, in fact, engaged in a policy area where they had no jurisdictional control with 
the intention to usurp power from those who normally held jurisdiction over the specific policy 
area. While the Hatfield-Kennedy proposal itself was eventually halted by pro-Reagan forces in 
the House, the proposal did move policy leaders to act: within weeks, Jackson and Warner had 
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come up with their own freeze proposal, while President Ronald Reagan began to consider 
decreasing the nuclear stockpile and moving resources toward more defensive weaponry.  
The Hatfield-Kennedy nuclear weapons story is one of attempted policy takeover: neither 
senator was a leader when it came to the issue of nuclear weapons, yet both wanted to change 
Congress’ view of the nuclear weapons arsenal from one of production to one of a weapons 
freeze. By wanting to shift the issue paradigm, both were attempting to usurp control of nuclear 
weapons from policy leadership, and those members of Congress who held control over an issue 
area due to their status as the heads of committees of jurisdiction. The story of Hatfield and 
Kennedy is also not unique: members of Congress may not agree with how an issue is dealt with 
in Congress, and may not agree with the policy supported by the chairs and ranking members of 
the committees who hold jurisdiction on specific issues. Other members of Congress will want to 
become challengers, those members who wish to take on policy leadership on specific issue 
areas. To that end, I ask: when do individual members of Congress, who are not the leaders on a 
specific issue area, engage in issue discussion in the media, and how does leadership respond to 
movements from challengers?   
I argue that members of Congress use attention to issues as a subsidy, either creating 
attention to a specific issue or capitalizing on increases in issue attention to engage in issues.  
Members do this in order to either protect an issue’s status quo or to take issue power away from 
policy leadership, those members of Congress who hold formal committee jurisdictional control 
over the issue area. The result is that as attention to an issue increases in the media, more 
members of Congress engage in that issue area in the media in order to promote their individual 
policy position on the issue.  A consequence of this movement is that issue policy leadership, 
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which would normally minimize its involvement in the issue in media, reacts in the media to 
movement by non-leadership.   
The rest of this chapter breaks down as follows: I first outline the larger argument and the 
primary hypotheses at work, before focusing on data analysis.  My data analysis takes on two 
forms: one focused on the number of members involved in discussion in issue areas and the other 
on the presence of leadership in the media on issues. 
Issue Salience and Members of Congress 
With previous scholarship in mind, I argue that to best understand why members engage 
in new issue areas, we need to understand how members of Congress view salience.  We know 
members of Congress want to minimize costs of engagement when becoming involved in an 
issue.  One way to do this is through the use of subsidies. Recalling Hall and Deardoff’s (2006) 
lobbying subsidy, we can think of issue salience (or the amount of attention an issue receives in 
the media) acting as a subsidy for members of Congress. The subsidy here is not the salience 
itself, but the movement in the salience.  Increases in issue salience are cheap information that 
cue members that an issue in question is important to the media and the public, and that as a 
result members of Congress should now want to become involved in this issue.  
Recalling discussion in Chapter 1, we can assume that members of Congress have equal 
access to the subsidy, and that the subsidy will work differently on different members of 
Congress from issue to issue, depending on the personal goals of an individual member.  An 
individual member may decide to engage in an issue because costs have decreased through 
increases in issue salience.  Similarly, another member may attempt to bring about increases in 
issue salience in order to lower the costs for others to become involved in an issue.  Other 
members may be experts who are generally involved in an issue regardless of the level of 
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salience.  Finally, some members may avoid the issue altogether, instead focusing on other issues 
based on their personal goals.  As issue salience increases then, we should expect to see more 
members of Congress involved in an issue area, as the costs of involvement decrease for 
members and individual members reach their cost threshold for involvement.    
Leaders, on the other hand, will minimize discussion until they need to become publicly 
involved in issues.  Policy leadership controls the policy at the status quo, and has already 
achieved the primary goal of issue control.  Leadership then should have little incentive to want 
to promote an issue further, as promotion of an issue means that more individuals would know 
about the issue, leading to potential challenger engagement and efforts to change an issue’s 
present circumstances. As a result, leaders then should only engage with the media when 
necessary, most likely to counteract the machinations of issue challengers.   
Now that we understand how salience works as a subsidy, we now turn to the question of 
which group is the first actor. What does the relationship between issue salience and member of 
Congress engagement look like?  As discussed in Chapter 1 (and recalling Figure 1.1), there are 
two potential models to consider when thinking about the direction between changes in issue 
salience and member engagement in issue areas.  The first is that the changes in the subsidy 
influence engagement by members of Congress.  Members of Congress are acting on increases in 
issue salience to engage in issue areas, using the salience subsidy to cue them in to the 
importance of the issue.  The result is that as the amount of attention on an issue increases, more 
members of Congress become involved in an issue.   
A second potential argument is that the relationship between member engagement and 
issue salience is reversed relative to the first model, that member of Congress involvement leads 
to more articles to be written on a subject area.  This explanation can be derived from Cook’s 
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(2006) notion of “Co-authors of the news”.  If members of Congress can influence the news, then 
they should be able to influence increases in discussion of issue areas in the media.   
There is the possibility as well that both of these cases are happening, that media 
discussion leads to member interest in a subject, and in turn member interest in a subject leads to 
media discussion.  The cyclical nature of stories could potentially be at play here, with both 
groups simultaneously pushing the other and in turn increasing interest in an issue area. 
In all cases, the result is that policy leaders engage in the issue to offset these increases in 
member involvement and issue salience: policy leaders want to protect their turf, and the 
appearance of members is a threat to their turf, whether the member created the salience 
themselves or if the salience came before member engagement.  
Following this discussion, we can derive a set of hypotheses for testing.  First, members 
of Congress will see changes in issue salience and decide to become involved in an issue area 
depending on the level of those changes.  As the number of articles increases on the issue, more 
members of Congress will see the total and decide to become involved in the issue.  To that end, 
I offer Hypothesis 1a.  
Hypothesis 1a: As the number of articles written on an issue area increases, the number of 
members of Congress engaging in the issue in the media will increase. 
 
In addition, there is also the possibility that members of Congress are the driving cog of 
issue attention as “co-authors of the news” as members of Congress cue the media to issues that 
they should care about.  Members have interests in issues, and want to push those to the general 
public.  In return the media responds to engagement with more discussion of these specific 
issues. Therefore, I offer Hypothesis 1b.  
Hypothesis 1b: As the number of members of Congress engaging in an issue area in media 
increases, the number of articles written on an issue increases.  
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Second, I move from focusing on general involvement to the involvement of leadership.  
At low levels of salience, leadership involvement should be limited as policy leaders want to 
minimize attention to their issue area in an attempt to prevent increased salience on the issue 
area.  If salience increases, then leadership needs to become involved in an issue, in order to 
represent and protect the status quo. As a result, I offer Hypothesis 2.  
Hypothesis 2: As the number of articles on an issue increases, policy leaders will be more likely 
to engage with the media on an issue area.  
 
Finally, I focus on the relationship between policy leadership involvement and non-
leadership involvement.  This relationship is conditional as leadership is more likely to become 
involved when salience increases if challengers become involved in an issue.  If salience 
increases but challengers do not engage in an issue, then there is less incentive for leadership 
engagement, as challengers are not using increased salience to shift the dominant issue position.  
If challengers are engaging, on the other hand, then leaders must engage the media to attempt to 
keep control over the issue.  I offer Hypothesis 3. 
Hypothesis 3: If a challenger has engaged in policy discussion in the media, a leader will be 
more likely to engage in media discussion regardless of the number of articles written on an 
issue.    
Data and Methods 
Newspaper Data 
Recalling Chapter 2, my primary data source here is newspaper data from The 
Washington Post on nine issue areas between 1977 and 2012.  I employ two pieces of data here: 
the number of articles written on a subject and the number of members of Congress who engage 
in an issue, by month.  In Table 3.1, I present summary data for the total number of articles and 
members captured for each issue.  As we can see, the involvement of members relative to issue 
salience varies: some issues, like agricultural subsidies and income assistance, have large 
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amounts of member involvement relative to issue salience, while other issues, like gays & 
lesbians and NASA exhibit lower levels of member involvement relative to salience. 
 
Table 3.1: Summary of Articles and Member of Congress mentions in The Washington Post 
by Issue 
 
 
 
Issue Area 
 
Total Number of 
Articles 
 
Total Member of 
Congress Mentions 
Agricultural Subsidies 1,279 1,476 
Climate Change/Global Warming 3,074 986 
Drug Policy 4,095 1,014 
Gays & Lesbians 7,781 1,289 
Immigration 10,126 3,374 
Income Assistance 2,575 1,360 
NASA& Space Exploration 7,370 892 
Nuclear Weapons 12,116 3,839 
Oil & Gas Industry 9,893 3,002 
 
Variables 
My unit of analysis for the time series is month, with the period January 1977 to 
December 2012 encompassing a total of 432 months.  I use a monthly series rather than a yearly 
series to allow for extensive analysis of change at a level where more nuanced changes in 
salience and involvement will be generally evident.  In addition, the small amount of data in 
some cases makes analysis at the weekly level far more problematic due to the lack of both 
articles and member mentions.  Therefore, given my data, the month is the most appropriate unit 
for analysis. With 432 months in my series, and 9 total issues, the total N for the entire dataset is 
3,879 (3,888 less 9, due to the use of a lagged dependent variable in the model for the first 
hypothesis).  
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Measuring Member of Congress Involvement 
I use two primary variables in this analysis.  The first refers to the number of members of 
Congress mentioned on an issue in The Washington Post in a specific month.  If a member is 
mentioned in a month, then I code them as having been in the discussion that month, regardless 
of whether they were only mentioned once in that month by The Washington Post or 20-30 times 
in that month.  I then analyze the total number of members mentioned in a given month. In 
addition, I employ dependent variables using the total number of Democrats and Republicans 
involved in a month, in order to ensure that increases are not simply the result of the two parties 
behaving differently when it comes to member involvement.    
In Table 3.2, I present frequency data for the mean number of articles and total number of 
members mentioned per month for each of the 9 issue areas. Both coverage and total number of 
members involved range greatly, with issues like nuclear weapons and immigration receiving far 
more coverage than agricultural subsidies and income assistance. In addition, the number of 
members involved varies as well. For example, NASA, an issue that in the series has at least one 
story every other day on average, typically has fewer members involved than agricultural 
subsidies, a issue that on average is written about only once every 10 days.  This has much to do 
with the nature of the issues themselves, in that NASA and space exploration have a multitude of 
involved actors – from presidents to astronauts. The issue of agricultural subsidies, on the other 
hand, is normally confined to committee hearings on such issues as peanuts and milk.  
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Table 3.2: Summary Statistics for Total Articles and Members of Congress per Month in 
The Washington Post 
  Articles   Members  
 
Issue Area 
 
Mean  
Standard 
Deviation 
 
Range 
 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
 
Range 
Agricultural Subsidies 2.96 3.15 0 – 22 2.70 4.30 0 - 22 
Climate Change 7.12 9.74 0 – 67 1.58 3.72 0 – 22 
Drug Policy 9.48 11.77 0 – 96 1.81 4.25 0 – 44 
Gays & Lesbians 18.01 13.46 0 - 96 2.26 3.94 0 – 23  
Immigration 23.44 17.70 1 – 156 5.17 6.68 0 – 63 
Income Assistance 5.96 7.54 0 – 72 2.05 5.48 0 – 73  
NASA & Space Exploration 17.06 12.20 1 – 174 1.55 2.69 0 – 21 
Nuclear Weapons 28.05 15.24 2 - 101 6.58 6.51 0 – 43  
Oil & Gas Industry 23.79 16.96 3 – 124 5.35 7.08 0 – 46  
 
Measuring Issue Salience 
The second major variable, and the primary independent variable under analysis, is issue 
salience. To measure this I use the number of articles about an issue in a given month in The 
Washington Post regardless of whether or not a member of Congress is mentioned in the article 
itself.  Recalling Table 3.2, the amount of coverage on an issue varies greatly from issue to issue.  
Nuclear weapons and immigration, for example, receive regular coverage with about a story per 
day.  The issue of agricultural subsidies, on the other hand, receives at most a story every 10 
days. The amount of variation from issue to issue in terms of both the average level of salience 
for an issue as well as what makes an issue highly salient informs my modeling choices, in 
particular the need to use panel time series with fixed unit effects.  
Measuring Leadership Involvement 
For Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3, I focus on policy leadership and the role leadership 
plays in the engagement process.  To determine which members would fit under policy 
54 
 
leadership, I compiled a list of the chairs and ranking members of committees that would hold 
some form of jurisdiction over the issue in question, using the Almanac of American Politics as 
my guide.  I was able to determine issue jurisdiction for 8 of the 9 issues in this study.  I was 
unable to determine policy leadership on the issue of gays & lesbians due to the wide-ranging 
issue areas that have been a part of gay & lesbian issue discussions (from armed services and 
military issues to Washington, D.C. issues to equal rights issues).  As a result, I do not test gays 
& lesbians in Hypothesis 2 or Hypothesis 3.  Some issues, such as immigration, only have one 
committee and one subcommittee, while others, such as nuclear weapons, have multiple 
committees claiming some form of jurisdiction over the issue. For a breakdown of the 
committees and subcommittees used to determine policy leadership, see Appendix 2.  
My dependent variable for Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3 is a dichotomous variable for 
whether or not a leader becomes involved in a given month.  I use a dichotomous variable rather 
than a count variable here because my concern is less about the number of leaders who become 
involved in a month more about whether leadership feels the need to become involved in a 
specific issue area.  
Measuring Non-Leader Involvement 
In Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3 (the hypotheses focused on the question of leadership 
involvement), I employ a dichotomous variable for whether or not a non-leader engages in the 
previous month to test the effect the presence of non-leaders in policy discussion has on 
leadership involvement. The logic here is that leadership is reacting to previous involvement by 
becoming more involved in the following month.  One potential problem is that my unit of 
analysis is at the monthly level, which can lead to high amounts of decay from one speaker to the 
next. For example, there is the chance that a non-leader in a previous month spoke on January 1, 
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and the leader in the following month spoke on February 28th.  I concede this and have fit the 
model with a non-leader dichotomous variable for both time t and time t-1.  In Table 3.5 and 
Figures 3.1 and 3.2, I use the lagged measure to be consistent with what I present in Tables 3.4 
and 3.5.  In Appendix 3, I present results when the non-leader engages in the same month the 
leader engages in discussion.  The results are similar for both hypotheses, though the results for 
Hypothesis 3 are stronger when the non-leader variable is not lagged.    
In Hypothesis 2, I primarily use the non-leader variable as a control for the effect salience 
has on leadership engagement.  In Hypothesis 3, I use both the dichotomous variable as well as 
an interaction between salience and non-leader engagement to view the effect non-leadership 
engagement has on the probability of leader engagement across levels of salience.  
Control Variables 
For the party models in Hypotheses 1a and 1b I use a control for when the party controls both 
chambers of Congress. For the Democratic and Republican models, control of neither the House nor 
Senate or only one body is coded as a zero, while control of both the House and Senate is coded as 1. 
While I do not present results using month and year-based dummies, I have tested the models in both 
hypotheses using controls for each month (using January as a baseline) and with a control for an 
election year.  The logic on both of these is based around the behavior of both members of Congress 
and the media.  For Congress, we would expect members of Congress to be more likely to seek 
national exposure in months when Congress is in session, while for the media we would expect 
media would be more likely to seek out members when members of Congress are actually in 
Washington, D.C. and not back in their home districts.  In particular, the months of August and 
December are months when Congress is not in session for an extended period of time, however, 
neither model changes the coefficient nor the standard error results significantly. In addition, checks 
on explained variance showed that their additions did not improve the R2 more than 0.01 (in the case 
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of the monthly variable).  Therefore, I do not include controls on month or year in the model.  In 
addition, in the models testing Hypothesis 2 and 3, I use a lagged dependent variable in order to 
assess how changes in one month affect the subsequent month. 
Methods 
For analysis of the first hypothesis, I employ a cross-lag paneled OLS time series with 
fixed effects for each of my 9 issue areas.  I use a cross-lag model in order to test variation both 
coming due to increases in issue salience (exogenous creation) and member movement 
(endogenous issue expansion).  In addition, I fit the model as a fixed effects model due to the 
amount of variation expected from issue to issue, in order to account for the variation between 
issues and ensure that one issue’s variation does not dominate the results.  I have fit the model in 
a variety of ways, including a negative binomial count model with panel fixed effects, as a 
standard OLS panel fixed effects regression, an OLS random effects regression, and a fixed 
effects regression with standardized coefficients, and found similar results to what I find in 
Tables 3.3 and 3.4 below.  I fit three sets of models: one for all members of Congress, one for 
just Democratic members, and one for just Republican members. 
Cross-lag models require two dependent variables for study (the two variables being 
tested under the cross-lag).  For my purposes, I use the number of articles written in The 
Washington Post on a subject by month at time t (exogenous) and the number of members of 
Congress mentioned at time t (endogenous).  The independent variables in each model are the 
lagged (t-1) number of articles in The Washington Post and the lagged (t-1) number of members 
of Congress mentioned. For example:  
Articlest  = B01 + B1 * Articlest-1 + B2 * Members t-1 + e 
Memberst  = B02 + B3 * Articlest-1 + B4 * Members t-1 + e 
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In the party models, I also control for the number of members who engaged in a previous 
month, as well as controls for whether the Democrats or Republicans controlled both houses of 
Congress in the party models.  For the Democrats, complete control occurs between 1977-1980, 
1987-1994, and 2009-2010, while Republicans control both bodies between 1995 and May of 
2001, and 2003-2006.  My expectations in terms of the controls is that a political party having 
complete control of Congress will lead to more members of Congress from that party discussing 
an issue.  Knowing that profit drives much of the decision-making processes of news creation 
(Hamilton 2004), journalists will want to talk to people who are most directly connected to the 
policy processes under discussion, namely people who can change these (the majority party).  In 
addition, there should be no relationship between control of Congress and the number of articles 
written on a subject, as the media in general will not take party control into consideration when 
determining what issues to focus on.  Finally in terms of diagnostics I use robust standard errors 
to deal with potential issues with serial autocorrelation.   
For the second and third hypotheses, I use fixed effects logistic regression using issue 
dummies to deal with the potential variation from issue to issue.  The dependent variable here is 
whether or not a leader engaged in a given month.  I use two models here: one that consists of 
salience in that month, lagged presence of leadership, presence of non-leadership, and issue 
dummies, as well as another model that in addition to the covariates in the first model includes 
an interaction between salience and the presence of non-leadership to view how the engagement 
of non-leadership affects leaders across salience.  
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Results 
Member Involvement 
In Table 3, I present results from the paneled time series looking at the number of 
members of Congress involved in an issue area by month. As noted above, the cross-lag 
produces two models, one with a dependent variable of the total number of articles on the subject 
in The Washington Post, and one with the dependent variable of the total number of members 
mentioned in The Washington Post.  In Table 3.3, I only present the results for all members of 
Congress, while Table 3.4 contains the results for both Democrats and Republicans.   
Table 3.3: Results, Cross-Lag Analysis of Members of Congress Involvement and Number 
of Articles 
 
 Number of Members Number of Articles 
Articles(t-1)  0.09 (0.02)* 0.65 (0.07)* 
Members (t-1) 0.36 (0.03)* 0.17 (0.08) 
Constant 0.64 (0.23)* 4.82 (0.83)* 
N 3,879 3,879 
R2 overall 0.35 0.62 
F 119.90 (0.00) 154.28 (0.00) 
Note: Fixed effects panel regression. Robust standard errors used. Significance * = p < 0.05 
 
 
In general, we see support for Hypothesis 1a: when more articles are written on a subject 
in a previous month, more members of Congress become involved in that issue area in the 
following month.  As the number of articles on a subject increases, the number of members of 
Congress who engage in the issue also increases.  On the other hand, we see less evidence for 
Hypothesis 1b: an increase in the number of members of Congress involved in the previous 
month does not translate into an increase in the number of articles written on a subject in The 
Washington Post. While the coefficient is two times greater than the standard error, the p-value 
for the measure is 0.072, outside of the 0.05 range used here.    
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In Table 3.4, I present results on issue engagement by separating out Democrats and 
Republicans, in order to see whether there are party-related differences.  In addition, I employ a 
control for whether the Democratic or Republican Party controls both houses of Congress during 
the month in question, assuming that total control of Congress will mean that party is more likely 
to be mentioned in The Washington Post (both due to the existence of more members than the 
other party and deference given to political leadership). 
Table 3.4: Results, Cross-Lag Analysis of Members of Congress Involvement and Number 
of Articles, Democrats and Republicans 
 
 Democrats Republicans 
 Number of 
Members 
Number of 
Articles 
Number of 
Members 
Number of 
Articles 
Articles(t-1)  0.05 (0.01)* 0.64 (0.07)* 0.04 (0.01)* 0.67 (0.07)* 
Members (t-1) 0.39 (0.04)* 0.33 (0.15) 0.34 (0.04)* 0.12 (0.11) 
Democratic Congress 0.54 (0.10)* -0.32 (0.37) - - 
Republican Congress - - 0.62 (0.17)* 0.33 (0.54) 
Constant 0.11 (0.18) 4.95 (0.97)* 0.12 (0.17) 4.65 (0.84)* 
N 3,879 3,879 3,879 3,879 
R2 overall 0.36 0.62 0.30 0.62 
F 42.85 (0.00) 181.52  (0.00) 36.41 (0.00) 129.73 (0.00) 
Note: Fixed effects panel regression. Robust standard errors used. Significance * = p < 0.05 
 
We see similar effects in Table 3.4 to the ones seen in Table 3.3.  The number of articles 
in a previous month has a positive effect on member engagement in the following month, while 
the number of members involved in one month is in the correct direction for both Democrats and 
Republicans, but is not significant at 0.05.  In addition, the party control variables for the two 
parties act as expected above:  while members of Congress involved in issues is greater when 
their party is in power, the presence of a specific political party does not lead to the writing of 
more articles on a subject area.    
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The Role of Leadership 
For testing Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3, I turn to a fixed effects logistic regression, 
testing both the effect issue salience and the presence non-leaders have on leader engagement 
using all members.  I fitted two regressions: the first testing only the effects of salience, lagged 
leader presence, the presence of non-leaders on leader presence and a series of issue dummies to 
isolate effects, and the second testing on leader presence using an interaction between salience 
and the engagement of non-leaders to view the effect of non-leader appearance across salience.  I 
fit the model on all months of all 8 issues.  This includes months when no articles were written 
on a specific issue in The Washington Post.  I find similar results to what I find in Table 3.5 
when I run the model without these months with no articles.  These results can be found in 
Appendix 4.   
In Table 3.5, I present logistic regression results for the probability a policy leader will 
engage an issue area, by month. I use two models here.  Model 1 is a model without the 
interaction between the number of articles per month and the non-leadership engagement 
variable.  Model 2 includes the interaction.  The reason I use two separate models is to see the 
effects of articles both independent and dependent upon non-leadership engagement.  
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Table 3.5: Leadership Engagement in Issue Areas 
Note: Fixed effects logistic regression generated by fitting random effects logistic regression and employing dummy 
variables for individual issues, with agricultural subsidies acting as the baseline case.   Issue significance is in terms 
of the difference between agricultural subsidies and the issue in question. Significance * = p < 0.05 
 
 
I present the models with the unit effects for each model present, in order to use these 
later in creating Figures 3.1 and 3.2.   I use agricultural subsidies as my baseline in the 
regression.  For interpretive purposes, the coefficients then represent the difference between 
agricultural subsidies and the other issues, with only NASA being similar to agricultural 
subsidies.  Returning to the main independent variables, we see general support for Hypothesis 2, 
based on the results in Model 1 and Model 2.  The coefficient for articles is both positive and 
significant at 0.05 in both models.   As logistic regression parameters may be challenging to 
interpret, I will instead present logistic regression curves predicting probability of leadership 
engagement across levels of salience for each of the 8 issue areas with assessable leadership.  To 
better represent the effects, I present probability curves for each of the two models.  In Figure 
3.1, I present probability curves for the probability of leadership engagement across levels of 
issue salience, using Model 1’s results. 
 Model 1 Model 2  
Articles (t)  0.08 (0.01)* 0.10 (0.01)* 
Leadership Engagement (t-1) 0.60 (0.10)* 0.60 (0.10)* 
Non-Leadership Engagement(t-1) 0.39 (0.10)* 0.61 (0.15)* 
Articles (t)  x Non-Leadership 
Engagement 
- -0.02 (0.01)* 
Climate Change & Global Warming -1.20 (0.18)* -1.19 (0.18)* 
Drug Policy -1.98 (0.21)* -1.98 (0.21)* 
Immigration -0.77 (0.17)* -0.79 (0.18)* 
Income Assistance & Social Welfare -0.75 (0.16)* -0.75 (0.17)* 
NASA & Space Exploration -0.89 (0.17)* -0.96 (0.17)* 
Nuclear Weapons -0.84 (0.18)* -0.86 (0.18)* 
Oil & Gas Industry -1.09 (0.18)* -1.11 (0.18)* 
Constant -1.37 (0.12)* -1.48 (0.13)* 
N 3,448 3,448 
LL -1702.10 -1699.97 
62 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Predicted Effect of Salience on Leadership Engagement 
 
Figure 3.1a. Agricultural Subsidies   Figure 3.1b. Climate Change 
   
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1c. Drug Policy    Figure 3.1d. Immigration 
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Figure 3.1e. Income Assistance   Figure 3.1f. NASA & Space Exploration 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1g. Nuclear Weapons    Figure 3.1h. Oil & Gas Industry 
   
 
 
 To create the curves, I use the first model, the regression without an interaction between 
salience and non-leader involvement. I allow salience to vary between each issue’s minimum 
salience and maximum salience, and set all other variables at zero.  I am only working with two 
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control variables here: the presence of a leader in the previous month and the presence of a non-
leader in the previous month.  I code both as zero in order to see what the graphs look like in the 
most extreme case, when members have not been previously involved.  My goal in Figure 3.1 is 
to first see how leaders react even when non-leaders have previously been present.  The results 
do not change when I create the graphs coding for non-leaders being present in the previous 
month.   
Returning to Figure 3.1, the result is that the x-axes covering salience for each issue area 
are different, ranging from 0-20 when it comes to agricultural subsidies up to 0 to 150 in the case 
of NASA & Space Exploration. I allow the axes to range in order to assess the effects at the real 
minimum and maximum of each issue area.  To test the potential variability of results, I simulate 
the results 1,000 times based on the original model for each issue, which are presented in grey in 
each graph.  Finally, I also include points in each model showing the number of leader entries 
and non-entries for each issue distributed across salience.   
The probability curves show strong evidence for Hypothesis 2 - as salience increases on 
all issues, the probability of policy leadership engagement into the issue area increases.  While 
the curve for Figure 3.1a (agricultural subsidies) does not reach a probability close to 1, it does 
show an upward trend in line with the trends seen in the other graphs.  In addition, the 
agricultural subsidies graph ends at its observed maximum of 22 stories per month. When 
extended out to 50 stories a month, the general trend on the data is similar to the other issue 
areas, with the probability greatly increasing as salience increases.   
Finally, I look at the interaction between salience and the presence of non-leaders, to see 
how the presence of non-leaders affects policy leadership across levels of salience.  In Figure 
3.2, I present the result of the interaction for each issue area, observing the probability of 
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leadership engagement across levels of salience for both non-leader engagement and lack of non-
leader engagement.  I use the regression in Model 2 from Table 3.5 to create the curves.  
Figure 3.2: Predicted Effect of Salience on Leadership Engagement, by Non-Leader 
Engagement 
 
Figure 3.2a. Agricultural Subsidies   Figure 3.2b. Climate Change 
   
 
 
Figure 3.2c. Drug Policy    Figure 3.2d. Immigration 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
66 
 
 
Figure 3.2e. Income Assistance   Figure 3.2f. NASA and Space Exploration 
   
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2g. Nuclear Weapons   Figure 3.2h. Oil & Gas Industry 
   
 
As in Figure 3.1, I use the observed minimums and maximums to cap the range of 
salience for each issue area, and present the observed levels of engagement for leaders across 
salience on the top and bottom of each graph in the figure.  As we can see from each graph in 
Figure 3.2, the line representing non-leadership engagement both starts at a higher level than the 
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line representing no engagement.  Leaders are generally more likely to engage when a non-leader 
is present in the previous month until around 30 articles a month, when the difference between 
the two cases is both very close to a probability of 1.  There is about a 10% difference in the 
probability in leader engagement when non-leaders have engaged in the previous month at the 
lowest levels of salience, though this effect diminishes as salience increases until we reach high 
levels of salience, implying that leaders are generally involved when discussion of issues is 
generally higher in a month.  Therefore, leaders are more likely to engage when non-leaders have 
become involved in the previous month, thought the effects diminish as salience increases and 
more individuals become involved.  Simply put, the appearance of non-leaders makes leaders 
more likely to engage in issue areas even at times of lower salience, in order to offset any effects 
non-leaders may try to have on public policy. 
Discussion 
Overall, I have found support for Hypothesis 1a, 2, and 3, and less support for Hypothesis 
1b.  As we see from the first hypothesis, as an issue becomes more salient, more members of 
Congress become involved in the issue area, whether to help maintain or shift public policy or to 
help promote themselves for upcoming elections.  We can see this both in issues with low 
general levels of salience, such as agricultural subsidies, as well as issues with more coverage, 
such as nuclear weapons.  With regards to the second and third hypotheses, we also see evidence 
of leadership reaction to these movements by non-leadership members, with leadership reacting 
to both the increase in issue salience and the presence of non-leaders attempting to change 
policy.  We see less evidence that members are acting as co-authors of the news, attempting to 
influence public policy by engaging in issues more in an attempt to influence media.  When 
salience is lower, members of Congress act on increases in discussion to move on issue areas.  In 
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Chapter 5, I will explore what happens when an issue area is ever-present, and members no 
longer have the power of the subsidy to work with.  
These trends are just part of a larger story on control of public policy.  With the increase 
of member involvement, there is the potential that individuals can attempt to take control of 
policy issues away from policy leadership.  However, in terms of message control, we see 
confusion: while non-leaders may be using increases in salience toengage in issue areas, 
leadership is responding by getting in as well.  The result is a back and forth between the two 
groups, and confusion over who controls the message on policy.  Non-leaders may be 
advantaged by getting in first, but leaders have institutional advantages to help protect their 
policy positions from immediate change by non-leaders.  
In addition, one important ramification from this work is that we have a better sense of 
how members of Congress use the media.  Members of Congress view the media as they do any 
other tool, in that it provides a way for them to reach any number of varied member goals.  For 
members of Congress, media provides a tool to all members to determine what issues members 
should engage in at a given time.  With increases in issue salience, members of Congress have 
more information on a subject and can engage in that subject while the public has its eyes on the 
issue. The result is that members of Congress can work toward achieving their goals both in 
terms of public policy and ambition, depending on the primary goal of the member of Congress 
in question.   
What we know here is that members of Congress are reacting to increases in issue 
salience and discussing issues that may be outside of their normal purview.  Members of 
Congress are cognizant of media and wish to capitalize on it as best they can to maximize their 
own personal goals, whether these goals relate to re-election and concerns within their district or 
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goals related to upward mobility in political life.  Regardless of the motivations, members of 
Congress use media as a subsidy to help determine when it is appropriate to engage an issue area, 
and through the use of the subsidy, attempt to either protect or change current public policy on an 
issue that seems to be of importance to the political media.  
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Chapter 4: Individual Members of Congress and Policy Change 
Introduction 
Having looked at how and when we should expect member of Congress engagement in 
issue areas, we now turn to the question of public policy.  Simply put, how do individual 
members of Congress change public policy?  Clearly there are many factors at work to inhibit 
members from making policy change, from institutional rules to problems of collective action 
with other members of Congress.  The normal condition for Congress should then be no policy 
change; however, policies do change, as members of Congress successfully get policy initiatives 
passed, which, in turn, changes a policy within Congress.   
How do members succeed in making these changes, and under what conditions should we 
expect success?  In this chapter, I explore policy change in the United States Congress, focusing 
on a series of cases to assess how individual members of Congress either use lower salience (in 
the case of policy leaders) or higher salience (in the case of non-leaders) to bring about or 
prevent policy change.  Two factors interact in whether individuals are successful at enacting 
policy change: the level of salience on the policy in question and whether the policy change is 
advocated by policy leadership or pushed by individual insurgent members of Congress.  
Depending on these factors, policy change can either be enacted or blocked by specific parties, 
with leaders having more power at lower levels of salience, and other members able to wield 
power at higher levels of salience.  I argue that policy leaders have control over policy during 
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times of low salience, and lose control as salience increases on an issue.  As a result, policy 
leaders who want to change public policy need to do so when the issue is not being discussed by 
the media.  When attention to the issue increases, the chance leaders have to change policy 
decreases and the chance non-leaders can reshape policy increases.  
I start the chapter by looking at what may bring about policy change, with particular 
focus on both the role Congress and policy leadership play in the process. I then focus on 3 case 
studies related to policy change and individual foci on policy change.  The first, agricultural 
subsidies, focuses on the movement to end subsidies entirely, and in particular on how Senator 
Richard Lugar of Indiana, a long term proponent of cutting subsidies, went from being on the 
outside of power to the very representation of power.  Second, I focus on immigration, and look 
at how increases in attention to immigration shifted power on the issue away from policy 
leadership and led to the lack of new policy in the mid-2000s. Finally, I look at the nuclear freeze 
movement of the early 1980s, focusing on how insurgent members of Congress used attention to 
refocus American policy on nuclear weapons and disarmament.   
My goals in this chapter are two-fold.  First, to explore policy change in the context of 
members either using the lack of salience (as in policy leadership) or the presence of salience (as 
with non-leaders) to bring about policy change.  The second is to identify and provide examples 
of the relationship between salience and members of Congress.  If members of Congress are 
using salience as a subsidy to maximize effectiveness, then we should be able to see how 
individual activity plays out in the media as salience increases.  Individual members should be 
strategic about engagement, attempting to find the right time to engage in an issue in the media.  
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Policy Change in the United States Congress 
The United States Congress conducts policy change through the legislative process, 
starting at the bill introduction phase and ending (if successful) with the signing of the bill by the 
president.  In particular, the body is designed to maximize member goals through the use of the 
committee system.  The institutional body depends on the committee system, which works 
through a trade-off of influence to maximize member goals through committee assignment 
(Weingast and Marshall 1988).  Central to the organizational process is the notion of majority 
rule: a majority of the membership must support a change to policy for the change to actually 
happen.  Therefore the committee process is central to understanding policy change in Congress, 
and its leaders, the chairs and ranking members of relevant committees, are the primary actors in 
the process on a given issue. 
 How do policy leaders control the policy process? Policy leaders use committee power to 
their advantage.  Most notably, at any stage in that process the bill can be killed, making the 
passage of bills and the changing of public policy a rare event.  The control leaders hold spans 
across the theoretical understandings of Congressional organization.  For the responsible party 
government theory espoused by Gary Cox and Mathew McCubbins (1993, 2005), the agenda 
control by leadership through the committee process works as a cartel: if the leadership wants 
something to not reach the floor, it will not reach the floor. The conditional party government 
model (Rohde 1991) gives control to the caucus to determine what reaches the floor, which 
inhibits individual engagement through the presence of collective action problems that individual 
members must overcome to succeed.  Therefore, policy change is hard to do as an individual 
member pushing for an issue area, simply because policy leaders control the agenda on issues 
they hold formal authority over.  
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In addition, control goes beyond the simple existence of committee chairs holding an 
agenda veto. The chair’s status as a gatekeeper for issue jurisdictions, both formal and informal, 
allows leaders to control specific issue areas (Shepsle and Weingast 1987) and can shape their 
jurisdiction not only in the committee stage, but also at the conference stage (Shepsle and 
Weingast 1987).  Even outside of institutional control, leadership holds power, as seen in the 
media, where leaders are generally those most likely to be Congressional newsmakers (Cook 
1986).  Finally, while committee control of members through punishment has diminished in the 
postreform Congress (Rohde 1991, 22), the potential does exist for party leadership to take 
negative actions against members, whether in terms of committee assignment (Baker 1983) or 
electoral support (Snowberg 2008).  
Salience and Policy Change: Leader versus Non-Leader Change 
Which members of Congress will attempt to change public policy?  Policy leaders, in 
general, should be supportive of current policy.  However, at the same time, policy leaders too 
may find opportunities to change public policy.  When parties gain control of a body of 
Congress, a policy leader that may have been in the minority prior to the election may now have 
the ability to actually reshape public policy in their issue area.  These moments for leaders are 
what Baumgartner and Jones (2009, 5) call “waves of enthusiasm,” when leaders see an 
opportunity to attempt to shift public policy on an issue closer to the leader’s ideal policy.  
Success will depend on issue salience.  For low levels of salience, leaders will be more likely to 
see change due to the lack of competition from other members and leaders’ institutional abilities 
to block non-leaders from attempting to stop change.  At high levels of salience, leader power 
diminishes as more members become involved in discussion and leaders’ institutional abilities to 
block non-leaders diminish.   
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In Figure 4.1, I outline the four possible scenarios related to my theory of salience and 
policy change dependent upon member involvement.  I focus on two potential factors: the 
inducer of policy change (policy leader-supported change attempts versus non-leader change 
attempts) and the level of salience (high versus low).   
 
Figure 4.1: Relationship between Policy Change Inducer and Issue Salience 
 
There are four expected scenarios.  In the top left of Figure 4.1, we see situations 
involving policy leaders attempting to make policy changes when an issue’s coverage is high.  In 
these situations, leaders are less likely to be able to enact change: their normal control of the 
issue diminishes, leaving other members the opportunity to prevent leaders from gaining the 
majority needed for change and in turn blocking leader attempts at policy change.  In the bottom 
left box we again have policy leaders attempting change, but this time during times when an 
issue has low levels of salience.  Here, unlike at high levels of salience, the normal controls 
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policy leaders have hold, allowing policy leaders to change policy without having to deal with 
potential usurpers stopping them.  
We now turn to change as attempted by non-leaders.  Here, the effects of salience are 
flipped: for high salience, policy change is more likely as increases in salience open the 
possibility that a policy leader’s control of an issue has diminished and non-leaders can 
effectively act to shift and change public policy.  Low salience, on the other hand, is less likely 
to lead to change: leadership control of an issue holds and non-leaders have no recourse to offset 
the power held by policy leaders.  
Over the course of the rest of this chapter, I will illustrate these scenarios using three case 
studies.  I will start by looking at agricultural subsidies, a case of lower issue salience.  Here, the 
“workhorses” in Congress come into play, with members using the body to move up and 
eventually become the policy leader on the issue.  In particular, I will focus on one U.S. Senator, 
Richard Lugar of Indiana, who found his early attempts to change subsidies stymied by policy 
leadership only for him to later take on the reins of policy leadership and finally have the 
opportunity to shift policy.  After the focus on low salience, I move to two cases of higher 
salience: immigration reform in the mid-2000s and the nuclear freeze.  These two cases contrast 
in terms of who attempted to shift public policy.  In the case of immigration reform, policy 
leaders attempted to shift policy on the issue only to have a multitude of actors engagein an 
attempt to reshape immigration in terms of each individual members’ desire, with the result 
being the lack of created policy.  On the nuclear freeze, members of Congress opposed to the 
continued creation of nuclear weapons and used increased attention to the nuclear freeze 
movement to attempt to stop production of weapons, leading policy leadership to shift their own 
policy closer to the desires of the non-leaders.   
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Agricultural Subsidies: Leadership Control during Low Salience 
Background 
The United States Congress has a long history of involvement in the area of agriculture.  
The House Agriculture Committee was established in 1820 (“Committee History”), and the 
Senate followed suit in 1825 (“History”).  Congress created both committees in order to separate 
agricultural issues from other economic issues, including trade and tariffs.  However by the 
1920s and 1930s American agriculture had stagnated. A combination of environmental issues 
that culminated in the Dust Bowl of the 1930s as well as economic issues due to the Great 
Depression had left farming as a profession on the brink of collapse.  The United States 
Congress, in response to these issues, created the first agricultural subsidy programs in the 
1920s, culminating with the 1933 Agricultural Adjustment Act, which included provisions 
paying farmers to not grow on certain land to help improve crop prices for all farmers.  The 
subsidy program has shifted and changed since then, culminating in the focus on crop insurance 
in the Agriculture Act of 2014 (Plumer 2014).  
While subsidies for farmers have persisted through the postwar period, there have been 
attempts to end the subsidization of agriculture, with arguments that subsidies lead to 
overabundance of specific crops (Urry 2015) and weaken the American economy (Edwards 
2007).  Most attempts prior to the Republican victories in the 1994 midterm elections were 
stopped by both Democrats and Republicans from farm states, as both groups viewed the 
continued protection of subsidies as central to the continual electoral success of their parties in 
those states.  While urban Democrats like Charles Schumer and Barney Frank attempted to make 
changes on subsidies in the 1980s by attacking specific subsidies like milk and tobacco, major 
reform was always pushed back or left out of the large omnibus farm bills.   
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The Republican victories of 1994 and the emergence of the 104th Congress offered new 
possibility for changing agricultural policy and shifting away from subsidies for two primary 
reasons.  First, the Farm Bill, the large omnibus agricultural policy bill that set farm policy in the 
United States and includes agricultural subsidies as a major component, was up for 5-year 
reauthorization, having last been authorized in 1990 by the Democratically-controlled 101st 
Congress.  The Republican Party was perfectly positioned to reshape policy, given that there was 
now need to reauthorize how the United States dealt with agricultural policy.  
Second, changes in the policy leadership on agriculture made the potential to end or at 
least drastically modify subsidies more likely to occur.  Democratic agricultural stalwarts such as 
Senate Agriculture Committee Chair Patrick Leahy of Vermont and House Agriculture 
Committee Chair Eligio “Kika” de la Garza of Texas both lost their chairmanships as power 
shifted from the Democratic Party to the Republican Party.  At the same time, the Republican 
policy leadership on agriculture had changed from the last time the Republicans held the Senate.  
Senator Jesse Helms, the North Carolina Republican whose support of tobacco and peanut 
subsidies had kept them from significant tampering in previous farm bills, was no longer the 
chair of the Agriculture Committee as he had been at the end of the 99th Congress, having moved 
over to Foreign Affairs.  In his place was Senator Richard Lugar of Indiana, a long-time force 
against high agricultural spending. However Lugar would have to face opposition from a long-
time champion of subsidies on the Republican side, Congressman Pat Roberts of Kansas, a long-
time champion of the wheat industry who now held the chairmanship of the House Agriculture 
Committee.    
Lugar, the new chair of the Senate Agriculture Committee in the 104th Congress, had 
long been a vocal proponent against high levels of agricultural spending.  During the 
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negotiations that led to the Agriculture and Food Act of 1981, Lugar noted of his fellow 
Agriculture Committee members spending habits that “The only compromise is among the 
members of the committee sitting around a table trying to protect separate commodities… There 
still are uncontrollable expenditures in every direction in this package” (Sinclair 1981a).  In 
addition, Lugar had made previous attempts to shift agricultural policy away from subsidy 
programs, failing to overhaul both the peanut subsidy program in 1981 (Sinclair 1981b) and the 
water subsidy program in 1982 (Sinclair 1982).  Lugar’s moves during the period of Republican 
majority in the Senate led to fears from pro-subsidy Republicans that a Lugar-led Agriculture 
Committee would cut subsidy programs dramatically, a charge that Agriculture Chair Jesse 
Helms made explicitly during his 1984 re-election campaign (Sinclair 1984).  While Lugar 
would eventually become the senior Republican on the Agriculture Committee at the end of the 
99th Congress (as Helms began to focus more on foreign affairs), he would find himself as 
ranking member following the Democrats’ successful capture of the Senate in the 1986 midterm 
elections. With the committee now in the hands of Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont, a Senator 
in a state dependent on dairy subsidies, Lugar would have to wait on shifting policy until the 
Republicans could retake the Senate.  
Unlike Senator Lugar, Congressman Pat Roberts did not have a history of fighting against 
subsidies.  Roberts was in fact a major proponent of subsidies, in particular wheat subsidies due 
to the nature of his district, the heavily wheat-dependent 1st district of Kansas.  As Ward Sinclair 
of The Washington Post noted on Roberts in 1981,  
Scratch his skin just a bit and Rep. Pat Roberts (R-Kan.) oozes wheat.  He talks 
wheat, breathes wheat, lives wheat all day long. Then, as he leaves for home 
each evening, Roberts checks a big signboard on his office wall, the baleful 
reminder that he is the Congressman from Wheat.  The board shows the daily 
wheat closing prices (always too low) at the Dodge City market.  Wheat is that 
important. (Sinclair 1981c). 
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For Roberts, protection of the wheat industry and the cultivation of wheat was paramount 
to his continued electoral success and his House career.  Roberts’ hard work protecting wheat led 
him to his position at the top of the House Agriculture Committee at the start of the 104th 
Congress, giving the perfect opportunity to protect subsidies from Lugar’s desire to end the 
subsidy program entirely.    
Low Salience and Leadership Policy Change: Lugar, Roberts, and Agricultural 
Subsidies 
Richard Lugar entered the 104th Congress wanting to change the subsidy system, even 
telling incoming Senate Budget Chairman Pete Domenici “I would not rule out any options, 
including the abolition of the programs” (LaFraniere 1994).  Meanwhile, Pat Roberts entered the 
104th Congress looking to protect agricultural subsidies, even as members of his own party in the 
House such as House Majority Leader Richard Armey were advocating for the end of subsidies 
(LaFraniere 1994).    
Lugar would strike first, proposing a $15 billion dollar cut in agricultural spending (“Mr. 
Lugar’s Surprising Allies” 1995) and advocating for the eventual abolition of agricultural 
subsidies (“Lugar’s Principled Stand” 1995).  At the same time, Lugar also announced a run for 
the presidency, focusing on agriculture by noting,  
As an Indiana farmer, I have advocated cutting farm subsidies by $15 billion. 
Farmers want to and should plant for the market, and not for the government. 
The government should not dictate the economy, the market and individual 
goals should. (Lugar 1995).  
 
Roberts, on the other hand, waited.  While Lugar and the Senate began proposing major 
changes, Roberts instead watched as both Lugar and the Clinton Administration proposed 
programs.  The opportunity for compromise between the two could potentially be the saving 
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grace for subsidies.  The Clinton plan, proposed in May 1995, would result in more modest cuts 
to agricultural spending than the cuts Lugar and the Senate Agriculture Committee wanted, and 
also called for the end of requiring “program crops” to be planted on lands by allowing farmers 
to plant any crops on subsidized lands, a provision Roberts supported (Gugliotta 1995a).  With 
both Clinton and Lugar’s plans laid out, and both calling for cuts to agriculture, Roberts would 
get involved in the process later in the year, calling for the creation of a fixed payment system to 
replace subsidies, with payments decreasing from year to year.  The payment plan would end 
subsidies by 2002.   
The Roberts plan, called “Freedom to Farm”, would not be immediately successful in the 
House of Representatives.  When Freedom to Farm reached the House Agriculture Committee in 
September of 1995, Roberts faced immediate opposition from members whose future electoral 
prospects would depend upon the continuation of subsidies.  The culmination of this opposition 
would come when four Republican House Agriculture committee members: Congressmen 
Richard Baker of Louisiana, Saxby Chambliss of Georgia, Larry Combest of Texas, and Bill 
Emerson of Missouri, defeated Roberts’ bill in committee (Gugliotta 1995b).  While the 
insurgent members were able to temporarily derail Roberts’ plan, Roberts bypassed the 
Agriculture Committee, instead sending the bill to become part of the failed omnibus spending 
bill that was a central component of the 1995-1996 government shutdowns.   
Roberts and Lugar were not done though: Roberts would reintroduce Freedom to Farm as 
the Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act, and the Senate would pass a version of 
Freedom to Farm in February 1996 following compromises with committee Democrats 
(Gugliotta 1996).  The Senate version of the bill would be incorporated into Roberts’ House bill 
in conference, and would pass both the House and Senate, finally being signed by President Bill 
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Clinton on April 4, 1996.  Despite opposition from both Democrats and Republicans who could 
be greatly hurt by changes to the subsidy system, Lugar and Roberts were able to reshape the 
agricultural subsidy program.  While many of the changes made by the two were eventually 
dismantled by future farm bills, the two had, at least in 1996, changed public policy on 
agricultural subsidies.  
Setting the Stage: Media and Congressional Involvement on Agricultural 
Subsidies 
So how did leadership win, even though faced with opposition from other members? 
When the 104th Congress began debating changes to agriculture policy, the issue of agricultural 
subsidies had received little coverage from the media.  The lack of coverage is unsurprising, as 
agricultural issues have rarely received general coverage from media, even during times of major 
agricultural strife.  In Figure 4.2, I graph the total number of articles on agricultural subsidies by 
year in The Washington Post from the year 1977 until 2012.  In addition, I include lines denoting 
the years 1995 and 1996, the two years encompassing the 104th Congress and the period the 
Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform (hereafter FAIR) Act of 1996 was considered.  
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Figure 4.2: Total Number of Articles on Agricultural Subsidies in The Washington Post by 
Year 
 
As we can see from the graph, the most articles on Agricultural Subsidies were written 
not during the 104th Congress, but in 1985, when major debt issues threatened to cripple family 
farms and the Farm Aid movement attempted to shed light on issues facing small family farms in 
the United States.  Even then, the total number of articles related to agricultural subsidies is only 
111, about an article every three days.  Meanwhile, the period encompassing the 104th Congress 
sees only 92 articles on agricultural subsidies, or under an article a week.  In general, the issue of 
agricultural subsidies receives very little coverage in the media relative to other issue areas, even 
during times when major changes on the issue may be about to occur.    
With that small amount of coverage, we should expect that the number of members of 
Congress involved will also be relatively small.  In Figure 4.3, I graph the total number of 
members of Congress mentioned with regards to agricultural subsidies in The Washington Post 
by year, again using dashed lines to denote the period of the 104th Congress (1995-1996).  Again, 
we see similar results to what we see in Figure 4.2, with a peak in 1985 and only 20-30 members 
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involved in the years 1995-1996.  Of particular note is that only 17 members are involved in 
1996, the year of FAIR’s passage.  In general, despite the major changes in FAIR, only a few 
members are quoted on the bill in the year it is passed, and a smaller number of members are 
quoted in the previous year (the first year of a Republican majority) than in 1985.  
Figure 4.3: Total Number of Members of Congress discussing Agricultural Subsidies in 
The Washington Post by Year 
 
 
We know that coverage is low and that individual involvement is low.  But what 
members of Congress become involved on agriculture?  In Figure 4.4, I present the number of 
mentions members of Congress received on agricultural subsidies in The Washington Post in the 
104th Congress.  For purposes of space and to allow for easy reading, I only present the top 10 
members by total number of mentions.  The result of this paring is that I present the totals for 7 
Republican members and three Democratic members.  I identify members who qualify as policy 
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leaders by capitalization.  Appendix 2 contains the list of relevant committees on agricultural 
subsidies.  
Figure 4.4: Number of Mentions on Agriculture Subsidies by Member, 104th Congress 
 
 
 
Figure 4.4 shows that the discussion of agricultural subsidies in The Washington Post is 
dominated by the two Agriculture committee chairs, Richard Lugar and Pat Roberts.  Lugar and 
Roberts together account for 46 of the 117 total mentions of members of Congress in the 104th 
Congress, or 39% of the mentions.  After Lugar and Roberts, many of the mentions come from 
either party leadership, such as House Speaker Newt Gingrich, Senate Majority Leader Robert 
Dole (who by the end of the 104th Congress had become the 1996 Republican presidential 
nominee), and Senate Minority Leader Thomas Daschle, or from minority policy leadership such 
as Senate Agriculture Committee ranking member Patrick Leahy.  The non-leadership members 
with the most mentions are both future leaders themselves: Congressman Charles Schumer of 
New York and Congressman John Boehner of Ohio.  Simply, when the United States Congress 
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took up farming reform, the primary actors involved in the process were leadership, and in 
particular, policy-related leadership.  More importantly, only one of the insurgents against 
Freedom to Farm among House Republicans makes an appearance, as Larry Combest has three 
mentions in the Congress.  Had the salience of subsidies been higher, Combest and his 
compatriots may have been more successful at stopping the large changes to the subsidy system.  
Instead, they were unable to turn their committee revolt into anything more than some changes 
once the bill was sent to conference.   
The combination of a lack of coverage and lack of membership involvement gives policy 
leadership in agriculture large amounts of power to both make change when they see fit or stop 
change from gaining traction if they believe that the changes would be harmful.  What we see in 
Figure 4.4 is the culmination of individual power in the leadership in times of low salience.  
When there is only limited discussion on an issue, policy leadership controls the agenda. Richard 
Lugar’s ascension to leadership power on agricultural issues at the beginning of the 104th 
Congress meant that Lugar now had the means necessary to make changes to the subsidy system 
in Congress.  Pat Roberts in turn had the ability to shape the program, moving away from the 
Senate’s desire for a total end to subsidies to the adoption of payment programs.  In times of low 
salience, leadership dominates, both in terms of protecting status quo policy as well as reshaping 
policy.  
Immigration Reform in the mid-2000s: Leadership Loss of Control 
Background 
When the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 was signed by President Ronald 
Reagan on November 6, 1986, the hard work of two subcommittee chairmen, Republican 
Senator Alan Simpson of Wyoming and Democratic Congressman Romano Mazzoli of 
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Kentucky, finally came to fruition.  The two men, the respective subcommittee chairmen of their 
respective chambers’ Judiciary subcommittee on Immigration, had spent the three previous 
Congresses answering President Reagan’s call to update immigration law by dealing with the 
questions of both employment and the status of undocumented individuals within American 
borders.  Simpson and Mazzoli had been able to work with only some push from other members, 
most of the push coming from agricultural interests who worried about migrant labor.  The hope 
was, as Reagan noted in his remarks, that “Future generations of Americans will be thankful for 
our efforts to humanely regain control of our borders and thereby preserve the value of one of the 
most sacred possessions of our people: American citizenship” (Reagan 1986).  
Within a generation, immigration law would again be challenged.  By 2005, new worries 
over Mexican immigration had led to a series of bills in the House and Senate in the 109th 
Congress designed to reshape both legal and illegal immigration.  At the same time, a rift began 
to open within the Republican Party over the nature of how exactly to deal with illegal 
immigrants already in the United States.  For policy leaders like House Judiciary Committee 
chairman James Sensenbrenner, the need to curtail illegal immigration was paramount to any 
immigration bill.  At the same time, the Senate’s bill, championed by Senator John McCain of 
Arizona, and sponsored by Senator Arlen Specter of Pennsylvania, instead focused on 
comprehensive reform, with the ability for some long-term illegal immigrants to possibly seek 
citizenship.  While both bodies succeeded in passing immigration bills, the differences between 
the two groups led to no bill in the 109th Congress, and as of 2016, subsequent Congresses have 
been unable to change policy on immigration.  
What happened in that 20 year period that changed immigration from an issue that could 
be crafted and completed by policy leaders to one where many actors fought and lost over 
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policy?  As we will see, the story of immigration is one about how increases in issue salience 
brought more members of Congress into the immigration conversation.  While Simpson and 
Mazzoli would be successful at changing public policy, Sensenbrenner would face charges from 
both his left and his right, eventually leading to the lack of policy change on immigration. 
The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986: Leadership Control 
To best understand the changes that discussion of immigration has gone through, it is 
important to go back and look at the context behind the last major immigration law change: the 
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986.  The 1986 passage was the culmination of 6 years 
of work, started by two members of Congress with little prior personal experience in 
immigration.  
In 1981, at the beginning of the 97th Congress, the respective Judiciary subcommittees on 
Immigration both received new chairs.  Romano Mazzoli, a Kentucky Democrat, replaced the 
outgoing Congresswoman Elizabeth Holtzmann as chair of the subcommittee following 
Holtzmann’s defeat in the 1980 United States Senate race in New York.  Meanwhile, the 
Republicans’ capture of the Senate meant that Wyoming Senator Alan Simpson was now 
chairman of the subcommittee on Immigration.  Both Romano Mazzoli and Alan Simpson 
represented areas with few, if any, immigrants, as neither Louisville, Kentucky nor the state of 
Wyoming was known for having a large non-American population.  For Mazzoli in particular, 
Gimpel and Edwards speculate that “he considered himself free for major immigration reform” 
(Gimpel and Edwards 1999, 134) once he took control of the House Judiciary Subcommittee on 
Immigration in 1981, because of this lack of immigrant representation.  
With new leadership unconstrained by past events, the opportunity for change was 
present.  Mazzoli and Simpson set to work, crafting and developing a bill that would both deal 
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with legal immigration and illegal immigration, focusing in particular in the latter on punishing 
businesses that employed illegal immigrants while also giving amnesty to illegal immigrants 
already in the country.   
Crafting and passage of the immigration bill would not be an immediate success story: 
while Simpson generally found success in the Senate during each Congress, Mazzoli ran into 
multiple road blocks in the House. Prominent Latino members, such as Edward Roybal and 
Robert Garcia, attempted to derail passage of the bill, arguing that that the legislation would hurt 
Latinos and employers.  As a result, Mazzoli pulled the bill from consideration in the 97th 
Congress, and the bill died in conference following initial passage in both Houses in the 98th 
Congress.  However, in the 99th Congress, House Judiciary Chairman Peter Rodino joined 
Mazzoli in his efforts in the House, and after some defeats (and the inclusion of an agricultural 
guest worker plan crafted by Congressman Charles Schumer of New York) they were able to 
finally get the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 passed.  
How did the bill finally pass?  A combination of factors came into play.  As Gimpel and 
Edwards (1999) point out, unlike the 97th and 98th Congresses, the deals necessary to passage 
finally came to fruition both in terms of guest worker programs and amnesty.  Importantly, 
despite the attacks from Hispanic members of Congress, Mazzoli and Simpson never lost control 
of the issue, and eventually won out versus their adversaries.  In Figure 4.5, I present a graph on 
the number of member mentions in the 99th Congress on immigration, presenting the top 10 
members (plus ties) on mentions. As with Figure 4.4, I present policy leaders via capitalization.   
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Figure 4.5: Number of Mentions on Immigration by Member, 99th Congress 
 
 
 
As with agricultural subsidies, leaders dominate discussion during the 99th Congress, with 
Alan Simpson, Peter Rodino, and Romano Mazzoli accounting for 27, 18, and 12 mentions on 
immigration in the 99th Congress respectively.  The total number of mentions of the three 
leaders, a total of 57 mentions, accounts for 37% of all mentions by members of Congress during 
the 99th Congress on immigration.  The closest member to these three in terms of total mentions 
is Charles Schumer, who worked with the three to get immigration reform passed.  Importantly, 
potential usurpers receive far fewer mentions in the 99th Congress, with Edward Roybal and 
Robert Garcia, the two primary opponents on the side of protecting Latinos and businesses, only 
receiving one total mention each in the 99th Congress.  By the time the issues with the bill had 
begun to be dealt with, the stage was given to leaders.  
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1986-2006: Leadership Loss of Control 
In the two decades following the passage of the Immigration Reform and Control Act, 
attention to immigration generally remained constant, though discussion began to move from 
legal immigration to illegal immigration.  In Figure 4.6, I present data on the total number of 
articles by month in The Washington Post related to immigration, with vertical lines representing 
the October 1986 passage of the Immigration Reform and Control Act in the House and Senate, 
and respective lines for the House and Senate immigration bills passed in 2005 and 2006.  
Figure 4.6: Total Number of Articles on Immigration in The Washington Post by Month 
 
 
As we can see from Figure 4.6, the total salience of immigration began to increase 
slightly in the early 1990s, though not overwhelmingly, with an average of about 20 stories a 
month on immigration throughout The Washington Post during the period 1990 and 1999.  
However, movement on immigration begins in 2002, and during the period of 2002 to 2004, 
there is about a story per day on immigration in The Washington Post.   
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By 2005, concerns began to move in Congress toward dealing with questions of 
immigration, due to a multitude of reasons.  Statistically, illegal immigration had been on the rise 
since at least 1990, moving from about 3 million individuals unauthorized to be in the United 
States to nearly 11 million in 2005 (Krogstad and Passel 2015).  In addition, the Republican 
Party, fresh off its comprehensive victory in the presidential and Congressional elections of 
2004, now had, as President George W. Bush put it, gained “political capital” (Stevenson 2004), 
and the opportunities for the Republicans to put their own stamp on immigration were ever 
present.  While Bush himself wanted to focus on guest worker visas and capturing primarily 
illegal immigrants who committed crimes, he found a Republican House that wanted to focus on 
tougher measures such as border security.  As Congressman Ray LaHood argued at the end of 
2004, “If the president wants to maintain credibility with House Republicans, he has to be 
engaged and willing to pass immigration reform that conservatives want.” (VanderHei and 
Babington 2004).  
In 2005, the Republican House began to work on immigration.  House Judiciary 
Chairman James Sensenbrenner introduced border security measures early in the 109th Congress, 
in an attempt to offset President Bush’s measures on temporary worker visas and push 
immigration to the right. Sensenbrenner linked border security to homeland security, as part of 
the larger REAL ID Act of 2005 (Allen 2005).  While REAL ID was primarily about 
standardizing drivers licenses, Sensenbrenner added in multiple provisions related to 
immigration, including requirements that noncitizens bring their passport to get a license and 
giving the United States government the ability to ignore environmental laws when considering 
the building of border barriers.  With the ability now to build a border wall without 
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environmental intrusion, the Republicans could move focus toward public policy based around 
border security and border walls.   
While the House set the stage, the Senate would be where the real activity on 
immigration reform began.  In May of 2005 Republican Senator John McCain, along with 
Democratic Senator Edward Kennedy of Massachusetts, introduced an immigration bill designed 
to ease restrictions on worker visas by giving immigrants more flexibility in terms of entering 
and leaving the country (Fears 2005).  McCain and Kennedy’s goal was to ease worker issues 
while also curbing terrorism.  To that, Republican Congressman Tom Tancredo of Colorado 
replied: "There might be a little more lipstick on this pig than there was before, but it is most 
certainly the same old pig” (Fears 2005).  For Tancredo and others, the Senate bill was a 
continuation of the status quo, a constant push on regular immigration while ignoring illegal 
immigration.  The battle between the House and Senate over immigration had begun in full 
force.   
Over the next year, the House and Senate would eventually introduce and pass their own 
measures on immigration: the House would act first, passing the Border Protection, Anti-
terrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005 in December, with the Senate passing the 
Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2006 the following May.  The two bills differed 
primarily in how they dealt with illegal immigrants already in the country, with the Senate bill 
offering the opportunity for some illegal immigrants to gain legal status.  With two very different 
bills in place, there would need to be some level of compromise and some amount of conference 
work to make immigration reform viable in 2006.  
At the same time, events elsewhere began to increase the salience of immigration issues.  
On March 10, 2006, at least 100,000 individuals, mostly immigrants, marched through Chicago 
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protesting the passage of the House bill (Avila and Olivo 2006).  At the center of the protests 
was Congressman Luis Gutierrez, a Chicago congressman who, taking up the mantle of Edward 
Roybal and Robert Garcia from the 1980s, told protestors “We have brought together the true 
fabric of what Chicago is, of what our country is” (Avila and Olivo 2006).  Protests would 
continue for the next two months, culminating in a May Day march on May 1, 2006 that drew 
400,000 people to Los Angeles to protest the House bill (Gorman et. Al. 2006).  While the 
protests died down after May, the long term significance of the protests could be felt in the 
Latino community, creating, in the words of Matt Barreto and his coauthors, “the foundation for 
a broad Latino movement” (Barreto et al. 2009).  
 Through all of the controversy and increases in issue salience, the policy leadership 
continued to use its institutional power to be a part of the policy process. The sponsors of both 
the Border Protection, Anti-terrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act and the 
Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act were policy leaders, with the two Judiciary chairmen 
(James Sensenbrenner and Arlen Specter) sponsoring their body’s respective bills.  With 
leadership controlling the debate and the primary bills, one would assume that given time and 
negotiation, the two bodies would eventually find common ground and report out a successful 
immigration bill as had happened in 1986 when the two immigration subcommittee chairs 
worked out their differences and passed a bill through Congress.  However, unlike 1981-1986, 
this did not happen.   
There are a few explanations for why the bill did not become law.  Part of the story 
comes from simple electoral change, as unlike the changeover from the 98th to the 99th Congress, 
the change from the 109th to the 110th Congress led to both houses of Congress changing hands, 
with the Democrats retaking control of the House for the first time since 1995 and the Senate for 
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the first time since 2003.  Even Democratic leaders, however, were unable to report out a 
comprehensive immigration bill while they held power, and subsequent changes in Congress 
have led to the lack of a new comprehensive immigration law as of 2016.   
Party change may account for part of the story, but issue salience also plays a role in the 
process.  2006, unlike 1986, was a time when immigration was highly salient in American life, 
both due to conservative fears over illegal immigration and the Latino response to 
Sensenbrenner’s House immigration bill. Recalling Figure 4.6, coverage of immigration in The 
Washington Post spiked as Sensenbrenner’s bill passed the House in December 2005, and stayed 
high throughout much of 2006.  While the spike did decrease following 2006, shocks to the 
system were still present throughout the rest of the series.  
The increased issue salience can also be seen in the involvement of members of 
Congress.  In particular, member involvement in immigration in the 109th Congress, unlike the 
99th Congress, was high.  In the 99th Congress, the Congress that passed the Immigration Reform 
and Control Act of 1986, there were 44 members of Congress mentioned in relation to 
immigration in The Washington Post, though only 15 of these members were mentioned more 
than 2 times in the 2 year period.  By contrast, 134 members of Congress, about 25% of the total 
number of members of Congress in office, were mentioned on immigration during the 109th 
Congress, and 50 members had more than 2 mentions during the 2 year period, including 14 
members who had at least 10 mentions in the 109th Congress.  In general, not only were more 
members of Congress involved in immigration in the 109th Congress, but they were also involved 
at a much higher rate than members had been in the 99th Congress.  
The raw numbers tell us that more members are involved, but who are these members and 
how do these members relate to policy leadership?  In Figure 4.7, I graph the number of member 
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mentions by members for the top 10 mentioned members on immigration (plus ties) for 2005 and 
2006.  As in other graphs, the names of policy leaders are capitalized.   
Figure 4.7: Number of Mentions on Immigration by Member, 109th Congress 
 
 
Unlike the 99th Congress, discussion is dominated by non-leaders, and the amount of 
discussion is substantially higher.  Alan Simpson, the member with the most coverage in the 99th 
Congress, would only rank 8th in the 109th Congress.  The top two members mentioned in the 
109th Congress are the two senators at the center of the Senate immigration bill: John McCain 
and Edward Kennedy.  Kennedy is also the highest ranked policy leader due to his role on the 
Senate Judiciary Committee’s subcommittee on immigration.  Yet it is McCain, with no 
jurisdictional control, who has the most mentions.  In addition, Tom Tancredo, a stalwart against 
illegal immigration who did not serve on the House Judiciary Committee, receives more 
mentions in the Congress than any policy leader other than Kennedy.  Policy then is being 
tugged in two different directions by two different groups.  McCain and Kennedy (who together 
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make up close to 20% of the total mentions of members of Congress on immigration in the 109th 
Congress) pulled policy toward the old position of security and amnesty.  At the same time, Tom 
Tancredo and other hard-liners were attempting to pull policy further than even policy leadership 
had conceived, moving toward blocking amnesty entirely.  That so many members are involved, 
with such a large amount of attention, as seen in Figure 4.6, means that changing policy in 
general would be much tougher than it had been in 1986.  The room for deal-making and 
punishment that might be available under periods of low salience are not present.  Between 
protests and confusion in Congress, the result is that leadership’s attempt at policy change did 
not come to pass.  Neither the Sensenbrenner bill nor the McCain/Kennedy bill were enacted, 
leaving the status quo as is to the chagrin of policy leaders.   
What we have seen in the story of immigration is how leadership power diminishes under 
the weight of high salience.  Members of Congress, reacting to increases in issue salience, 
attempt to shift policy toward their preferred issue direction.  The giant mass of members 
involved leads to stagnation, as a hardline House and a moderate Senate are unable to make 
changes during periods of high salience.  The result from this process is the continuation of the 
status quo, as leaders are unable to make their desired policy change.   
We have now seen how policy change can be successfully sought by leadership during 
times of low salience as well as how higher levels of salience and reaction to media attention can 
lead to the absence of leadership-induced change during times of high salience.  We now turn to 
how individual members themselves can use salience to their advantage, tapping into issues and 
increasing salience on issue areas.  The nuclear freeze of the early 1980s was not a product of 
policy leadership.  Instead, it is the product of five members of Congress with varying interest 
97 
 
and experience with the issue using nascent levels of salience to try and reshape nuclear weapons 
policy in the United States.   
The Nuclear Freeze: Issue Usurpation and Leadership Loss of Control 
Background 
When the United States dropped atom bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan in 
August 1945, the American government became the first (and to date only) power to ever use 
nuclear weapons in combat.  In the 35 years that separated the dropping of atomic bombs and the 
election of Ronald Reagan as President of the United States in 1980, the United States continued 
to develop nuclear weapons, focusing on policy designed to continue to build weapons and 
increase the nuclear stockpile.  There were many reasons for this buildup.  Most importantly, the 
American relationship with the Soviet Union guided nuclear weapons policy, as the United 
States government built up their weapons in response to potential Soviet buildups.  By focusing 
on a policy of mutually assured destruction, both sides were fixated on creating and modifying 
weapons to ensure that in the case of a nuclear strike they would be ready to respond.  While 
treaties such as SALT I and SALT II were signed by both the United States and the Soviet Union 
as an attempt to reign in weapons, both American and Soviet arsenals continued to grow.  In 
addition, SALT II’s ratification was eventually stalled and left uncompleted following the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan in 1979.   
While policy leaders on nuclear weapons focused on buildup, others outside of 
government began to question America’s use of nuclear power both for energy and weaponry.  
The nuclear power movement had begun to see the fruits of their labor realized in the late 1970s, 
as the United States government, in response to issues at Three Mile Island, had begun to pull 
back from focusing on nuclear power plants (for a more thorough discussion, see Chapter 4 of 
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Baumgartner and Jones 2009).  At the same time, many of these activists began to shift their 
attention toward nuclear weapons.   
Central to these efforts were finding a successful policy strategy that would appeal to a 
wide variety of groups.  Activist Randall Forsberg and others in the movement eventually settled 
on centering policy change around a bilateral freeze of production of nuclear weapons by both 
the United States and the Soviet Union.  The goal, as Forsberg and others argued, was to appeal 
to the two groups that would be most important in achieving victory: the peace community and 
their organized networks of individuals, and the middle class and their ability to change 
American life through strength in numbers (Waller 1987, 29-30).  However, as activists began to 
shift toward the freeze, they found a United States government focused more on building up 
weapons than decreasing weapons, especially after the 1980 election.   
The 1980 presidential election brought with it a new rise in conservatism in American 
government.  The Republican Party’s victories were victories for conservatism, and this 
conservatism extended to the question of nuclear weapons.  Newly elected President Ronald 
Reagan had run explicitly counter to mutually assured destruction, instead focusing on “a 
credible strategy which will deter a Soviet attack by the clear capability of our forces to survive 
and ultimately to destroy Soviet military targets” (1980).   Reagan then had little incentive to 
freeze production, especially without guarantees that the Soviet Union would be a faithful 
partner in the endeavor.  
Reagan had not been the only Republican to gain power due to the 1980 elections. The 
United States Senate, a body held by the Democrats since 1955, was now in the hands of the 
GOP, the result of a landslide election that had knocked off more dovish senators like former 
Presidential nominee George McGovern of South Dakota and future Democratic presidential 
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candidate Mike Gravel.  Policy leadership, on the other hand, did not move as drastically from 
one end to the other.  The hawkish John Stennis of Mississippi gave way to the hawkish John 
Tower of Texas for the Senate Armed Services Committee.  At the same time, the Senate Armed 
Services Subcommittee on Strategic and Theater Nuclear Forces, the primary subcommittee 
devoted to nuclear weapons, also changed hands between hawkish members of the Senate. 
Democrat Henry “Scoop” Jackson of Washington was replaced as chair by John Warner of 
Virginia, a former Navy captain and Secretary of the Navy under the Nixon administration.    
Democrats remained in control of the House of Representatives following the 1980 
election, though the members in power on nuclear weapons were by no means supporters of a 
freeze. House Armed Services Chair, Melvin Price, did give up the chairmanship of the nuclear 
subcommittee, which was taken on by Congressman Samuel Stratton of New York. In general, 
the status quo on nuclear weapons remained in place, and policy leadership was structured to 
continue past policies on nuclear defense.   
In addition, the nuclear question was not on the minds of Congress:  President Reagan 
and the Congress had put primary focus on budgetary and tax issues in an attempt to pass an 
income tax cut in 1981, meaning that issues like nuclear weapons would be on the sideline, 
relegated to cost discussions and defense committee hearings. 
Between hostility from the House and Senate policy leaders and the lack of focus on 
nuclear issues, anti-nuclear activists then faced a major uphill battle to even potentially think 
about stopping the buildup and construction of weapons.  Yet by the mid-1980s, the House had 
passed a nuclear freeze and the Reagan administration had begun to consider arms reductions in 
negotiations with the Soviets.  So what happened?  How did these efforts succeed and how was 
policy leadership pushed to make changes on policy?  The story in Congress is focused on 5 men 
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outside of the policy leadership who were involved at varying levels: some, such as Edward 
Markey, Ted Kennedy, and Mark Hatfield, were central actors, while others like Jonathan 
Bingham and Silvio Conte played more symbolic roles.  Yet it was the work of the five to 
increase issue salience, which led to the eventual passage of the nuclear freeze in some capacity.   
1981: Prelude to the Freeze 
At the start of the 97th Congress, the nuclear freeze movement was not on the 
Congressional agenda.  In fact, nuclear power, in general, was not high on the agenda early in 
1981, as the Reagan administration put primary focus on budgetary and tax issues, culminating 
in the passage of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 in July of that year.  For the most part, 
nuclear weapons policy, under the control of policy leadership, should continue to move in the 
direction of the status quo, increasing weaponry while continuing to maintain a large nuclear 
arsenal.  In general, Congress focused on nuclear nonproliferation, the desire to prevent 
American arms and other arms from getting into the hands of other countries. The Reagan 
Defense budget in 1981 decreased funding in some areas, but continued to protect the 
development and building of the MX intercontinental ballistic missile, as both the House and 
Senate voted to continue production of the missile (“Defense Bill Makes Most of Reagan's 
Cuts.”).   
At the same time, while Congress was only briefly touching on the question of nuclear 
weapons, the issue had begun to gain more traction within the media.  In Figure 4.8, I outline the 
total amount of coverage on nuclear weapons by month in The Washington Post prior to and at 
the beginning of the Reagan administration, with focus on the period of 1977 to 1981.  
101 
 
Figure 4.8: Total Number of Articles on Nuclear Weapons in The Washington Post by 
Month, 1977-1981 
 
As we can see from Figure 4.8, nuclear weapons received some coverage in The 
Washington Post, but that coverage was not as large as the coverage nuclear weapons would 
receive in the following decades.  The average number of articles by month in The Washington 
Post on nuclear weapons over the 36 year period between 1977 and 2012 was about 28 articles, 
or about an article a day.  During the period 1977 and 1980, the average is about 20 articles a 
month.  Readers of The Washington Post were not seeing daily coverage of nuclear weapons, 
though the coverage is still large relative to other issues.    At the same time, members of 
Congress are not necessarily involved in the coverage of nuclear weapons.  In Figure 4.9, I graph 
the number of members mentioned by month in The Washington Post by month from 1977 to 
1981.   
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Figure 4.9: Total Number of Members discussing Nuclear Weapons in The Washington 
Post by Month, 1977-1981 
 
As we can see from Figure 4.9, member involvement is generally low throughout the 
entire period between 1977 and 1981. There is a peak of 24 members in June of 1978, though 
there are only 20 articles on nuclear weapons in that month.  Much of the discussion in June 
1978 is over the exportation of uranium to India for use in nuclear power plants - a move some 
worried would lead to India gaining the capability to create an atomic bomb as well as plans to 
add other nuclear aircraft to President Jimmy Carter’s defense bill.  Otherwise, only a handful of 
members are usually involved in conversation on nuclear weapons, even as coverage of nuclear 
weapons begins to increase.  In 1981, for example, 39 members are mentioned at some point 
during the year in The Washington Post with regards to nuclear weapons. .  However, most of 
these members receive brief coverage, with only 8 members receiving more than 2 mentions in 
the year.  Some of these members are policy leaders such as Senate Armed Services Committee 
chair John Tower and Senate Government Operations Nuclear Subcommittee chair Charles 
Percy. Others are former policy leaders like Senator John Glenn of Ohio, or party leaders such as 
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Senate Majority Leader Howard Baker and Senate Minority Whip Alan Cranston.  There is also 
only one member of the House who gets mentioned more than 2 times in 1981.  That member, 
Edward Markey of Massachusetts, did not have direct jurisdiction over nuclear weapons.  In 
1982, however, Markey would become central to the question of how an individual member of 
Congress could create policy change on nuclear weapons.   
1982: Introduction of the Freeze and Rise of the Freeze Movement 
While 1981 showed the strength of the status quo, 1982 brought change, and members of 
Congress began to notice some of the shifts in opinion that had begun to sprout up due to the 
peace movement.  In particular, a young Massachusetts Congressman named Edward Markey 
began to take notice of some of the protest movements outside of Congress.  By 1982, Markey 
had already developed a reputation in energy policy as someone who wanted to focus on cleaner 
and safer forms of energy, attempting to move the United States away from power like nuclear 
energy.  In addition, Markey also began to explore nuclear proliferation by having Douglas 
Waller, one of his staffers, look into the policy despite Markey’s lack of personal committee 
jurisdiction on the issue.  Waller’s work, coupled with the work of Markey’s administrative 
assistant, Peter Franchot, led Markey to seriously consider going ahead with a freeze proposal in 
the House.  Markey’s interest was echoed by his staffers, with Franchot exclaiming on the freeze 
that “The freeze is going to sweep this country… and there’s no reason why we shouldn’t be in 
the middle of it” (Waller 1987, 47).   Markey would introduce a public freeze provision in the 
97th Congress, announcing to the other members in February 5, 1982 that he was going to go 
ahead with his proposal and that he was looking for cosponsors (Waller 1987, 53).  
Markey’s introduction of a freeze proposal was initially met with little fanfare.  While he 
had been able to get some cosponsors, he needed more support from people who were not House 
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of Representatives liberals, both to ensure that the bill would get through both the House and 
Senate, and to convince Republicans (and in particular Ronald Reagan) that the freeze was both 
popular and necessary.  He found his support from a close source, Edward Kennedy, the senior 
United States Senator from Massachusetts and liberal lion.  Kennedy, fresh off an insurgent run 
for president of the United States in 1980, was considered (as of 1982) a viable candidate to take 
on Ronald Reagan in the 1984 presidential election.  Kennedy had also begun investigating the 
viability of the freeze after hearing from constituents about their worries over nuclear war while 
meeting with constituents in the winter of 1981 (Waller 1987, 59).  
Kennedy would also bring in a Republican ally, Senator Mark Hatfield of Oregon.  While 
Kennedy’s push could be linked to both good public policy and electoral politics, Hatfield’s was 
entirely in the realm of policy change.  Mark Hatfield was among the first servicemen to set foot 
in Hiroshima following the United States’ dropping of the atomic bomb on the city in August 
1945.  As Hatfield later recounted to Sojurners,  
One month after the bomb, I walked through the streets of Hiroshima and I saw 
the utter devastation in every direction from nuclear power. All of those 
experiences were really the fundamental beginnings of my thinking about 
those specific issues, of Vietnam, war in general, nuclear power, and hunger. 
(Wallis 1996) 
 
Due to both his personal convictions and the bipartisan flavor the measure would be able 
to take on, Hatfield then was a natural ally to Kennedy’s efforts to put in place a freeze. Kennedy 
and Hatfield worked out their version of the language, and got in touch with Markey to introduce 
a joint resolution to Congress calling for President Reagan to seek a bilateral freeze with the 
Soviet Union, looking to stop production of nuclear weapons.  The three would be joined by two 
more members in their resolution-introducing coalition, Democratic congressman Jonathan 
Bingham of New York, who had called for a freeze just before Markey’s efforts went public 
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(Waller 1987, 54) and Silvio Conte, a Republican representative from Western Massachusetts 
who had co-sponsored Markey’s original bill, and became the primary sponsor of the House 
form of the freeze proposal due to his more moderate record versus the more anti-nuclear 
Markey (Waller 1987, 66).  On March 10, 1982, the bilateral freeze was introduced in Congress, 
complete with a large media event at American University in Washington, DC.   
Markey, Kennedy, and their allies made their play in Congress, but how would 
policymakers and the Reagan administration respond?  Reagan’s allies attacked almost 
immediately, with Secretary of State Alexander Haig calling the freeze “bad arms control policy” 
(Hornblower 1982).  Reagan himself soon after claimed that the United States was defensively 
inferior to the Soviets, and therefore a freeze would be highly problematic for U.S. defense 
capabilities versus a potential Soviet attack (Waller 1987, 77).   The Reagan administration 
wanted nothing to do with a freeze.  
Meanwhile, in Congress, the battle to control the nature of the freeze was on. Within 
three weeks of the introduction of the freeze, John Warner and Henry “Scoop” Jackson, the chair 
and ranking member of the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic and Theater 
Nuclear Forces, had introduced their own version of the nuclear freeze, which called for looking 
into the freeze following an American buildup of weapons and a Soviet decrease in weaponry 
(Waller 1987, 92).  Other members of Congress also began to introduce their own versions of the 
freeze, working to push public policy on nuclear weapons in different directions.   
In 1982, the nuclear freeze movement in Congress took control of the issue area, and 
came in early, before the large jumps in salience occurred.  In Figure 4.l0, I graph both the total 
number of articles on nuclear weapons in The Washington Post in 1982 as well as the total 
106 
 
number of members involved by month, adding a vertical line to represent March, the month the 
five members introduced the freeze bill.  
Figure 4.10: Total Number of Articles and Total Members Mentioned on Nuclear Weapons 
in The Washington Post, 1982. 
 
As we can see from Figure 4.10, March 1982 corresponds with a major rise in both the 
total number of articles on nuclear weapons in The Washington Post and the total number of 
members mentioned on nuclear weapons in The Washington Post. Recalling Figures 4.9 and 
4.10, the peaks for articles and members are 65 and 24 respectively.  Both of these are eclipsed 
in April 1982, the month following introduction of the freeze proposal, and the upward trajectory 
in March suggests that members recognized the potential issues with nuclear weapons and their 
salience, and wanted to become involved.  We can see here some evidence that the media blitz 
by the 5 freeze members moved other members to react.   
We know that salience increased and members became involved in the process, but 
exactly who were the members that were talking about nuclear weapons?   In Figure 4.11, I 
graph the total number of mentions by member in The Washington Post in 1982 on nuclear 
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weapons.  As in Figures 4.4, 4.5, and 4.7, I only graph the top 10 members mentioned.  In 
addition, I identify policy leaders through name capitalization.   
Figure 4.11: Number of Mentions of Members of Congress on Nuclear Weapons in The 
Washington Post, 1982 
 
 
For reference, in 1982 there are a total of 259 mentions of members of Congress in The 
Washington Post on nuclear weapons.  Of these, 86 of them, or 33% of the total mentions of 
members of Congress on nuclear weapons in 1982, come from the 5 members of Congress 
sponsoring freeze resolution.  In addition, as we can see from Figure 11, the four most-
mentioned members are all freeze sponsors (Silvio Conte is mentioned 3 times in 1982).  The 
first leader to make an appearance on the list is John Warner, the Senate Armed Services 
Subcommittee Chair on Strategic and Theater Nuclear Forces.  It is Warner and Henry Jackson 
who respond to the freeze proponents with their own freeze bill. Warner and Jackson saw the 
Kennedy/Hatfield/Markey movement, and in turn tried to make it their own issue.  Markey and 
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his compatriots had succeeded at moving the goalposts of policy from no consideration of a 
freeze to at least some consideration of the potential for a freeze.  
The Freeze: After March 1982 
The freeze proposed by Markey would lose in the House on a procedural amendment in 
July of 1982, however this was only the beginning of the freeze process.  The 98th Congress 
would take up the freeze, this time bringing the ire of conservatives like Jerry Falwell and Phyllis 
Schafly, both of whom attacked the freeze as un-American (Waller 1987, 187).  The freeze 
finally passed in the House on May 4, 1983, after weeks of debate and the addition of a sunset 
provision if stockpiles were not reduced (Waller 1987, 285). While the Senate, due to the control 
held by Republicans, would not pass a freeze resolution before the 1984 presidential election, the 
reverberations of the freeze movement had been felt in the White House.  By his second term, 
President Ronald Reagan had returned to the negotiating table with new Soviet premier Mikhail 
Gorbachev and had begun to focus on arms control as a part of public policy.  The freeze 
movement may not have directly won the battle and created a nuclear freeze, but by pushing both 
policy leaders and President Reagan to react to them with resolutions and movements, they had 
at least pushed public policy away from a focus on the constant buildup of weapons.   
Discussion 
The primary goal of this chapter is to explore two major parts of my larger argument.  
The first of these is the role policy leaders can play at times of low salience and how that role 
diminishes during times of greater salience.  As we saw with agricultural subsidies, the normal 
workhorse model of politics held: Richard Lugar worked his way up from freshman Senator to 
chair of the Agriculture Committee, and then used that opportunity to change policy.  Yet, policy 
leaders saw diminished roles in both the cases of immigration and nuclear weapons.  By losing 
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control of an issue to usurpers, and having to react to movement by non-leaders, leaders 
eventually face one of two possibilities: the creation of a new status quo when leaders did not 
want to change the status quo (as in nuclear weapons) or the continuation of the status quo when 
leaders wanted to change policy (as in immigration).  In both cases, as salience increased, 
leadership lost power over an issue area.   
The second goal here is to explore the endogenous relationship between salience and 
members of Congress, something that I can only do on a limited basis in statistical modeling.  I 
hold that both types of salience creation are occurring: members of Congress are reacting to 
exogenous events (as seen in the case of immigration) and members of Congress are also 
attempting to create salience through their actions (as seen in the case of nuclear weapons with 
the 5 freeze leaders).  Members of Congress are both trying to increase the scope of a conflict (as 
the renegade House Agriculture Republicans attempted to do in committee hearings over the 
Freedom to Farm Act) and are also reacting to increases in salience.  In general, members of 
Congress use the limited agenda space available as well as a set of issue policy positions in order 
to decide when and where to become involved in issue areas, attempting to shift policy in some 
way.   
However, we have explored to this point issues that receive some, but not constant 
coverage from the media.  In the next chapter, I explore the question of what happens in an issue 
where coverage is constant and ever present.  Here, the salience of subsidy cannot be used in the 
way it is used when an issue has large fluctuations in coverage.  Instead, members must be more 
strategic.  
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Chapter 5: Member Engagement and Policy Change: Jack Kemp 
and Taxation 
Introduction 
We understand now how members of Congress act when salience increases on an issue, 
and the ramifications issue salience and member engagement have on policy change, given levels 
of salience.  But what happens when attention to an issue is always high?  Do members of 
Congress use salience here in the same way they do when issue salience can make significant 
increases and decreases?  Members of Congress have equal access to the salience subsidy, so 
they already know that a highly salient issue exists and is something they should be aware of in 
terms of policy.  Members then should not have a need to engage in the issue area because in 
general, members of Congress are constantly involved in a consistently high salient issue.  
In this chapter, I argue that in issues that receive consistently high levels of coverage, 
members of Congress are not acting on changes to salience, but rather strategically using 
salience to appeal to specific groups.  All members of Congress have access to a large amount of 
information on highly salient issues, and shifts in issue attention will not determine member 
involvement, because members should generally be involved in the issue area considering its 
level of coverage.  Instead, members of Congress must be more strategic, focusing on specific 
aspects of issues or marketing to specific groups of people in order to find groups that can help 
the member move their idea forward.  Recalling E.E. Schattschneider’s conflict expansion theory 
(1975), members of Congress need to expand the conflict beyond knowing that an issue exists, 
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focusing on the fact that their issue solution exists, in order to bring new, potentially more 
helpful individuals into the discussion.  
I now turn to a specific case to better expand how individual members who do not have 
policy leadership on issues take control of specific issue areas when issue salience is constantly 
high.  I focus on the specific issue of taxation and income taxes, with particular focus on the time 
period between 1977 and 1986.  This 10 year period includes many major events in the history of 
taxation in the United States, from Proposition 13 in California in 1978 to the passage of the Tax 
Reform Act of 1986.  In the middle of this time period lies the primary focus of my analysis, a 
tax bill at the dawn of the Reagan Administration that would reshape the level of taxation in the 
United States: the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA).  This bill is the culmination of 
5 years of work from Republicans to move the party and the nation from a focus on tax 
deductions and one-time fixes to a tax policy based around lowered income tax rates.  
I have two reasons for focusing on the case of taxation.  First, it is a case of high issue 
attention, in that unlike many of the other issues under study, taxation is constantly part of 
everyday American life.  While some issues, such as agricultural subsidies, have a maximum of 
22 articles a month in The Washington Post, there were on average 17 articles per week in The 
Washington Post on taxation.  Members, in general, will be talking about taxes regularly.  
Second, taxation also offers an opportunity to explore more directly the role individual 
members, with the right skill sets and ideas, can play in the policy process.  During the period of 
study, members of Congress used changes both within and outside of the body to push for new 
tax law in the United States.  In particular, I focus on one specific member of Congress and one 
specific series of moments: Republican Jack Kemp of New York between the period 1977 and 
1981.  Kemp was not a natural tax cutter in terms of policy leadership.  He never served on the 
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House Ways & Means Committee, the primary committee devoted to taxation, and while he did 
serve on the Budget Committee, Kemp did not receive this committee assignment until he had 
become a central figure on taxation.  While Kemp’s initial victory would be brief, the work that 
he and others (including Senator William Roth of Delaware) had put into tax policy would 
become a central component of both United States tax policy and the essence of the Republican 
Party.   
In the remainder of this chapter, I will explore tax policy in the United States Congress 
during the period of 1977-1986.  I begin with an overview of the primary data source used.  
Unlike the data used in previous chapters, I focus on only tax law and income taxes.   In addition, 
my unit of analysis is at the weekly count level, which will allow me to explore questions of 
member direction more fully.  Following the data discussion, I walk through the history of 
taxation in the United States before passage of ERTA, putting particular focus on the period 
between 1977 and 1981, with Jack Kemp as my centerpiece. Finally, I look at the general trends 
behind the relationship between members of Congress and issue attention, looking at the 
direction of causality between member of Congress involvement in taxation and articles on 
taxation.  Much of the analysis here mirrors work done in previous chapters.  By examining an 
issue with a large amount of salience in terms of previous work, I am looking to explore the 
differences between issues with low levels of salience and those that receive large amounts of 
attention on a daily basis.   
Data 
Mentions of Taxation and Income Taxes in The Washington Post 
My primary data comes from articles in The Washington Post between the period of 1977 
and 1986. While the Kemp period I discuss in the case study focuses on the period 1977 and 
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1981, I use a longer 10 year period to encompass a wider variety of events in the history of 
American taxation, including the 1986 Tax Reform Act.  I use two Lexis-Nexis search terms in 
my data: “tax law” and “income taxes.”  I also use the two search terms to maximize my 
collection of tax discussion in The Washington Post.  While “tax law” is the primary search term 
assigned by Lexis-Nexis to articles related to taxation, Lexis-Nexis also uses “income taxes” to 
deal with articles directly related to income taxes.  The “income taxes” search term is used more 
sparingly than the “tax law” term to describe taxation, meaning that to best capture discussion of 
taxation in The Washington Post, I need to use both terms.  As with my other data, I use an 85% 
search threshold, allowing for articles that both directly deal with taxation as well as articles that 
at least mention taxation (or contain taxation as part of a series of smaller stories).   
My unit of analysis is weekly number of articles in The Washington Post on tax law and 
income taxes.  I use weekly articles (versus monthly articles) here for two reasons, in which first 
is size.  The total number of articles written on taxation between 1977 and 1986 in The 
Washington Post is 8,873.  Recalling Table 3.1, the 10 year total for taxation is smaller than only 
three issues measured over a 36 year period: nuclear weapons (12,116), immigration (10,126), 
and oil & gas industry (9,984).  Simply put, there is simply more data in the 10 year period than 
in most of my searches over a 36 year period.  
The second reason for a weekly analysis is that the presence of more data allows me to 
test the temporal questions central to my analysis more thoroughly.  The advantage of using the 
weekly level is that members of Congress are reacting to events at a faster pace than from month 
to month.  However, a disadvantage apparent in the lack of data from week to week in my other 
searches makes testing and analysis far more problematic.  As weeks may pass between 
observations, especially in cases of low salience (such as agricultural subsidies), attempting to 
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run a week to week analysis on issues with a large number of zeroes will lead to overweighting 
in favor of the zeroes.  While week to week may not perfectly capture members of Congress 
reacting to other members of Congress engaging in issues, it does get closer to the temporal 
question, and the large amount of data from week to week allows me to analyze without having 
to worry about weeks with observations overwhelming the data.  
To best understand the sheer amount of data under analysis, it is important to see what 
the data actually looks like over time.  In Figure 5.1, I present yearly statistics on the number of 
articles written on taxation and income taxes in The Washington Post between 1977 and 1986 
and the number of mentions of members of Congress on taxation and income taxes during the 
same period.  I use yearly numbers here rather than weekly numbers, in order to give a general 
picture of what media discussion of taxation looked like during the larger period 1977 to 1986.  
Figure 5.1: Number of Articles and Mentions of Members of Congress on Taxation in The 
Washington Post, by Year 
 
As we can see from Figure 5.1, taxation has received extensive coverage in The Washington 
Post.  There are, on average, about 887 articles per year in The Washington Post on taxation 
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between 1977 and 1986, or about 2.43 articles per day.  Even in 1979, the lowest point for 
articles in the series, there were 621 articles on taxation in The Washington Post, or about 1.70 
articles per day.  In general, taxation is an issue that receives significant coverage from the paper, 
even during times of considerably lower coverage.    
The large number of articles means that members of Congress are also constantly 
involved in taxation.  On average, there are about 556 mentions of a member of Congress per 
year on taxation in The Washington Post.  In 1980, the low point of the series, there are 296 
mentions of members of Congress.  Members of Congress discuss taxation in the media at rates 
higher than most other issues, and as a result, are constantly aware of both the presence of 
taxation and know that it is an issue they should be care about and engage in.  
To test members of Congress, I again use my standard for active involvement in the issue 
area, which involves any action on taxation by a member mentioned in The Washington Post that 
is not simply voting.  For policy leadership, I identify members as policy leaders on taxation if 
they are the chairs and ranking members of 5 committees, by Congress: the House Ways & 
Means Committee, the House Budget Committee, the Senate Finance Committee, the Senate 
Budget Committee, and the Joint Committee on Taxation (though the Joint Committee on 
Taxation is chaired in alternate years by the House Ways & Means Chair and the Senate Finance 
Chair).  In addition, I also identify a member as a policy leader if they are the chair or ranking 
member of the Senate Finance Subcommittee on Taxation.  
Other Data 
In addition to my original data on tax discussion in The Washington Post, I use other data 
to explore aspects outside of the media’s perception of Congress.  These datasets come primarily 
from the Comparative Agendas Project’s United States data (comparativeagendas.net).  The 
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Comparative Agendas Project collects data on policy in 20 countries, two states, and the 
European Union.  The United States data, administered by Bryan Jones at the University of 
Texas-Austin, includes policy data on both government and non-government functions in the 
post-World War II era.  In particular, I employ two datasets from this larger data in my analysis.  
The first is the Congressional Bills Project, administered by Scott E. Adler and John Wilkerson.  
The Congressional Bills Project is a collection of every bill introduced in the United States 
Congress between 1947 and 2015.  The second dataset I employ is the Political Party Platforms 
dataset created and administered by Christina Wohlbrecht at the University of Notre Dame.  The 
platforms dataset codes all quasi-sentence (period and semi-colon separated) mentions of policy 
in the Democratic and Republican Party Platforms between 1948 and 2012.  In both datasets, I 
employ the use of the Policy Agendas Project subtopic code on taxation, 107, to find and analyze 
bills and platform statements related to taxes and taxation.  
Taxation before 1977: Whip Inflation Now 
To best understand how the United States went from the tax system of the 1970s to the 
cut-focused, reform-minded system of the 1980s, it is important to look at the period prior to the 
election of Jimmy Carter in 1976.  The Republican Party of the mid-1970s, reeling from the 
resignation of President Richard Nixon, turned to Gerald Ford to lead the party and the country 
toward financial solvency.  Ford’s solutions would stand in stark contrast to the solutions offered 
four years later by his successor as presidential nominee, Ronald Reagan. 
While the income tax had been codified as part of American life with the passage of the 
16th Amendment, the United States government had attempted to implement federal income 
taxes since the American Civil War, when a tax on individuals was first introduced, prior to 
being rescinded following the end of the war the end of the war (Terrell 2012).  The top 
117 
 
individual tax rate varied greatly in the early years of the implementation of the tax, primarily 
increasing during times of war (such as World War I and World War II, when the maximum rate 
hit 94% of income), and dropping during peacetime.  By the early 1970s, the maximum tax rate 
was at 70% of income, with the minimum around 15% of income (Tax Foundation).   
The early 1970s were not kind to the Republican Party. Though their fortunes had started 
out well with the re-election of Richard Nixon in 1972, scandal led to the resignations of first 
Vice President Spiro Agnew, and finally President Nixon himself, following controversy over 
Nixon’s role in the break-in at the Democratic National Committee Headquarters at the 
Watergate Hotel in Washington, D.C.  In Nixon’s place came new president Gerald Ford, a man 
thrust into both a political mess within his party and an economic downturn due to the 1973 oil 
embargo by OPEC nations.  To deal with the economic issues, Ford introduced the “Whip 
Inflation Now” (WIN) plan in an address to Congress on October 8, 1974, just before the 1974 
Congressional elections.  While Ford focused WIN on a variety of both public and private 
measures to decrease inflation, one part of this plan was tax increases.  Ford recognized the 
issues that may come from introducing a tax increase just before the 1974 elections, and noted “I 
think, and I suspect each of you know, this is the acid test of our joint determination to whip 
inflation in America” (Ford 1974).  Weeks after Ford’s speech, the Republicans would lose 49 
seats in the House of Representatives and 4 seats in the Senate, giving the Democrats even more 
control of both houses of Congress. 
In the aftermath of the 1974 elections, the Republican Party began to explore new 
avenues in an attempt to take power away from the Democrats.  One of these avenues came to 
light at a dinner meeting at the Hotel Washington’s Two Continents restaurant in December 
1974, following the election and Ford’s WIN speech.  In attendance were Wall Street Journal 
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editor Jude Wanniski, White House Chief of Staff (and future Defense Secretary) Donald 
Rumsfeld, Rumsfeld’s deputy (and future Vice President) Richard Cheney, and Arthur Laffer, a 
University of Chicago economist.  On a bar napkin, Laffer sketched out what would become the 
Laffer Curve, arguing that increased taxation would not lead to increased revenues due to the 
lack of desire to work (Worstall 2014).  Instead, Laffer argued that taxes should be decreased, in 
order find a tax level that would maximize revenues.   
Cheney and Rumsfeld were not the only two to hear Laffer’s presentation.  In 1976, 
another politician would not only hear Laffer and Wanniski’s argument for tax cuts, but would 
begin to act on it.  Jack Kemp, a former NFL quarterback turned Republican Congressman from 
New York, had been interested in taxation as part of a larger plan toward helping offset some of 
the economic issues in his heavily industrial Buffalo district (Kondracke and Barnes 2015).  
Kemp’s tax work in the early 1970s had focused on corporate tax breaks in order to keep 
businesses afloat, though these early efforts had not been successful in Congress.  In 1976, Kemp 
met with Wanniski for the first time, and by the end of the first meeting (a 14-hour affair that 
stretched from Capitol Hill to Kemp’s home in Bethesda, Maryland), Kemp had decided to 
champion the Laffer-Wanniski tax cut movement (Kondracke and Barnes 2015, 38).  Kemp first 
proposed a tax cut plan (as part of a larger economic bill) that spring, though the bill would not 
move through Congress in 1976, as the Democratically-controlled Congress refused to consider 
the bill.   
Meanwhile, events outside of Congress further limited Kemp’s ability to move tax cuts 
forward in the future.  After surviving a primary challenge from former California governor 
Ronald Reagan, President Gerald Ford would lose the presidency to Georgia governor Jimmy 
Carter in November 1976.  The only piece of federal elected power held by the Republicans was 
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gone, and Democrats had total control of government.  The prospects of tax cuts looked bleak 
going into 1977.  
1977-1980: Jack Kemp’s Emergence 
The Political Landscape of the 95th and 96th Congresses 
In 1977, at the dawn of the 95th Congress, the Democratic Party was in complete control 
of the elected parts of the federal government.  The Democrats had added one seat in the House, 
giving them 292 seats to the Republicans’ 143.  In the Senate, the Democrats remained in power, 
adding a seat to end up with 61 senators  
When Jack Kemp began to craft a tax cut bill, he faced daunting odds for his bill 
receiving consideration, let alone passage.  Beyond his status as a member of the Republican 
Party, Kemp was neither a leader nor was he even a member of a committee that would have any 
part in taxation.  In addition, the members who held policy leadership on taxation, House Ways 
& Means Committee Chair Al Ullman of Oregon and Senate Finance Committee Chair Russell 
Long of Louisiana, both wanted no part of decreasing the income tax rate, as the two chairs had 
extensive experience in taxation and budget policy.  While Ullman had only taken control of the 
Ways & Means Committee on an interim basis in 1973 following the resignation of long-time 
chairman Wilbur Mills, Ullman had been central to constructing the modern budgetary policy in 
the United States Congress, and had been the first chairman of the Budget Committee following 
its creation in 1974.  Long had served as the chair of the Senate Finance Committee since 1966, 
and had a long history in tax policy, having been a central actor behind enactment of the Earned 
Income Tax Credit in 1975.  In general, both Ullman and Long were policy leaders both in terms 
of their power in their respective bodies of Congress and their histories in tax and budgetary 
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policy.  Neither would be easily defeated by a single United States representative who had no 
jurisdiction over tax policy.    
In addition, members of Kemp’s own party were also generally uneasy with the idea of 
cutting taxes, especially tax-writing members such as Ways & Means ranking member Barber 
Conable.  A New Yorker like Kemp, Conable was more focused on balanced budgets than 
cutting taxes as a solution to economic woes (Fleming 2004, see also Barone 1990, 621).  Other 
Republicans found tax cuts highly problematic, most notably Republican Senator Bob Dole, 
who, like Conable, wanted to focus on balancing budgets.  While the members remained uneasy 
with the proposition of lowering taxes, there was still hope to be found within the Republican 
ranks.  The intellectual Republican elite, led by Wanniski and Irving Kristol, had been building 
an intellectual network that had begun to put focus on the economy and taxation (Smith 2009), 
and Kemp gladly became the champion of this intellectual movement. 
Kemp first proposed a 22% cut in taxation as an alternative to Democratic tax bills, and 
enlisted the help of Budget Committee member John Rousselot, a conservative Republican, who 
sponsored the tax cut bill in the House.  The Rousselot alternative failed 258-148, though Kemp 
was able to get all but 10 Republicans (and 25 Democrats) to vote in favor of the 22% cut 
(Kondracke and Barnes 2015, 44).  While he had been unsuccessful, Kemp had now a sense of 
where Congress was on the question of tax cuts, and had a starting point to work with.  
Kemp’s next action would be to become the public face of tax cuts, though he would 
need help in the Senate if there was any hope for passage.  Kemp found his help in the form of 
William Roth, a Republican Senator from Delaware.  Roth, a fiscal conservative (who would 
later become the name behind the Roth IRA) was receptive to Kemp’s efforts, and the two began 
to put together what would become known as Kemp-Roth.  Kemp-Roth’s goal was simple: cut 
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the general income tax rate for all Americans by 30% over a three year period.  Kemp and Roth 
introduced their bill in mid-1977, and though it received little consideration in Congress, it 
mostly failed as an alternative to Democratic tax bills.  From the simple perspective of changing 
policy during 1977 and 1978, Jack Kemp had failed to enact tax cuts and change public policy.  
Salience Control and Party Control 
Why had Kemp failed to change public policy in the Carter administration?  Two 
important factors come into play.  Two important factors come into play: pre-existing coverage 
and lack of Republican power within the House or Senate.  First, in general, coverage of taxation 
during the Carter administration remained high and stagnant.  In Figure 5.2, I graph the total 
number of articles by week in The Washington Post for the period 1977-1980, encompassing the 
95th and 96th Congresses.   
Figure 5.2: Number of Articles by Week on Taxation in The Washington Post, 1977-1980 
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As we can see from Figure 5.3, discussion of taxation fluctuated, but did not significantly 
change, between 1977 and 1980.  There were small increases in coverage at times, such as in the 
summer of 1978 as events outside of Washington moved discussion of taxation from income 
taxes to property taxes.  However, there was no spike of attention that Kemp or Roth could 
effectively act upon to potentially take control of the issue.  The issue had constant amounts of 
attention already, with about 14 articles per week (or 2 articles per day) during the period 1977 
and 1980.  At the series’ peak, as many as four articles per day in The Washington Post discussed 
taxation in some way.  Two effects would emerge of this.  First, the lack of a marked increase in 
coverage means that there is no spike in attention to let individuals know that they should care 
about this issue.  Second, the overwhelming amount of taxation coverage also means that most 
policymakers would already know a lot about taxation, making acting on a surge of increasing 
number of articles far less likely.  An increase from 15 articles to 20 is less powerful than an 
increase from 0 to 5.  Issue salience then was not working for Kemp and Roth.  Riding salience 
to policy change would not be possible in the case of taxation.   
In addition to the lack of fluctuations on issue salience, Republicans did not hold the 
House or Senate, and had not held these since 1954.  Democrats held large majorities in both 
chambers and control of committees.  The control of committees cannot be understated, as 
committee chair control over hearings gives them negative agenda control (Cox & McCubbins 
1993, 2005).  Simply, if a bill goes against the party’s wishes, then the bill will be blocked.  A 
large scale cutting of the income tax rate was not in the priorities or desires of Democrats in 
Congress.  Tax cuts would therefore not get out of committee, and would have to instead be 
brought up on the floor, as part of the amendments process.  
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The domination of the tax-writing chairs in the media during the 95th and 96th Congresses 
also contributed to the lack of policy change. In Figure 5.3, I present the yearly figures for 
member of Congress mentions, for all members of Congress.  In addition, I use capitalization to 
denote members who are policy leaders on the subject of taxation, based on their party roles 
within relevant Congressional committees.  These members are: Democrats Al Ullman (Ways & 
Means Chair), Robert Giamio (House Budget Chair), Russell Long (Senate Finance Chair), Ed 
Muskie (Senate Budget Chair); Independent Harry F. Byrd, Jr. (Senate Finance Subcommittee on 
Taxation Chair); and Republicans Barber Conable (ranking member of the Ways & Means 
Committee), Delbert Latta (ranking member of the House Budget Committee), Carl Curtis 
(ranking member of the Senate Finance Committee during the 95th Congress, 1977-1978 only), 
Robert Dole (ranking member of the Senate Finance Committee during the 96th Congress, 1979-
1980 only), Henry Bellmon (ranking member of the Senate Budget Committee), and Robert 
Packwood (ranking member of the Senate Finance Subcommittee on Taxation).  For presentation 
here, I only present members with at least 10 mentions during the year in question.  
Figure 5.3: Number of Mentions of Members of Congress on Taxation in The Washington 
Post, 1977-1980 
 
Figure 5.3a. 1977     Figure 5.3b. 1978 
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Figure 5.3c. 1979     Figure 5.3d. 1980 
   
 
As we can see from Figure 5.3, discussion of taxation in The Washington Post is 
dominated by Russell Long and Al Ullman, the chairs of the Senate and House tax-writing 
committees.  Long and Ullman together, combined for 24% of member mentions (108 out of 
459) in 1977, and 23% of discussion (138 of 596 mentions) in 1978.  The two overwhelmingly 
dominated all other discussion of taxation in that period.  Other Democrats appear at various 
levels, though the most consistent actor involved outside of Long and Ullman is Senate Majority 
Leader Robert Byrd.  By 1980, however, the control Long and Ullman had over discussion began 
to slip.  The two together only accounted for 16% (80 of 249) of total discussion, with others, 
including Kemp and Roth, beginning to take control.  There is at least some evidence that the 
power of Long and Ullman had waned by this point, but how did Kemp and Roth move from 
being on the outside of discussion to the center, despite the control of Democratic policy leaders?  
The answer lies in Kemp’s focus on creating his own salience on the issue of taxation, through 
bill introductions and coverage.  While the results of Kemp tax cut focus would not move policy 
before 1980, they would do two important things that would have ramifications in 1981.  First, 
Kemp’s focus on tax cuts would make him the Republican face of taxation by the time 
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presidential considerations were being made for 1980.  Second, and relatedly, the focus on tax 
cuts would also draw the attention of a former Republican governor looking for an economic 
focus  
Increasing Coverage and Winning the Republican Party 
Despite the long odds against passage of his tax cut, Jack Kemp did not give up on the 
bill.  In fact, he would use the tax cut bill as his way into the conversation on taxation.  While 
this conversation at the top was dominated by Russell Long and Al Ullman, Kemp still carved 
out an important niche in tax coverage, receiving more coverage from national sources while 
gaining support from within the Republican Party.   
One way that Kemp kept his name near the news was simply persistence on the issue of 
taxation.  He reintroduced the Tax Reduction Act multiple times in the 95th Congress, keeping 
his name involved in taxation while building interest in his plan.  In total, Kemp introduced 11 
tax reduction bills in the 95th Congress, and 16 bills related to taxation.  For comparison 
purposes, in Figure 5.4, I present the total number of tax bills introduced by members in the 95th 
Congress, using data from the Congressional Bills Project administered by Scott E. Adler and 
John Wilkerson.  I identified tax bills by using the Policy Agendas Project topic code for taxation 
(107).  For readability purposes, I only present members who introduced over 5 bills in the 
Congress. As in Figure 5.3, I present policy leaders using capitalization.   
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Figure 5.4: Taxation Bill Introductions, 95th Congress 
 
 
As we can see from Figure 5.4, Republicans in general were among the top introducers of 
bills in the 95th Congress.  The reasons here are twofold: first, Democrats, and in particular 
Democratic leaders, would not need to introduce a bill more than once, as leaders would be able 
to guide their bills to the floor with fewer problems than other members because of their agenda 
control.  Second, bill introductions can act as a position-taking measure, letting others know 
one’s position on a specific issue (Mayhew 1974).  Republicans, as the minority party, would 
need to be doing more signaling in an attempt to let policy makers and the public know the 
available alternatives for future elections.  Looking at the totals, at the top, unsurprisingly, is 
Barber Conable, the Republican ranking member on Ways & Means.  The ranking member, as 
the policy leader for Republicans on the issue of taxation, would be front and center in any 
discussion of taxation.  In second is Jack Kemp, staking a claim for being on the forefront of 
Republican thoughts on taxation. Kemp’s persistence kept him a part of the taxation discussion.  
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However, bill introductions alone do not explain activity, as members of Congress 
introduce bills all the time.  Would the policy translate into media coverage? While Kemp and 
Roth’s tax bill did not receive large amounts of coverage relative to the coverage of the two 
policy leaders, Long and Ullman, it did break through in terms of coverage of the Republican 
Party on taxation.  In Figure 5.5, I graph mentions of Republicans on taxation in The Washington 
Post each year between 1977 and 1980, work similar to Figure 5.3.  As in other graphs, leaders 
are denoted with capitalized names.  For space, I only include members who have at least 5 
mentions in the year in question. 
Figure 5.5: Number of Mentions of Republicans on Taxation in The Washington Post, 1977-
1980 
 
Figure 5.5a. 1977     Figure 5.5b. 1978 
   
 
 
Figure 5.5c. 1979     Figure 5.5d. 1980 
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Four members of Congress appear at the top of the mentions lists all four years: policy 
leaders Barber Conable, Robert Packwood, and Robert Dole, and Senator William Roth.  Jack 
Kemp appears on two, 1978 and 1980.  In 1977, the leader on tax discussion is Dole, a future 
ranking member and chair of the Senate Finance Committee, who had sponsored a bill with 
Republican Congressman Robert Daniel of Virginia on getting tax refunds for specific 
individuals following the passage of the 1976 tax bill.  Roth is 2nd, though most of the discussion 
here focused on energy and tuition tax breaks versus the Kemp-Roth bill (Kemp himself is 
mentioned once in 1977, as the sponsor of Kemp-Roth in the House).  In 1978, William Steiger 
takes center stage, pushing for a capital gains tax cut, while Roth and Kemp both make 
appearances discussing tax cuts and attempts to pass the Kemp-Roth bill.  In 1979, as the amount 
of discussion on taxation decreases following passage of energy taxes, leadership dominates 
again, with Barber Conable and Robert Dole being the primary actors involved in taxes for the 
Republicans.  However, in 1980, Kemp and Roth again become a primary focal point of tax 
discussion, with only Dole competing with them on the discussion.  By 1980, Kemp and Roth 
had emerged as a force on taxation in the Republican Party. 
Republicans had been won over by the tax cut.  Due in part to the push of the intellectual 
elite, the Republican National Committee had endorsed the plan in September of 1977 (“Rise of 
Kemp” 1978).  In addition, House Minority Leader John Rhodes made the tax cut a centerpiece 
of Republican attacks on Democrats, noting “Starting here and now, Republicans intend to make 
sure that the American voter knows which party seeks a real tax cut and which party . . . really 
wants to continue a policy (of) high taxes” (Russell 1978).  The Republican Congress, with some 
exceptions, united behind the tax cut.   
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Congressional Republicans were not the only ones noticing the tax cut.  Jack Kemp had 
also attracted the attention of Ronald Reagan, the former governor of California who had nearly 
defeated President Ford at the 1976 Republican National Convention.  Reagan was thinking 
toward the 1980 presidential election and a matchup with President Jimmy Carter, and having 
seen the success of tax cuts in Proposition 13, began to warm to Kemp’s call for cutting taxes. 
The Reagan revolution would put taxation front and center at the 1980 Republican National 
Convention.  In Figure 5.6, I present party platform data on the number of quasi-sentences (or 
phrases) related to taxation within the party platforms of the Republican Party from 1948-2008.  
The party platform data was compiled and coded by Christina Wohlbrecht at the University of 
Notre Dame.  I used the Comparative Agendas Project code number for taxation (107) to find 
statements on taxation.  I present these in two forms: the raw number of quasi-sentences and the 
percent of the total platform that discusses taxation.  In addition, I include a vertical line for 
1980, the year Ronald Reagan embraced Jack Kemp’s tax plan.  
Figure 5.6: Discussion of Taxation in Republican Party Platforms, 1948-2008 
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One important factor to note here in Figure 5.6 is that the total percent taxation 
encompasses in any platform is small.  This is unsurprising, considering the vast number of 
issues that a party has to discuss in any platform, from national defense to agriculture.  
Therefore, devoting even a few percentage points to taxation is devoting a significant amount of 
time to an issue area.  From what we see here, the number of quasi-sentences and the percent of 
the platform discussing taxation, increased starting in 1972, culminating in a jump of 26 
mentions (from 18 to 44) between 1976 and 1980, an increase of 1% of the total platform (from 
about 2% of the platform to 3%).   The Republican Party had been looking for a way to talk 
about taxation, and Kemp offered the solution to their problem of how to discuss the subject.   
By 1980, Reagan had fully embraced Jack Kemp’s vision for taxation.  Kemp’s backers, 
such as Jude Wanniski, had wanted Kemp himself to run for president primarily focusing on the 
tax cut plan (Stockman 1985).  Rather than run for president, Kemp instead decided to convince 
a viable presidential candidate that his tax cut idea was the way to go.  Reagan came on board as 
a tax cutter, calling for tax cuts as part of his larger message to the American people.  With a 
faltering economy and a crisis in Iran, the Reagan Revolution steamrolled its way to the White 
House, bringing along with it the possibility that tax cuts could actually happen in the new 97th 
Congress.  
1981: Kemp’s Victory on ERTA 
The election of Ronald Reagan was not the only event that would reshape the United 
States government.  Two other electoral events had drastically shifted the leadership on the 
Democratic side of Congress.  First, Republicans took control of the Senate for the first time 
since 1954, as Republicans gained 12 seats and lost none to bring their total to 53 to the 
Democrats’ 46.  Russell Long lost the chairmanship of the Senate Finance Committee, as 
131 
 
Republican Robert Dole took control of the tax-writing committee.  On the House side, while the 
Republicans did not gain control of the body, they did pick up 34 seats, including the seat of 
Ways & Means Chair Al Ullman, who lost his re-election bid.  In Ullman’s place at Ways & 
Means came Dan Rostenkowski, an Illinois Democrat who had given up his shot at party 
leadership to chair the tax-writing committee.  Kemp had also gained more allies in the House, 
with recent elections bringing to the body new members with an interest in supply side 
economics, including Richard Cheney of Wyoming (he of the original Laffer-Wanniski 
meeting), Democrat Phil Gramm of Texas, and Georgia Republican Newt Gingrich.  All three 
would be central to the movement of tax cuts in the House of Representatives.  
The Republicans had reason to believe tax cuts would happen quickly.  The Senate was 
on board immediately.  While Robert Dole had not been as warm at the outset on the economic 
benefits of cutting taxes, he quickly joined ranks behind the Reagan administration, calling for 
immediate tax cuts at the start of the 97th Congress (Atkinson 1981), and threatened to start 
working on tax writing in the Finance Committee first, a move that traditionally had been given 
to the House Ways & Means Committee.  The Senate, now in Republican hands, would not be an 
issue for the tax cutters.    
With Republicans now controlling two of the three main electoral bodies of the United 
States government, Kemp’s desired tax cut would now receive more consideration. .  However, 
the Democrats still controlled the House.  Would Rostenkowski be as powerful as Ullman and 
keep tax cuts from reaching the floor?  Democratic leaders were not as sold on the need for tax 
cuts, with Senate Minority Whip Alan Cranston noting that the tax cuts were geared toward 
people with higher income brackets, and assumed “They must just buy more fur coats and 
Cadillacs” (Dewar 1981).  However, the Democratic rank and file of the House was more 
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receptive to the possibility of cutting taxes.  The Democratic Boll Weevils, a group of 
conservative Southern Democrats in the House, wanted more control of the party apparatus and 
started seeing their members get committee assignments, beginning with Texan Kent Hance 
getting on Ways & Means.  While the Boll Weevils were primarily focused on cuts to the 
budget, they were at least somewhat open to the idea of tax cuts (Pine 1981).  The control of the 
Senate and the presidency, coupled with the dissension in the Democratic ranks, which gave the 
Republicans an opportunity for movement on taxes in the House. 
Furthermore, the Reagan election had weakened Democratic resolve to stop tax cuts.  The 
Washington Post noted in February of 1981 that the Democratic plan in general was not to stop a 
tax cut, but to make it a shorter-term tax cut, as Democrats did not want to come off as 
obstructionists in the aftermath of the Reagan’s victory (Atkinson and Lescaze 1981).  Therefore, 
the Democrats were starting their negotiating not from a place of no tax cuts, but rather a place 
of minimal tax cuts.  Jack Kemp, Jude Wanniski, and Arthur Laffer had already won.  Their tax 
cut idea had moved from the fringes of Republican thought on taxes in the mid-1970s to the 
forefront of a victorious presidential campaign in 1981, all by becoming the primary solution to 
the problem of taxes within the Republican Party.  Policy change would simply be a formality to 
the mantra that had emanated in the Republican Party.  The combination of Kemp’s persistence 
and the opportunity created by appealing to Republican leaders (including Ronald Reagan) had 
led the Republican Party away from the era of Whip Inflation Now, and into the tax cut era.   
Importantly, Kemp led the Republican Party despite never being the primary story on 
taxation.  Even in 1981, Jack Kemp did not dominate national discussion.  In Figure 5.7, I 
present the total number of mentions of members of Congress on taxation in the year 1981, using 
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the same format as Figures 5.3 and 5.5.  For reference, policy leaders are represented in capital 
letters.  For ease in reading I only present members with at least 10 mentions in 1981.  
Figure 5.7: Number of Mentions of Members of Congress on Taxation, 1981 
 
As in Figure 5.3, leadership dominates.  Robert Dole and Dan Rostenkowski are the two 
most mentioned members of Congress on taxation in 1981, similar to the statuses of Russell 
Long and Al Ullman between 1977 and 1980.  Many of the other individuals involved are also 
leaders, whether of the policy leader variety (such as Budget Chair James Jones and Ways & 
Means Ranking Member Barber Conable) or the party variety (such as House Speaker Thomas 
P. “Tip” O’Neill and Senate Majority Leader Howard Baker).  Right there in the mix is Jack 
Kemp, a member of Congress with no formal tax control (though at this point he had received a 
seat on the House Budget Committee following the 1980 elections).  Kemp may not have 
dominated discussion, but the difference between 1977-1980 and 1981 was that the shifts 
following the 1980 elections had made his plan more palatable.  By working Congress, 
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connecting to Ronald Reagan, and riding Reagan’s coattails to victory, Kemp had linked tax cuts 
to a winning president, and would now be able to see the fruits of his labor.  
Those fruits came to bear on August 13, 1981, when President Ronald Reagan signed the 
Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA).  ERTA, or H.R. 4242, had been introduced by 
Rostenkowski weeks earlier, after months of committee debate and discussion.  Central to the 
bill was the tax cut, which the Office of Tax Analysis later noted was “by far the biggest tax 
change (and the biggest tax cut) over the past 35 years” (Tempalski 2006).  While the bill only 
cut taxes by 23% on average (and 20%, from 70% to 50% for the highest earning bracket), Kemp 
had succeeded in cutting taxes.  Kemp’s win was short-lived, as some of these cuts were 
removed and taxes were increased the following year with the Tax Equity and Fiscal 
Responsibility Act of 1982. However, the ramifications of Kemp’s movement would be felt in 
the Republican Party long after the passage of ERTA.  Recalling Figure 5.6, discussion of 
taxation encompassed 5% of the 2008 Republican Platform.  Jack Kemp, using opportunity and 
persistence, changed Congressional policy on taxation despite not ever serving (let alone 
chairing) the primary tax-writing committees of Congress.  
The Era of Tax Cuts: Discussion Control and Leadership Response 
With the story of Kemp in mind, it is important to see how general trends look during the 
period.  I will focus on analysis related to Hypothesis 1 in Chapter 3, looking at the relationship 
between members of Congress and articles.  Considering the high levels of salience already 
present in taxation, I assume that policy leadership is generally involved in taxation, and would 
not need to be prodded by other members of Congress to become involved in taxes.  Figures 5.3 
and 5.7 show support for this notion, as each set of mention totals by year is dominated by policy 
leadership, in particular the chairs of the primary tax writing committees.  Therefore, my analysis 
135 
 
will only focus on the question of the relationship between members of Congress and the number 
of articles written on taxation.  
My general expectations here are different than those in Chapter 3.  As salience on 
taxation is always high, members of Congress should not be using salience as a subsidy in the 
same way members of Congress use salience with lower attention issues.  On the other hand, 
members should be attempting to create their own salience on the issue, attempting to 
differentiate themselves from what leadership is doing.  Members see activity in Congress, and 
react by engaging in discussion.  This in turn leads to more coverage of the issue and gives 
individual members the chance to engage with their own specific viewpoints.  
 From an individual standpoint, we see this throughout the series.  Just as Jack Kemp 
pushed to make a place for tax cuts, so too did others.  William Steiger made capital gains tax 
cuts his issue before his death in 1978.  Later in the process, Democrats would become involved, 
with Richard Gephardt and Bill Bradley pushing for tax reform, a movement that would 
eventually lead to the passage of the Tax Reform Act of 1986.  We should expect that member 
involvement should increase the number of articles, in that if members are doing things outside 
of normal expectations on taxes, then the media may be more prone to want to pick up on that 
later.  
My level of analysis, as noted before, is at the level of weekly articles on tax law and 
income taxes in The Washington Post.  My data encompasses the period 1977-1986, giving a 
total of 520 weeks (minus 4 due to lag usage in the analysis, for a total N of 516).  I use a smaller 
period here, versus analysis in Chapter 3, due to the sheer number of articles involved.  Also, a 
weekly level is closer to the speed of reaction to news than a monthly level, allowing for more 
fruitful study of how the back and forth relationship works.  
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Unlike the work in Chapter 3, I am only working with 10 years of data.  While I may lose 
some period dynamics by not focusing on an entire 36 year period, the large number of articles 
on taxation from week to week allows me to look more closely at the time-based dynamics at 
work in the relationship between the number of members of Congress and the number of articles 
on a subject. I also assume that coverage of taxation is constantly high.  Considering the 
Republican Party would make taxation a central focus of their economic platform (Smith 2009), 
discussion of taxation should remain relatively high throughout the following 26 years.  
As in Chapter 3, I use OLS cross-lag models to account for the chance that articles at past 
times may be affecting member involvement in the present, and that member involvement may 
be affecting the number of articles written on a subject.  As I am working at the weekly level, I 
can now employ more cross lags in order to see whether recent past reverberations have an effect 
on current coverage of taxation.  Therefore, I employ 4 cross lags in the model, creating a model 
of multiple cross-lags, as seen below.  
 
Articlest = B0 + B1 * Articlest-1 + B2 * Articlest-2 + B3 * Articlest-3 + Articlest-4 + Memberst-1 + 
Memberst-2 + Memberst-3 + Memberst-4 + e  
Memberst = B0 + B1 * Articlest-1 + B2 * Articlest-2 + B3 * Articlest-3 + Articlest-4 + Memberst-1 + 
Memberst-2 + Memberst-3 + Memberst-4 + e  
 
As before, I employ robust standard errors in the model.  In Table 5.1, I present results of 
the regression, using a 0.05 threshold for significance. 
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Table 5.1: Results, Cross-Lag Analysis of Members of Congress Involvement and Number 
of Articles, Taxation 
 
 Number of Members Number of Articles 
Articles(t-1)  0.05 (0.05) 0.28 (0.07)* 
Articles(t-2) 0.05 (0.05) 0.22 (0.05)* 
Articles(t-3) -0.08 (0.05) 0.00 (0.01) 
Articles(t-4) -0.04 (0.05) 0.03 (0.05) 
Members (t-1) 0.44 (0.07)* 0.20 (0.07)* 
Members (t-2) -0.06 (0.06) -0.19 (0.07)* 
Members (t-3) 0.14 (0.07)* 0.09 (0.07) 
Members (t-4) 0.11 (0.06)* -0.03 (0.06) 
Constant 3.17 (0.84)* 7.42 (0.93)* 
N 516 516 
R2  0.28 0.24 
F 7.90 (0.00) 14.71 (0.00) 
Note: Robust standard errors used. Significance * = p < 0.05 
 
As we can see from Table 5.1, there is support for my expectations on the direction of 
movement.  In both cases, previous activity by a group does explain future activity by a group-  
past involvement by members of Congress leads to more involvement in the present, and past 
articles leads to more articles in the present.  As for the cross-lags, there is evidence that more 
member of Congress involvement in an issue in the past leads to more articles in the present, 
though this effect seems to last only for one week before going in the reverse direction.  
Members of Congress only have a limited amount of time to impress the media. With such a 
large amount of coverage already, taxation is an issue where you have to stand out and continue 
to stand out to succeed.  On the other hand, more articles does not lead to more members of 
Congress becoming involved in an issue.  As noted previously, there are already numerous 
members of Congress involved in taxation.  They already know the stakes of taxation, and an 
increase in the number of articles written in the past on the subject will not move members of 
Congress to become involved in the present.  
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Discussion 
We have seen that members of Congress can even move policy on issues that have 
consistently high amounts of salience.  Jack Kemp entered 1977 as part of a House minority 
fighting for an issue the majority wanted no part of, in an issue people already knew significant 
amounts about.  Kemp focused on creating salience directed toward his bill, found a coalition 
willing to help him push for his idea, and eventually won out due to perseverance and the 
opportunity presented by the election of Ronald Reagan.  By becoming the Republican standard-
bearer for taxation (despite not being a member of the Ways & Means Committee), Jack Kemp 
changed public policy on an issue area with consistently high salience.  
What does this tell us about the larger story of the use of salience as a subsidy?  Simply, 
salience will be used differently depending on the issue area.  Taxation is an area that receives 
extensive coverage from the media, as demonstrated by an average of 2 articles a day in The 
Washington Post on the subject of taxation.  All members of Congress know the story and the 
players, so members of Congress who wish to break into a high-salience area either have to join 
the system (as with policy leaders), or do all they can to break the system (as with Kemp’s 
continuous introduction of tax bills).   
In terms of modern connection, Jack Kemp’s push on taxation is similar to the House 
Republicans’ repeated introduction of bills overturning the Affordable Care Act between 2011 
and 2016.  While Republicans controlled the House in the entire period, there was no hope that 
the bill would be signed by President Barack Obama, the individual behind the Affordable Care 
Act, yet they voted time and again to repeal the law.  Jack Kemp’s continued introduction of bills 
can be seen in this light: a repeated call to action that signals a desire for change.  That being 
said, persistence is only part of the story - opportunity (and in particular, Kemp’s relationship 
with Ronald Reagan) which brought tax cuts across the finish line. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
Introduction 
Over the course of this dissertation, I have set out to show three things: first, the role 
issue salience plays in the considerations of members of Congress in terms of issue engagement; 
second, the relationship between members of Congress and the political media; and finally, how 
the relationship between members of Congress and the political media influences the reshaping 
of American public policy.  In this final chapter, I will outline how I have explored these three 
relationships, as well as potential future analysis related to this work.  My larger story is one of 
the relationship between one of the three primary branches of government, the United States 
Congress, and the political media, and how this relationship influences American public policy.  
I focus on how members of Congress are using increases in issue attention to attempt to reshape 
public policy, hoping to use the opportunity created by increased attention to usurp the control 
policy leadership normally has over public policy.  By doing so, I have highlighted an avenue 
members of Congress can use to reshape public policy without having to go through the long 
process of gaining committee seniority.  It is a method that comes with only a small chance of 
success when a member competes with the 534 other members of Congress, yet in some cases it 
can be highly effective in bringing about real policy change.   
Members of Congress and Issue Salience 
At the beginning of this work, I argued that members of Congress view changes in issue 
salience as a subsidy, in that changes in salience alert members that an issue may be particularly 
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important.  These changes let members know when involvement in an issue area will best 
maximize exposure to the general public.  As we saw in Chapter 3, the number of articles on a 
subject led members of Congress to become involved in an issue area, as members acted on 
previous month interest from the media to engaged at higher rates in the current month.  For 
leadership, this meant engaging in policy debate when, under normal circumstances, leadership 
would want to avoid involvement.  Leadership engages in the issue area in the media in order to 
protect their control of the issue from other members who may try to shift the policy debate.   
Members of Congress may be reacting to issue salience, but the presence of a reaction 
depends on actual movement in issue attention.  When salience is consistently high on an issue, 
there is no signal alerting members of Congress to an issue’s importance.  Members already 
know that an issue is important.  Instead, members must carve out their own niche on a subject, 
in an attempt to alert the political media to the importance of a specific issue.  As seen in Chapter 
5, a member of Congress, like Jack Kemp, could never expect to immediately enact tax cuts, as 
most members of Congress already knew of the importance of taxation, and were generally 
disposed against Kemp’s plan.  However, Kemp could carve out a niche, alerting the media to 
the importance of his plan.  The cross-lag model in Chapter 5 is a reverse of the model in 
Chapter 3: large amounts of salience means that members are not acting on increases in articles.  
Rather, the political media acts on increases in member involvement, moving to see what these 
members are up to in terms of highly salient issues.  Kemp used this to make his policy well 
known within Republican circles, which in turn led to the support of Reagan and the passage of 
the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981.  
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The Relationship between Congress and the Media 
Related to the question of how issue salience plays a role in member of Congress 
engagement on issues, is the relationship between members of Congress and the media.  
Members of Congress alone do not have the power that other political actors have over media.  
Unlike the other two branches of government, the daily actions of members of Congress cannot 
always bring about media attention.  The singular president and the nine Supreme Court justices 
can demand attention more easily than the 535 members of Congress.  Therefore, members of 
Congress have a different relationship with the media versus members of the other two branches 
of government.  Journalists will cover the activities of the president and Supreme Court justices 
without prodding.  Members of Congress, unlike the other two groups, need to work harder to 
gain attention to their efforts.   
As we have seen here, members of Congress and journalists can see the benefit in 
working with each other.  The efforts of members of both bodies can be seen throughout, from 
the relationship between articles and members in Chapters 3 and 5 to the individual stories of 
involvement in Chapter 4.  The very nature of member of Congress coverage suggests that this is 
happening: members of Congress see journalists acting on issues, and respond by engaging in 
issues with journalists.  The nature of member involvement does not simply involve quotation.  
The use of commentary by journalists can link an individual member to an issue simply as the 
result of a comment or a Congressional action.  The two groups see the other in action, and look 
to respond, hoping to maximize each other’s benefits for their own gain.  
Reshaping Public Policy 
Finally, the reasons we see these movements by members are laid out in terms of 
attempts to change public policy.  Some members of Congress do not agree with the current 
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conception of public policy in a given issue area.  Therefore, given the opportunity increases in 
salience offer in terms of public and media exposure, members of Congress act and engage in 
issues in an attempt to push their policy solution to the front of the consciousness on that public 
policy.  As we have seen in Chapter 3, there is evidence that members of Congress engage in 
issues when salience on issues increases, but how does this translate into policy change?  For 
some members, like Richard Lugar of Indiana, policy change came through following the normal 
pathway of building to the policy leader role, with some early signaling to let others know that 
policy change would come with ascendancy.  For others, such as Edward Markey of 
Massachusetts, coalition building and acting on increases in issue salience led to policy change, 
as policy leaders, threatened by the incursion from other members of Congress, attempted to 
immediately compromise.  Finally, even in cases of high salience, the potential for policy change 
remains possible, especially if members of Congress can attach themselves to the right people at 
the right time (as Jack Kemp did with Ronald Reagan).  
That being said, policy change is not an easy process.  Members of Congress do not 
simply bring about policy change automatically, and as we have seen in agricultural subsidies, a 
policy change in one time period can be reversed when new leadership crafts their own policy.  
The reality is that members are constantly competing with one another to maximize attention.  
The use of salience as a subsidy does not require the time and effort the committee path requires.  
While the possibility of success is low, the potential for success at a lower cost makes the 
subsidy path an intriguing possibility for members of Congress who wish to move policy 
quickly. 
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Moving Forward 
The work here is simply an initial examination into the relationship between members of 
Congress and the media.  There are other avenues that may offer additional insight into how 
members of Congress use issue salience.  A first option is exploring the characteristics that 
explain what types of members of Congress engage in specific issue areas.  Are members of 
Congress engaging in issues members of committees that have formal policy control over these 
issue areas?  Or are these members considering potential higher office?  The second question is 
significantly more daunting because of the nature of ambition (especially considering members 
of Congress are generally ambitious), but considering previous work on Congressional activity 
from ambitious members of Congress (Victor 2013), there is the potential that members use 
issues to help build a national name.  While exploring pure motivation may not be viable, 
exploring post-hoc motivation can at least give some insight into how members who do 
eventually seek higher office use increases in issue salience to their advantage.  
Second, there is the question of how the relationship between members of Congress and 
the media works when the media’s role is more pronounced.  Television news, unlike 
newspaper-based news, involves decisions made by news producers that may determine the 
types of individuals that receive interviews (Shoub, Tyner, and Lovett 2016).  As a result, the 
choice to interview a member of Congress is not based on the decision of journalistic 
connections, but rather what would make for the best possible story.  Therefore, we can assume 
that under normal circumstances, policy leaders should be generally given deference versus other 
members of Congress, as news producers are likely looking first to the members with the most 
expertise on an issue area.  Under what circumstances would we expect non-leaders to be 
allowed to engage in these issue areas? This question would also allow a fuller understanding of 
the role journalists and news producers play in the process, as the creators of the news would be 
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deciding which individuals to include in the process.  Are news producers more likely to pick 
non-leaders on issues as issue salience increases?  Newly produced data, such as that created by 
the Chapel Hill American Media Project (CHAMP) would allow a more full exploration of how 
members of Congress can potentially affect television news.  
Third, there is the question of easy versus hard issues.  Borrowing from the work of 
Carmines and Stimson (1980) should we expect differences based on the ease in the public 
offering an opinion on an issue?  One would expect that members may want to be more involved 
in easy issues, in that they will likely lead to the most media coverage easily understood by 
constituents and individuals whom ambitious members may want to reach, however hard issues 
also offer their own advantages, especially for members of Congress who regularly deal with 
more technocratic issues due to the nature of their districts.  Does involvement vary significantly 
between easy and hard issues over time?    
Finally, one possible mode of discovery for analysis would be field work, in particular 
interviews with members of Congress, their staff, and journalists.  To what extent are members 
of Congress truly “co-authors of the news”?  How do members of Congress use changes in issue 
salience when deciding whether or not to engage in issue areas?  Field work focusing on how 
members of Congress use the media to their advantage would enlighten us further on both the 
relationship between members of Congress and the media, as well as how members of Congress 
use issue attention when deciding when and how to become involved in public policy.  
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Appendix 1: Search Terms Used to Find Issues in Lexis-Nexis 
Agricultural Subsidies 
All Stories 
SUBJECT(AGRICULTURAL SUBSIDIES 9*%) OR SUBJECT(AGRICULTURAL 
SUBSIDIES 85%) OR SUBJECT(AGRICULTURAL SUBSIDIES 86%)  OR 
SUBJECT(AGRICULTURAL SUBSIDIES 87%)  OR SUBJECT(AGRICULTURAL 
SUBSIDIES 88%) OR SUBJECT(AGRICULTURAL SUBSIDIES 89%)  
 
Stories Related to Members of Congress 
SUBJECT(AGRICULTURAL SUBSIDIES 9*%) OR SUBJECT(AGRICULTURAL 
SUBSIDIES 85%) OR SUBJECT(AGRICULTURAL SUBSIDIES 86%)  OR 
SUBJECT(AGRICULTURAL SUBSIDIES 87%)  OR SUBJECT(AGRICULTURAL 
SUBSIDIES 88%) OR SUBJECT(AGRICULTURAL SUBSIDIES 89%) AND BODY(Rep. w/p 
R) OR BODY(Rep. w/p D) OR BODY(Representative w/p R) OR BODY(Representative w/p 
D) OR BODY(Congressman w/p R) OR BODY(Congressman w/p D) OR 
BODY(Congresswoman w/p R) OR BODY(Congresswoman w/p D) OR BODY(leader w/p 
Majority) OR BODY(leader w/p Minority) OR BODY(leader w/p House) OR BODY(leader w/p 
Senate) OR BODY(speaker w/p House) OR BODY(chair! w/1 committee) OR BODY(Senat! 
w/p R) OR BODY(Senat! w/p D) OR BODY(Sen. w/p D) OR BODY(Sen. w/p R) OR 
BODY(chair! w/5 R) OR BODY(chair!  w/5 D) OR (whip w/1 majority) OR (whip w/1 
minority) 
 
 
Climate Change/Global Warming 
All Stories 
SUBJECT(Global Warming 9*%) OR SUBJECT(GLOBAL WARMING 85%) OR 
SUBJECT(GLOBAL WARMING 86%)  OR SUBJECT(GLOBAL WARMING 87%)  OR 
SUBJECT(GLOBAL WARMING 88%) OR SUBJECT(GLOBAL WARMING 89%)  OR 
SUBJECT(Climate Change 9*%) OR SUBJECT(CLIMATE CHANGE 85%) OR 
SUBJECT(CLIMATE CHANGE 86%)  OR SUBJECT(CLIMATE CHANGE 87%)  OR 
SUBJECT(CLIMATE CHANGE 88%) OR SUBJECT(CLIMATE CHANGE 89%)   
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Stories Related to Members of Congress 
SUBJECT(Global Warming 9*%) OR SUBJECT(GLOBAL WARMING 85%) OR 
SUBJECT(GLOBAL WARMING 86%)  OR SUBJECT(GLOBAL WARMING 87%)  OR 
SUBJECT(GLOBAL WARMING 88%) OR SUBJECT(GLOBAL WARMING 89%)  OR 
SUBJECT(Climate Change 9*%) OR SUBJECT(CLIMATE CHANGE 85%) OR 
SUBJECT(CLIMATE CHANGE 86%)  OR SUBJECT(CLIMATE CHANGE 87%)  OR 
SUBJECT(CLIMATE CHANGE 88%) OR SUBJECT(CLIMATE CHANGE 89%)  AND 
BODY(Rep. w/p R) OR BODY(Rep. w/p D) OR BODY(Representative w/p R) OR 
BODY(Representative w/p D) OR BODY(Congressman w/p R) OR BODY(Congressman w/p 
D) OR BODY(Congresswoman w/p R) OR BODY(Congresswoman w/p D) OR BODY(leader 
w/p Majority) OR BODY(leader w/p Minority) OR BODY(leader w/p House) OR BODY(leader 
w/p Senate) OR BODY(speaker w/p House) OR BODY(chair! w/1 committee) OR 
BODY(Senat! w/p R) OR BODY(Senat! w/p D) OR BODY(Sen. w/p D) OR BODY(Sen. w/p 
R) OR BODY(chair! w/5 R) OR BODY(chair! w/5 D) OR (whip w/1 majority) OR (whip w/1 
minority) 
 
 
Drug Policy 
All Stories 
SUBJECT(Drug Policy 9*%) OR SUBJECT(DRUG POLICY 85%) OR SUBJECT(DRUG 
POLICY 86%)  OR SUBJECT(DRUG POLICY 87%)  OR SUBJECT(DRUG POLICY 88%) 
OR SUBJECT(DRUG POLICY 89%)   AND NOT SUBJECT(Prescription Drug Policy 9*%) 
OR SUBJECT(Prescription Drug Policy 85%) OR SUBJECT(Prescription Drug Policy 86%)  
OR SUBJECT(Prescription Drug Policy 87%)  OR SUBJECT(Prescription Drug Policy 88%) 
OR SUBJECT(Prescription Drug Policy 89%)   
 
Stories Related to Members of Congress 
SUBJECT(Drug Policy 9*%) OR SUBJECT(DRUG POLICY 85%) OR SUBJECT(DRUG 
POLICY 86%)  OR SUBJECT(DRUG POLICY 87%)  OR SUBJECT(DRUG POLICY 88%) 
OR SUBJECT(DRUG POLICY 89%)  AND BODY(Rep. w/p R) OR BODY(Rep. w/p D) OR 
BODY(Representative w/p R) OR BODY(Representative w/p D) OR BODY(Congressman w/p 
R) OR BODY(Congressman w/p D) OR BODY(Congresswoman w/p R) OR 
BODY(Congresswoman w/p D) OR BODY(leader w/p Majority) OR BODY(leader w/p 
Minority) OR BODY(leader w/p House) OR BODY(leader w/p Senate) OR BODY(speaker w/p 
House) OR BODY(chair! w/1 committee) OR BODY(Senat! w/p R) OR BODY(Senat! w/p D) 
OR BODY(Sen. w/p D) OR BODY(Sen. w/p R) OR BODY(chair! w/5 R) OR BODY(chair! w/5 
D) OR (whip w/1 majority) OR (whip w/1 minority) AND NOT SUBJECT(Prescription Drug 
Policy 9*%) OR SUBJECT(Prescription Drug Policy 85%) OR SUBJECT(Prescription Drug 
Policy 86%)  OR SUBJECT(Prescription Drug Policy 87%)  OR SUBJECT(Prescription Drug 
Policy 88%) OR SUBJECT(Prescription Drug Policy 89%)   
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Gays & Lesbians 
All Stories 
SUBJECT(Gays & Lesbians 9*%) OR SUBJECT(GAYS & LESBIANS 85%) OR 
SUBJECT(GAYS & LESBIANS 86%)  OR SUBJECT(GAYS & LESBIANS 87%)  OR 
SUBJECT(GAYS & LESBIANS 88%) OR SUBJECT(GAYS & LESBIANS 89%)  
Stories Related to Members of Congress 
SUBJECT(Gays & Lesbians 9*%) OR SUBJECT(GAYS & LESBIANS 85%) OR 
SUBJECT(GAYS & LESBIANS 86%)  OR SUBJECT(GAYS & LESBIANS 87%)  OR 
SUBJECT(GAYS & LESBIANS 88%) OR SUBJECT(GAYS & LESBIANS 89%) AND 
BODY(Rep. w/p R) OR BODY(Rep. w/p D) OR BODY(Representative w/p R) OR 
BODY(Representative w/p D) OR BODY(Congressman w/p R) OR BODY(Congressman w/p 
D) OR BODY(Congresswoman w/p R) OR BODY(Congresswoman w/p D) OR BODY(leader 
w/p Majority) OR BODY(leader w/p Minority) OR BODY(leader w/p House) OR BODY(leader 
w/p Senate) OR BODY(speaker w/p House) OR BODY(chair! w/1 committee) OR 
BODY(Senat! w/p R) OR BODY(Senat! w/p D) OR BODY(Sen. w/p D) OR BODY(Sen. w/p 
R) OR BODY(chair! w/5 R) OR BODY(chair! w/5 D) OR (whip w/1 majority) OR (whip w/1 
minority) 
 
Immigration 
All Stories 
SUBJECT(Immigration 9*%) OR SUBJECT(IMMIGRATION 85%) OR 
SUBJECT(IMMIGRATION 86%)  OR SUBJECT(IMMIGRATION 87%)  OR 
SUBJECT(IMMIGRATION 88%) OR SUBJECT(IMMIGRATION 89%) 
Stories Related to Members of Congress 
SUBJECT(Immigration 9*%) OR SUBJECT(IMMIGRATION 85%) OR 
SUBJECT(IMMIGRATION 86%)  OR SUBJECT(IMMIGRATION 87%)  OR 
SUBJECT(IMMIGRATION 88%) OR SUBJECT(IMMIGRATION 89%) AND BODY(Rep. 
w/p R) OR BODY(Rep. w/p D) OR BODY(Representative w/p R) OR BODY(Representative 
w/p D) OR BODY(Congressman w/p R) OR BODY(Congressman w/p D) OR 
BODY(Congresswoman w/p R) OR BODY(Congresswoman w/p D) OR BODY(leader w/p 
Majority) OR BODY(leader w/p Minority) OR BODY(leader w/p House) OR BODY(leader w/p 
Senate) OR BODY(speaker w/p House) OR BODY(chair! w/1 committee) OR BODY(Senat! 
w/p R) OR BODY(Senat! w/p D) OR BODY(Sen. w/p D) OR BODY(Sen. w/p R) OR 
BODY(chair! w/5 R) OR BODY(chair! w/5 D) OR (whip w/1 majority) OR (whip w/1 minority) 
 
Income Assistance/Social Welfare 
All Stories 
SUBJECT(SOCIAL WELFARE 9*%) OR SUBJECT(SOCIAL WELFARE 85%) OR 
SUBJECT(SOCIAL WELFARE 86%)  OR SUBJECT(SOCIAL WELFARE 87%)  OR 
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SUBJECT(SOCIAL WELFARE 88%) OR SUBJECT(SOCIAL WELFARE 89%) OR 
SUBJECT(INCOME ASSISTANCE 9*%) OR SUBJECT(INCOME ASSISTANCE 85%) OR 
SUBJECT(INCOME ASSISTANCE 86%)  OR SUBJECT(INCOME ASSISTANCE 87%)  OR 
SUBJECT(INCOME ASSISTANCE 88%) OR SUBJECT(INCOME ASSISTANCE 89%) 
Stories Related to Members of Congress 
SUBJECT(SOCIAL WELFARE 9*%) OR SUBJECT(SOCIAL WELFARE 85%) OR 
SUBJECT(SOCIAL WELFARE 86%)  OR SUBJECT(SOCIAL WELFARE 87%)  OR 
SUBJECT(SOCIAL WELFARE 88%) OR SUBJECT(SOCIAL WELFARE 89%) OR 
SUBJECT(INCOME ASSISTANCE 9*%) OR SUBJECT(INCOME ASSISTANCE 85%) OR 
SUBJECT(INCOME ASSISTANCE 86%)  OR SUBJECT(INCOME ASSISTANCE 87%)  OR 
SUBJECT(INCOME ASSISTANCE 88%) OR SUBJECT(INCOME ASSISTANCE 89%) AND 
BODY(Rep. w/p R) OR BODY(Rep. w/p D) OR BODY(Representative w/p R) OR 
BODY(Representative w/p D) OR BODY(Congressman w/p R) OR BODY(Congressman w/p 
D) OR BODY(Congresswoman w/p R) OR BODY(Congresswoman w/p D) OR BODY(leader 
w/p Majority) OR BODY(leader w/p Minority) OR BODY(leader w/p House) OR BODY(leader 
w/p Senate) OR BODY(speaker w/p House) OR BODY(chair! w/1 committee) OR 
BODY(Senat! w/p R) OR BODY(Senat! w/p D) OR BODY(Sen. w/p D) OR BODY(Sen. w/p 
R) OR BODY(chair! w/5 R) OR BODY(chair! w/5 D) OR (whip w/1 majority) OR (whip w/1 
minority) 
 
NASA & Space Exploration 
All Stories 
SUBJECT(Space Exploration 9*%) OR SUBJECT(SPACE EXPLORATION 85%) OR 
SUBJECT(SPACE EXPLORATION 86%)  OR SUBJECT(SPACE EXPLORATION 87%)  OR 
SUBJECT(SPACE EXPLORATION 88%) OR SUBJECT(SPACE EXPLORATION 89%)  OR 
SUBJECT(Space & Aeronautics Agencies 9*%) OR SUBJECT(SPACE & AERONAUTICS 
AGENCIES 85%) OR SUBJECT(SPACE & AERONAUTICS AGENCIES 86%)  OR 
SUBJECT(SPACE & AERONAUTICS AGENCIES 87%)  OR SUBJECT(SPACE & 
AERONAUTICS AGENCIES 88%) OR SUBJECT(SPACE & AERONAUTICS AGENCIES 
89%)   
Stories Related to Members of Congress 
SUBJECT(Space Exploration 9*%) OR SUBJECT(SPACE EXPLORATION 85%) OR 
SUBJECT(SPACE EXPLORATION 86%)  OR SUBJECT(SPACE EXPLORATION 87%)  OR 
SUBJECT(SPACE EXPLORATION 88%) OR SUBJECT(SPACE EXPLORATION 89%)  OR 
SUBJECT(Space & Aeronautics Agencies 9*%) OR SUBJECT(SPACE & AERONAUTICS 
AGENCIES 85%) OR SUBJECT(SPACE & AERONAUTICS AGENCIES 86%)  OR 
SUBJECT(SPACE & AERONAUTICS AGENCIES 87%)  OR SUBJECT(SPACE & 
AERONAUTICS AGENCIES 88%) OR SUBJECT(SPACE & AERONAUTICS AGENCIES 
89%)  AND BODY(Rep. w/p R) OR BODY(Rep. w/p D) OR BODY(Representative w/p R) OR 
BODY(Representative w/p D) OR BODY(Congressman w/p R) OR BODY(Congressman w/p 
D) OR BODY(Congresswoman w/p R) OR BODY(Congresswoman w/p D) OR BODY(leader 
w/p Majority) OR BODY(leader w/p Minority) OR BODY(leader w/p House) OR BODY(leader 
w/p Senate) OR BODY(speaker w/p House) OR BODY(chair! w/1 committee) OR 
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BODY(Senat! w/p R) OR BODY(Senat! w/p D) OR BODY(Sen. w/p D) OR BODY(Sen. w/p 
R) OR BODY(chair! w/5 R) OR BODY(chair! w/5 D) OR (whip w/1 majority) OR (whip w/1 
minority) 
 
Nuclear Weapons 
All Stories 
SUBJECT(Nuclear Weapons 9*%) OR SUBJECT(NUCLEAR WEAPONS 85%) OR 
SUBJECT(NUCLEAR WEAPONS 86%)  OR SUBJECT(NUCLEAR WEAPONS 87%)  OR 
SUBJECT(NUCLEAR WEAPONS 88%) OR SUBJECT(NUCLEAR WEAPONS 89%) 
Stories Related to Members of Congress 
SUBJECT(Nuclear Weapons 9*%) OR SUBJECT(NUCLEAR WEAPONS 85%) OR 
SUBJECT(NUCLEAR WEAPONS 86%)  OR SUBJECT(NUCLEAR WEAPONS 87%)  OR 
SUBJECT(NUCLEAR WEAPONS 88%) OR SUBJECT(NUCLEAR WEAPONS 89%) AND 
BODY(Rep. w/p R) OR BODY(Rep. w/p D) OR BODY(Representative w/p R) OR 
BODY(Representative w/p D) OR BODY(Congressman w/p R) OR BODY(Congressman w/p 
D) OR BODY(Congresswoman w/p R) OR BODY(Congresswoman w/p D) OR BODY(leader 
w/p Majority) OR BODY(leader w/p Minority) OR BODY(leader w/p House) OR BODY(leader 
w/p Senate) OR BODY(speaker w/p House) OR BODY(chair! w/1 committee) OR 
BODY(Senat! w/p R) OR BODY(Senat! w/p D) OR BODY(Sen. w/p D) OR BODY(Sen. w/p 
R) OR BODY(chair! w/5 R) OR BODY(chair! w/5 D) OR (whip w/1 majority) OR (whip w/1 
minority) 
Oil & Gas Industry 
All Stories 
SUBJECT(Oil & Gas Industry 9*%) OR SUBJECT(OIL & GAS INDUSTRY 85%) OR 
SUBJECT(OIL & GAS INDUSTRY 86%)  OR SUBJECT(OIL & GAS INDUSTRY 87%)  OR 
SUBJECT(OIL & GAS INDUSTRY 88%) OR SUBJECT(OIL & GAS INDUSTRY 89%)   
Stories Related to Members of Congress 
SUBJECT(Oil & Gas Industry 9*%) OR SUBJECT(OIL & GAS INDUSTRY 85%) OR 
SUBJECT(OIL & GAS INDUSTRY 86%)  OR SUBJECT(OIL & GAS INDUSTRY 87%)  OR 
SUBJECT(OIL & GAS INDUSTRY 88%) OR SUBJECT(OIL & GAS INDUSTRY 89%)  AND 
BODY(Rep. w/p R) OR BODY(Rep. w/p D) OR BODY(Representative w/p R) OR 
BODY(Representative w/p D) OR BODY(Congressman w/p R) OR BODY(Congressman w/p 
D) OR BODY(Congresswoman w/p R) OR BODY(Congresswoman w/p D) OR BODY(leader 
w/p Majority) OR BODY(leader w/p Minority) OR BODY(leader w/p House) OR BODY(leader 
w/p Senate) OR BODY(speaker w/p House) OR BODY(chair! w/1 committee) OR 
BODY(Senat! w/p R) OR BODY(Senat! w/p D) OR BODY(Sen. w/p D) OR BODY(Sen. w/p 
R) OR BODY(chair! w/5 R) OR BODY(chair! w/5 D) OR (whip w/1 majority) OR (whip w/1 
minority) 
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Taxation 
All Stories 
SUBJECT(TAX LAW 9*%) OR SUBJECT(TAX LAW 85%) OR SUBJECT(TAX LAW 86%)  
OR SUBJECT(TAX LAW 87%)  OR SUBJECT(TAX LAW 88%) OR SUBJECT(TAX LAW 
89%) OR SUBJECT(INCOME TAX 9*%) OR SUBJECT(INCOME TAX 85%) OR 
SUBJECT(INCOME TAX 86%)  OR SUBJECT(INCOME TAX 87%)  OR 
SUBJECT(INCOME TAX 88%) OR SUBJECT(INCOME TAX 89%)   
Stories Related to Members of Congress 
SUBJECT(TAX LAW 9*%) OR SUBJECT(TAX LAW 85%) OR SUBJECT(TAX LAW 86%)  
OR SUBJECT(TAX LAW 87%)  OR SUBJECT(TAX LAW 88%) OR SUBJECT(TAX LAW 
89%) OR SUBJECT(INCOME TAX 9*%) OR SUBJECT(INCOME TAX 85%) OR 
SUBJECT(INCOME TAX 86%)  OR SUBJECT(INCOME TAX 87%)  OR 
SUBJECT(INCOME TAX 88%) OR SUBJECT(INCOME TAX 89%)  AND BODY(Rep. w/p 
R) OR BODY(Rep. w/p D) OR BODY(Representative w/p R) OR BODY(Representative w/p 
D) OR BODY(Congressman w/p R) OR BODY(Congressman w/p D) OR 
BODY(Congresswoman w/p R) OR BODY(Congresswoman w/p D) OR BODY(leader w/p 
Majority) OR BODY(leader w/p Minority) OR BODY(leader w/p House) OR BODY(leader w/p 
Senate) OR BODY(speaker w/p House) OR BODY(chair! w/1 committee) OR BODY(Senat! 
w/p R) OR BODY(Senat! w/p D) OR BODY(Sen. w/p D) OR BODY(Sen. w/p R) OR 
BODY(chair! w/5 R) OR BODY(chair!  w/5 D) OR (whip w/1 majority) OR (whip w/1 
minority) 
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Appendix 2: Committee Leaders Used to Define Leadership 
Using The Almanac of American Politics and CQ Researcher, I compiled a list of relevant 
committees for each of the eight issues that I felt I could reasonably assign leadership to.  In each 
case, I coded for the chairs and ranking members in each Congress.  Below, you can find a list of 
the committees and subcommittees I used for each of the eight issues.  
Agricultural Subsidies 
House 
House Agriculture Committee; House Appropriations Subcommittee on Agriculture 
Senate 
Senate Agriculture Committee; Senate Agriculture Subcommittee on Agricultural Production; 
Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Agriculture 
 
 
Climate Change 
House 
House Interior Committee, House Government Operations Subcommittee on Environment, 
House Energy Committee, House Energy and Environment Subcommittee, House Select 
Committee on Energy Independence and Global Warming 
Senate 
Senate Environment and Public Works Committee; Senate Environment Subcommittee on 
Environmental Pollution; Senate Environment Subcommittee on Clean Air 
 
 
Drug Policy 
House 
House Select Committee on Narcotics; House Government Reform Subcommittee on Drugs 
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Senate 
Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions; Senate Labor Subcommittee on 
Drugs; Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Drugs and Crime 
 
Immigration 
House 
House Judiciary Committee; House Judiciary Subcommittee on Immigration 
Senate 
Senate Judiciary Committee; Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Immigration 
 
Income Assistance 
House 
House Ways & Means Committee; House Ways & Means Subcommittee on Human Resources 
Senate 
Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions  
NASA 
House 
House Space, Science and Technology Committee; House Science Subcommittee on Space; 
House Appropriations Subcommittee related to space.   
Senate 
Senate Space, Science and Technology Committee; Senate Science Subcommittee on Space; 
Senate Appropriations Subcommittee related to space.   
 
Nuclear Weapons 
House 
House Armed Services Committee; House Armed Services Subcommittee on Nuclear 
Weapons/Strategic Forces; House Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense; House Foreign 
Relations/International Relations Committee; House Foreign Relations Subcommittee on 
Terrorism and Nonproliferation.  
Senate 
House Armed Services Committee; House Armed Services Subcommittee on Nuclear 
Weapons/Strategic Forces; Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Nuclear Stockpiles; Senate 
Government Operations Subcommittee on Nuclear Weapons; Senate Appropriations 
Subcommittee on Defense; Senate Foreign Affairs Committee; Senate Foreign Affairs 
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Subcommittee on European Affairs; Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Strategic and 
Theater Nuclear Forces 
Oil & Gas Industry 
House 
House Interior Committee, House Government Operations Subcommittee on Environment, 
House Energy Committee (pre-Energy Department), House Energy and Environment 
Subcommittee, House Commerce and Energy Committee; House Select Committee on Energy 
(95th Congress); House Appropriations Committee on Energy 
Senate 
Senate Energy; Senate Appropriations Energy 
 
Taxation 
House 
House Budget, House Ways & Means 
Senate 
Senate Budget; Senate Finance 
Joint 
Joint Committee on Taxation 
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Appendix 3: Leadership Engagement in Issue Areas, Non-
Leadership at Time t 
Table A.1: Leadership Engagement in Issue Areas, Non-Leadership at Time t 
Note: Fixed effects logistic regression generated by fitting random effects logistic regression and employing dummy 
variables for individual topics, with agricultural subsidies acting as the baseline case.   Topic significance is in terms 
of the difference between agricultural subsidies and the topic in question. Significance * = p < 0.0
 Model 1 Model 2  
Articles (t)  0.06 (0.01)* 0.09 (0.01)* 
Leadership Engagement (t-1) 0.65 (0.10)* 0.65 (0.10)* 
Non-Leadership Engagement 1.99 (0.11)* 2.50 (0.17)* 
Articles (t)  x Non-Leadership 
Engagement 
- -0.04 (0.01)* 
Climate Change & Global Warming -1.01 (0.20)* -1.00 (0.21)* 
Drug Policy -2.00 (0.22)* -2.03 (0.22)* 
Immigration -0.80 (0.19)* -0.85 (0.19)* 
Income Assistance & Social Welfare -0.63 (0.18)* -0.64 (0.19)* 
NASA & Space Exploration -0.17 (0.19) -0.35 (0.19) 
Nuclear Weapons -0.75 (0.20)* -0.81 (0.20)* 
Oil & Gas Industry -1.06 (0.19)* -1.12 (0.19)* 
Constant -2.21 (0.14)* -2.51 (0.17)* 
N 3,448 3,448 
LL -1514.92 -1506.95 
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Figure A.1: Predicted Effect of Salience on Leadership Engagement, Non-Leadert 
 
Figure A.1a. Agricultural Subsidies   Figure A.1b. Climate Change 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A.1c. Drug Policy    Figure A.1d. Immigration 
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Figure A.1e. Income Assistance   Figure A.1f. NASA & Space Exploration 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A.1g. Nuclear Weapons    Figure A.1h. Oil & Gas Industry 
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Figure A.2: Predicted Effect of Salience on Leadership Engagement, by Non-Leader 
Engagement 
 
Figure A.2a. Agricultural Subsidies   Figure A.2b. Climate Change 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A.2c. Drug Policy    Figure A.2d. Immigration 
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Figure A.2e. Income Assistance   Figure A.2f. NASA and Space Exploration 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A.2g. Nuclear Weapons   Figure A.2h. Oil & Gas Industry 
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Appendix 4: Leadership Engagement in Issue Areas, Salience>0 
Table A.2: Leadership Engagement in Issue Areas, Salience>0 
Note: Fixed effects logistic regression generated by fitting random effects logistic regression and employing dummy 
variables for individual issues, with agricultural subsidies acting as the baseline case.   Issue significance is in terms 
of the difference between agricultural subsidies and the issue in question. Significance * = p < 0.
 Model 1 Model 2  
Salience  0.08 (0.00)* 0.09 (0.01)* 
Leadership Engagement (t-1) 0.58 (0.10)* 0.58 (0.10)* 
Non-Leadership Engagement 0.33 (0.10)* 0.44 (0.15)* 
Salience x Non-Leadership Engagement - -0.01 (0.01) 
Climate Change -1.26 (0.19)* -1.26 (0.19)* 
Drug Policy -2.17 (0.21)* -2.17 (0.21)* 
Immigration -0.95 (0.18)* -0.96 (0.18)* 
Income Assistance -0.90 (0.17)* -0.90 (0.17)* 
NASA -1.10 (0.17)* -1.13 (0.17)* 
Nuclear Weapons -0.99 (0.19)* -1.00 (0.19)* 
Oil & Gas Industry -1.26 (0.18)* -1.27 (0.18)* 
Constant -1.05 (0.12)* -1.11 (0.14)* 
N 3,187 3,187 
LL -1659.29 -1658.85 
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